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I. INTRODUCTION 
Juan was seven years old when I met him and had been living on the streets 
of Caracas before the authorities institutionalized him.  I was volunteering in a 
public facility when a thin boy in a blue T-shirt motioned me aside, saying he had 
something to show me.  He told me his name was Juan as he began to pull some-
thing out from under his shirt.  At first, I was afraid he had drugs; what were re-
vealed instead were two worn notebooks.  He proudly opened the books, showing 
me line after line of misshapen letters and sentence fragments.  Without teachers 
or guidance, he was trying to teach himself to write by copying notices from the 
lobby bulletin board. 
“Help me out,” he said, “I want to learn.  I have two brothers who need my 
help.” 
Juan represents the large number of disenfranchised citizens in the region 
who want to provide for themselves and for their families. They want the ability to 
develop their own capacities and to seek their own personal fulfillment.1  This 
socio-economic exclusion is a systemic issue that contributes to the entrenchment 
of poverty and instability in the region.2  Millions of Latin American citizens are 
 ___________________________  
 1. AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 87 (Anchor, 2000) (“[P]overty must be seen as the 
deprivation of basic capabilities rather than merely as lowness of incomes.”). 
 2. Exclusion forces people to engage in “economic activities and social relations that keep them 
poor;” social exclusion and political marginality create “logjams of disadvantage.” THE CHRONIC 
POVERTY REPORT 2004-2005, v (2005), available at http://www.chronicpoverty.org/uploads 
/publication_files/CPR1_ReportFull.pdf (citing Arjan de Haan & Michael Lipton, Poverty in Emerging 
Asia: Progress, Setbacks, and Log-jams, 16 ASIAN DEVELOPMENT REV. 135 (1998)).  In Latin Ameri-
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born, live, and ultimately die without having the opportunities to achieve their 
potential;3 when these marginalized citizens find no options for a better life in 
Latin America, some continue their life as is. However, many create other options 
for themselves, most commonly through crime, revolution, or emigration to other 
countries.4  Capitalizing on the recurrent instability that results, caudillos— politi-
cal “strongmen”—have historically provided only temporary and unsustainable 
order based on populism or coercion.5  Even national constitutions are subject to 
instability; many Latin American countries have a history of changing constitu-
tions and writing new ones with relative frequency.6   
International bodies have attempted to provide a more sustainable response to 
instability through legal reform7 with an emphasis on rule of law,8 access to jus-
 ___________________________  
ca, poverty is a distributional problem enhanced by underlying “socio-economic structures [that] are 
deeply rooted in Latin America’s colonial past.”  Such structures involve the concentration of power 
among a few, to the exclusion of majorities.  In addition to socio-economic status, race and ethnicity 
are a strong basis for exclusion. Id. at 79.  The poor in Latin America are excluded from both public 
services and broader citizenship rights. Id. at 82.  Exclusion from services and rights may contribute to 
the persistence of poverty.  Even though efforts have been made for inclusion among Latin Americans, 
they have not been properly integrated into the socio-political systems.  This creates a de facto exclu-
sion, where being included does not necessarily bring about the benefits of inclusion. See Francis 
Fukuyama, The Latin American Experience, 19 J. DEMOCRACY 69, 71-72 (2008) (discussing how 
although there is more inclusion in programs such as public education, weak systems do not meet the 
demands placed on them; this increases cynicism among the poor who “see a system controlled by 
elites biased against them”). 
 3. Viviane Azevedo & César P. Bouillon, Social Mobility in Latin America: A Review of Existing 
Evidence (Inter-Am. Dev. Bank, Working Paper No. 689, 2009) (reviewing data and concluding that 
social mobility in Latin America is low, even relative to developed nations that have low social mobili-
ty, such as the United States and the United Kingdom). 
 4. See Magaly Sanchez R., Insecurity and Violence as a New Power Relation in Latin America, 606 
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 178, 179 (2006) (“As the urgency of circumstances facing 
middle- and working-class people increased, many turned to radical violence, leading to successive 
waves of strikes, demonstrations, and insurrections throughout the region.”). See, e.g., David Abel, 
Riots Erupt as Congress Barred from Venezuela Capital, BOS. GLOBE, Aug. 28, 1999, at A2; Clifford 
Krauss, Reeling from Riots, Argentina Declares a State of Siege, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2001, at A3; 
Costa Rican Labor Protest Turns Violent, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 28, 1996, at 11A; Emigration from 
Latin America: Making the Most of an Exodus, ECONOMIST, Feb. 21, 2002 [hereinafter Exodus]; 
World Watch—Peru: Workers Protest Nationwide over Food and Fuel Prices, WALL ST. J., July 10, 
2008, at A8; HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2009, at 24–25 (2009), available at 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_2009_EN_Complete.pdf [hereinafter UN Development Report]. 
 5. See JOHN LYNCH, CAUDILLOS IN SPANISH AMERICA, 1800–1850 (1992); Symposium, Challeng-
es to Fragile Democracies in the Americas: Legitimacy and Accountability, 36 TEX. INT’L L.J. 319, 
324 (2001) (comparing nineteenth century caudillos to modern Latin American leaders); Jorge J. Pozo, 
Bank Holiday: The Constitutionality of President Mahuad’s Freezing of Accounts and the Closing of 
Equador’s Banks, 15 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 61, 69–70 (2002); Miguel Schor, Constitutionalism Through 
the Looking Glass of Latin America, 41 TEX. INT’L L.J. 1, 3 (2006); Gabriel L. Negretto & Jose Anto-
nio Aguilar Rivera, Liberalism and Emergency Powers in Latin America: Reflections on Carl Schmitt 
and the Theory of Constitutional Dictatorship, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1797, 1798 (2000) (noting that 
the powers of Latin American presidents are not subject to any checks). 
 6. Only four countries have had 20 or more constitutions, all of them in Latin America: the Domin-
ican Republic (32), Venezuela (26), Haiti (24) and Ecuador (20); a large number of constitutions is 
almost always a reliable indicator of political instability. Jose Louis Cordiero, Latin America: Consti-
tution Crazy, LATIN BUS. CHRON., Oct. 6, 2008, available at http://www.latinbusinesschronicle.com/ 
app/article.aspx?id=2799. 
 7. See also, Amy J. Cohen, Thinking with Culture in Law and Development, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 511, 
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tice, and the use of alternative or appropriate9 dispute resolution (hereafter 
ADR).10  Yet, in the Latin America of yesterday and today, there is a marked gap 
between law on the books and law in action,11 due in part to lack of citizen en-
 ___________________________  
Neocultural interventionists reason that transplanted law and legal institutions stand outside cul-
ture and cannot achieve their intended effects without the ‘culture’ of law’s ordinary users. Cul-
ture thus appears as a tool to take law—formal and a cultural—and to translate it into something 
that is specific, local, embedded in individual consciousness, and hence powerful. 
 
Id. 
 8. Rule of law concerns “the supremacy of legal rules with respect to the order of human affairs, 
and providing standards for resolving disputes that inevitably arise—quintessential public ordering.”  
Rule of law is often used to speak of limits placed on political officials.  See Richard C. Reuben, ADR 
and the Rule of Law, 16 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 4, 4 (2010) [hereinafter Reuben, ADR and the Rule of 
Law]; see also Barry R. Weingast, The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law, 91 
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 245, 260 (1997) (writing that rule of law is a “phenomena requiring the political 
officials to respect limits on their own behavior”). 
 9. See DOUGLAS H. YARN, DICTIONARY OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 17-26 (1999) (distinguishing 
between the two uses of the acronym “ADR” as “Alternative Dispute Resolution” or “Appropriate 
Dispute Resolution”; “alternative” generally refers to methods of dispute resolution other than the 
court system, while “appropriate” includes litigation and emphasizes the selection of the method to 
match the dispute); see also LEONARD L . RISKIN ET. AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS 19-20 
(4th ed. 2009) (highlighting the role of the lawyer in assisting the client selecting the appropriate 
method for addressing the specific dispute). 
 10. Jean R. Sternlight, Is Alternative Dispute Resolution Consistent with the Rule of Law? Lessons 
from Abroad, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 569, 572-77 (2007) [hereinafter Sternlight, ADR Consistent] (dis-
cussing how efforts have been made by groups such as the United States Agency for International 
Development and the American Bar Association to promote rule of law through the international 
promotion of ADR).  For a comprehensive review of the USAID efforts in the region, see U.S. 
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, ACHIEVEMENTS IN BUILDING AND MAINTAINING THE 
RULE OF LAW 1–2 (2002), available at http://transition.usaid.gov/our_work/democracy_ 
and_governance/publications/pdfs/pnacr220.pdf [hereinafter ACHIEVEMENTS IN BUILDING AND 
MAINTAINING THE RULE OF LAW]. 
 11. “In order to evaluate the rule of law in a given country, it is necessary to look not only at the 
laws as written (de jure), but also at how they are actually implemented in practice and experienced by 
those who are subject to them (de facto). Unlike other indices, the WJP Rule of Law Index™ method-
ology focuses entirely on adherence to the rule of law in practice.” MARK AGRAST ET. AL., THE 
WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT RULE OF LAW INDEX 2011, at 118 (2011), available at 
http://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/wjproli2011_0.pdf.   
 
Latin America presents a picture of sharp contrasts. In spite of recent movements towards open-
ness and political freedoms that have positioned many countries at the forefront in protecting 
basic rights and liberties, the region’s public institutions remain fragile. Corruption and a lack of 
government accountability are still prevalent. Accordingly, the perception of impunity remains 
widespread. In Argentina and Mexico, for instance, only 15 percent of the people believe that in-
stitutions will act effectively in cases of corruption. Furthermore, public institutions in Latin 
America are not as efficient as those of countries in other regions, and police forces struggle to 
provide protection from crime or to punish perpetrators of abuses. Nowadays, Latin American 
countries show the highest crime rates in the world . . . and the criminal investigation and adjudi-
cation systems rank among the worst in the world. 
 
Id. at 25. Nine factors were catalogued as contributing to the Rule of Law Index: limited government 
powers, absence of corruption, order and security, fundamental rights, open government, regulatory 
enforcement, access to civil justice, and effective criminal justice. Id. at 1. Based on these factors, 
Chile, followed by Brazil, are the best performers in the region, while Venezuela and Bolivia have the 
lowest rankings. Id. at 112. 
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gagement.12  During colonial times, there was a saying among citizens in parts of 
the region, “Obedezco pero no cumplo” (“I obey but do not execute”), used to 
reference Spanish laws that were imposed on the indigenous populations.13  Ra-
ther than being the result of a participatory political process, these laws were 
completely foreign to Latin Americans.  Even today, local stakeholders have lim-
ited engagement and few opportunities for collaborative governance. For purposes 
of this Article, collaborative governance refers to citizen engagement in public 
decision-making through a policy continuum that includes deliberative democra-
cy, collaborative public management, and alternative dispute resolution in the 
policy process. In this regard, Lisa Blomgren Bingham defines collaborative gov-
ernance as “the integration of reasoned discussions by the citizens and other resi-
dents into the decision-making of public representatives, especially when these 
approaches are embedded in the workings of local governance over time.”14 To 
date, the lack of such collaborative governance in Latin America has resulted in 
poor ownership of current laws, which are in many cases still imported to the 
region.15   
If we aim to foster systemic inclusion and move from revolution to collabora-
tive governance, from riots to civic dialogue, from noise to music, participation is 
essential.  Oftentimes, the caudillo is the only instrument allowed to play, thus 
leaving the “power of the orchestra” untapped.16  Those who wish to participate, 
but are prevented from doing so, often create reactionary noise in the form of riots 
and revolutions.  Latin America has yet to experience the full orchestra’s capacity 
to produce music; it has yet to experience a higher level of “social cohesion”17 and 
 ___________________________  
 12. Jorge L. Esquirol, Continuing Fictions of Latin American Law, 55 FLA. L. REV. 41, 103-04 
(2003) (arguing that the disconnect between the letter of the law and how the law is carried out is 
caused, in part, by a lack of citizen engagement). 
 13. See Michael Knox, Continuing Evolution of the Costa Rican Judiciary, 32 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 
133, 137 (2001).  
 
Colonists recognized the value and importance of the law in theory, but they took a very practical 
approach to its application. They would pay lip service to the law, but felt no compunction about 
violating its terms when necessary. When regulations were ‘impossible or inconvenient to exe-
cute’ they were ‘shelved with the famous Spanish formula, I obey but do not execute, and were 
referred back to Spain again for further consideration. 
 
Id. See also, Felipe Saez Garcia, The Nature of Judicial Reform in Latin America and some Strategic 
Considerations, 13 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1267, 1276 (1998) (describing the monarchy’s authority over 
the Indies and the hierarchical structures of authority that led up to the monarchs). 
 14. Lisa Blomgren Bingham, Collaborative Governance: Emerging Practices and the Incomplete 
Legal Framework for Citizen and Stakeholder Voice, 2009 J. DISP. RESOL. 269, 274 n.28 (2009) [here-
inafter Bingham, Collaborative Governance: Emerging Practices] (quoting an interview with Terry 
Amsler, Program Director, Collaborative Governance Initiative, Inst. for Local Gov't, Sacramento, Cal. 
(Nov. 28, 2009)). See also Lisa Blomgren Bingham, Reflections on Designing Governance to Produce 
the Rule of Law, 2011 J. DISP. RESOL. 67 (2011). 
 15. Esquirol, supra note 12, at 104. Esquirol notes that laws imported into Latin America from 
abroad fail to engage local stakeholders, thereby compromising the legitimacy of the law. Id. He also 
observes that recent reform efforts have replicated the same mistakes of importation without engage-
ment. Id. 
 16. Pozo, supra note 5, at 69 (describing how caudillos “centralized power and shared it with no 
one”).  
 17. Even though there is no single definition of social cohesion, the Economic Commission for Latin 
America and the Carribbean offers three fundamental elements: social integration, social capital and 
social ethics.  Social integration refers to the capacity of citizens to participate in their country’s devel-
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the participation of a broader spectrum of stakeholders who are engaged in the 
system and therefore invested in upholding it.18  Only when Juan and his fellow 
citizens have an active role in decision-making processes will they become pro-
tagonists in their own lives and builders of the Latin America they want.19 
Although reforming the judiciary, providing access to justice through ADR, 
and having transparent elections are important measures to foster rule of law, they 
have proven insufficient.  The focus of ADR implementation should be broadened 
from its current use as a means for access to justice for the poor to having an ex-
panded role that would include fostering necessary capacities for all citizens, thus 
promoting systemic inclusion and participation. If rule of law is to be sustainable, 
citizens should have access to participatory experiences in private conflict resolu-
tion and should have the opportunity to engage in collaborative governance, which 
includes public conflict resolution as well as the other stages in the policy contin-
uum—deliberative democracy and collaborative public management. These expe-
riences could begin to challenge the caudillo mentality by providing opportunities 
for them to make choices that affect their own lives. 
Expanding the role of ADR in connection to rule of law can act to establish a 
foundation for sustainable rule of law.  In this regard, the social capital necessary 
for rule of law can be created by private conflict resolution consistent with proce-
dural justice values.20 Also, traditionally marginalized majorities, if engaged, em-
powered, and ultimately included in collaborative governance, will be given a 
greater stake in the system, thus contributing to the enhancement of rule of law.21  
Drawing on the multi-door courthouse model’s vision of the integrated deliv-
ery of dispute resolution services, Latin America has developed the specific form 
of Casas de Justicia, which mainly work at redressing small grievances in the 
low- income urban communities and rural areas.  This Article argues that the role 
of Casas de Justicia could be expanded to go beyond the framework of access to 
justice for the poor. They could have a broader impact if they provide experiences 
of participatory private conflict resolution for citizens of all socio-economic lev-
els. In addition, while the original multi-door courthouse model had a screener 
who rerouted the cases to the most appropriate forum for resolution, this posi-
tion—called a conflict assessor in the proposed model of the Casas de Justicia —
 ___________________________  
opment, which implies access to well-being and the possibility of self-determination.  Social capital 
refers to the trust, networks, and social linkages that make a sense of community possible.  Social 
ethics refers to collective values that form a foundation for social interaction.  SOCIAL COHESION: 
INCLUSION AND A SENSE OF BELONGING IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 17-18 (2007), 
available at http://www.eclac.org/publicaciones/xml/0/29030/2007-219-Social_Cohesion-web.pdf; 
Maria de Lourdes Dieck Assad, Social Cohesion as the First Item in the Human Rights Agenda: Mexi-
co’s Performance, 5 ST. THOMAS L.J. 639, 639 (2008) (writing that “the term ‘social cohesion’ refers 
mainly to the reduction of poverty and inequality”). 
 18. See generally Archon Fung & Erik Olin Wright, Deepening Democracy: Innovations in Empow-
ered Participatory Governance, 29 POL. & SOC. 5 (2001) (providing an examination of different pro-
grams designed to increase participation and the preservation of democratic vitality). 
 19. See generally Mariana Hernández Crespo, Building the Latin America We Want: Supplementing 
Representative Democracies with Consensus-Building, 10 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 425 (2009) 
[hereinafter Hernández Crespo, Building]. 
 20. See Reuben, ADR and the Rule of Law, supra note 8, at 6 (discussing the relationship between 
rule of law and procedural justice). 
 21. See generally Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff & Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice and the Rule of 
Law: Fostering Legitimacy in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 2011 J. DISP. RESOL. 1 [Hereinafter 
Blumoff & Tyler, Procedural Justice and the Rule of Law]. 
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would be modified from the role of a decision-maker to that of an expert guide. 
This guide would help the citizens identify the root causes of systemic issues, 
empowering them to select the most appropriate forum for resolution of their dis-
putes.  In this way, the proposed model would foster self-determination and deci-
sion-making capacity, as well as problem solving capacity when facilitative pro-
cesses are used. By adding an organizational ombuds function, the conflict asses-
sors would be able to perform root cause analysis, which could identify systemic 
issues that can serve as the starting point for collaborative governance agendas. 
Given the strategic position of Casas de Justicia, which bring the community 
together and connect it with the government, they could help members of the 
community address the public issues that affect them and could craft public policy 
pertaining to the community through collaborative governance. The experience 
citizens gain through private conflict resolution can help them develop some of 
the capacities needed to make their participation in collaborative governance more 
effective. 
The adapted role of qualified screeners, who act as conflict assessors in the 
proposed model of Casas de Justicia, would fulfill an essential function in em-
powering citizens and identifying systemic issues that could be addressed through 
collaborative governance.  The screeners could spearhead the process of making 
citizens protagonists in private conflict resolution, opening to them a range of 
options that exist beyond passive resignation, retaliation, or litigation for those 
who can afford it.  In addition to guiding the parties in the selection of an appro-
priate dispute resolution process, they could also perform root-cause analysis, 
which could be utilized to discover the underlying conflict, aggregate data, and 
identify social issues. In the ADR field, a dispute is understood as a conflict that 
has escalated. It is therefore possible, at times, to resolve a dispute while leaving 
the underlying conflict unaddressed.22 Root cause analysis can move beyond 
merely resolving disputes; it can examine and potentially address the underlying 
conflicts. Furthermore, root cause analysis could identify systemic issues that 
could be addressed through public conflict resolution. It could also serve as the 
starting point for collaborative governance in the other stages of the policy contin-
uum.  To this end, state and national committees of conflict assessors from the 
Casas de Justicia could be formed to develop channels of communication, best 
practices, and accountability. 
Based upon common issues among Latin American countries and the solu-
tions implemented, this Article aims to expand the range of possibilities for dis-
cussion among stakeholders, international financial institutions (hereafter IFIs), 
and foreign aid organizations about ways to tap the potential of ADR beyond mere 
 ___________________________  
 22. “Conflict may be defined simply as a clash of interests or aspirations, actual or perceived.  Dis-
putes are immediate manifestations of conflict, and arise when people take action based on this actual 
or perceived clash.” RISKIN ET AL., supra note 9, at 3.  Conflicts can be approached from a number of 
different perspectives and explained in different ways.  James Schellenberg identifies three sets of 
theories to organize conflicts.  The first relates to the individual characteristics of people; an example 
of this is need theory, which refers to a conflict arising out of an unmet need.  The second set includes 
social process theories.  These theories look beyond the individual characteristic and are based on the 
relationships between people, perhaps along distributional lines.  The third group is social structure 
theories, where conflicts are viewed as arising out of institutional structures that organize society.  Id. 
at 3-4 (citing JAMES A. SCHELLENBERG, CONFLICT RESOLUTION: THEORY, RESEARCH, AND PRACTICE 
39-102 (1996)).       
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access to justice, expanding ADR to promote inclusion and participation in the 
Latin American context. This Article suggests this or any proposal aimed at pro-
moting ADR in the region should be developed and owned by the stakeholders; to 
that end, it argues Dispute System Design (hereafter DSD) can provide a partici-
patory framework in guiding the development and ongoing evaluation of conflict 
resolution systems. By engaging in local DSD efforts, stakeholders can adapt and 
diverge from the proposal to address their specific contextual reality. They can 
enhance citizen participation through private conflict management and dispute 
resolution as well as through experiences of collaborative governance that meet 
the needs of each country.  
In Part II, this Article explores the current reality of exclusion and responses 
to exclusion, which include both de facto responses by citizens and de jure re-
sponses by international organizations, whose focus has been on advancing rule of 
law.  Within this context, it discusses how ADR has been promoted as part of the 
rule of law agenda aiming to expand access to justice and further explores some of 
the challenges involved in its implementation.  Part III suggests ADR could be 
used beyond access to justice by promoting systemic inclusion and citizen partici-
pation not only through private conflict resolution, but also through collaborative 
governance; thus, ADR could serve as a necessary foundation for a more sustain-
able rule of law.  Specifically, it suggests this can be achieved by tapping into the 
potential of the multi-door courthouse model, which already exists in Latin Amer-
ica, by expanding the role of the Casas de Justicia.  It examines how the scope of 
Casas de Justicia could be broadened to include not only the poor, but all citizens. 
In addition to resolving private disputes, the Casas de Justicia could be used as 
building blocks to develop citizens’ capacity for both public and private conflict 
resolution. Furthermore, this section argues that some of the issues identified in 
the Casas de Justicia could be used as a starting point for collaborative govern-
ance.  Part IV suggests participation is a critical element for effective implementa-
tion of ADR in Latin America and contends that DSD can provide a framework 
which acts to engage stakeholders in the decision-making process, allowing them 
to address their local needs.  It also explains the need for capacity building and 
points out possible challenges, such as resistance to change, asymmetries of pow-
er, and other contextual obstacles.   
II. WASTED POTENTIAL: THE EFFECT OF EXCLUSION IN LATIN AMERICA 
This section begins by contextualizing the efforts to promote rule of law in 
Latin America, a region where millions of citizens are usually excluded from pub-
lic decision-making.  Next, it examines a variety of responses to the issues of ex-
clusion and instability, including de facto responses by local citizens and caudillos 
and de jure responses by international bodies. In addition, in the context of de jure 
responses, it examines the specific challenges facing the promotion of ADR in the 
region. 
A.  The Context: Prevailing Exclusion 
In addressing the specific challenges of the region, understanding the reality 
on the ground in Latin America is of critical importance if rule of law is to be 
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promoted.  The following account describes the reality of those complexities 
found in the region. 
1. The Invisible Majorities 
Even though each country in Latin America is quite distinct, most of the 
countries share a common denominator: a large percentage of the population lives 
in the sprawling urban centers of the region.23  Rural migrants who seek a better 
life and standard of living come to the city looking for jobs that often do not ex-
ist.24  They usually live in marginal housing in the favelas (shanty-towns) and 
barrios (slums) without streets, sewers, or building codes.  Life is most precarious 
for those living at the edges of the favelas and barrios in flimsy shelters of card-
board and mud brick with no access to running water or electricity.  In most cases, 
these citizens do not own the land,25 they do not have an address, and their com-
munities do not exist on most official maps.  Urban infrastructures tend to be 
overwhelmed by the thousands of new immigrants that come from the countryside 
each month.  Government programs for health, education, and safety are at times 
inaccessible.26  As economist Hernando de Soto has observed, these societies 
function outside of formal economic and legal systems,27 in what he has called the 
informal system. This system is characterized by a lack of property rights acting to 
block access to credit, thus providing little opportunity for advancement.28  This 
informal sector in Latin America is the invisible majority. 
Making a living in the favelas and barrios usually requires hard work and 
does not provide the possibility of social mobility.  For example, a woman who 
sells flowers in the streets of a large urban center in the region begins her workday 
long before dawn with a long trek down from the slums that cling to the hills sur-
rounding the city.  She has no car, so she stands in queue at a bus stop for a ride to 
the city center that can last two hours or more due to traffic.  She will then sell her 
flowers amid the traffic stopped at the red lights, working until nightfall.  At the 
end of the day, she repeats the journey back to the edge of the favela or barrio, 
making her way up the hill through the narrow lanes between the shanties, until 
she arrives at her own makeshift dwelling.  She will do this day in and day out, yet 
 ___________________________  
 23. Latin American and Caribbean countries had 78.6% of their population living in urban areas in 
2008. WORLD BANK DATA CATALOG, http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog (last visited June 18, 
2011). 
 24. See Marcela Cerrutti & Rodolfo Bertoncello, Urbanization and Internal Migration Patterns in 
Latin America (June 5, 2003), http://pum.princeton.edu/pumconference/papers/1-Cerrutti.pdf (regard-
ing rapid urbanization in Latin America). 
 25. HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH: THE ECONOMIC ANSWER TO TERRORISM 17-57 (2002). 
 26. See, e.g., Center for Global Development: Latin American Shadow Financial Regulatory Com-
mittee, Enhancing Access to Financial Services in Latin America, CENTER FOR GLOBAL 
DEVELOPMENT, available at http://www.cgdev.org/doc/CLAAFStatement.pdf (discussing poor citi-
zens’ lack of access to financial services); William D. Savedoff, A Moving Target: Universal Access to 
Healthcare Services in Latin America and the Caribbean 28 (Inter-Am. Dev. Bank, Working Paper 
No. 667, 2009), available at http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=1834994. 
 27. In describing the Peruvian reality, de Soto coined the distinction between the “informal” and 
“formal” sectors of society. DE SOTO, supra note 25, at 11-12. See also Alejandro Portes & Kelly 
Hoffman, Latin American Class Structures: Their Composition and Change During the Neoliberal 
Era, 38 LATIN AM. RES. REV. 41, 74-77 (2003). 
 28. DE SOTO, supra note 25, at 11-12. 
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she will never make enough to get out of the favela or barrio—to cross over from 
the informal world at the fringe of society to the formal world of homeownership, 
taxes, and a car.29  This gulf between the informal and formal sectors poses one of 
the biggest challenges for Latin America, which, as a region, has no hope of ad-
vancing in any area if the majorities continue to be excluded from the formal eco-
nomic and political system.30  Likewise, efforts to promote rule of law will have a 
limited effect if this contextual reality is not taken into account. 
2.  The Exclusion of the “Have-Nots” 
In most Latin American countries, there is a tendency to perceive others as 
belonging to different socio-economic groups.31  In broad terms, these social 
groups could be divided into the “haves” and the “have-nots.”32  Usually, the af-
fluent, or the “haves,” tend to believe they can function independently of the 
“have-nots,” since they have the means to accomplish their goals on their own; 
thus, they usually lack an integral vision of their own society.33  In reality, they are 
part of a larger whole, like pieces of a jigsaw puzzle.  Yet, their interactions with 
the other pieces of the puzzle, the “have-nots,” are limited to helping them, ignor-
ing them, or protecting themselves from them.  It is not the norm to see “haves” 
and “have-nots” interacting as equals to create joint gains. 
Similarly, the “have-nots” also tend to have a distorted perception of their 
role in the social system.  In this case, the pieces of the jigsaw puzzle usually be-
lieve they have little to contribute to the puzzle itself.  They tend to believe they 
have little or nothing to contribute to the development of society as a whole.  In 
many instances, they accept assistance34 from the “haves” but think they cannot 
offer anything of substantial value in return.  Despite good intentions on both 
sides, the dynamic of this interaction reinforces the belief that the contributions of 
the “have-nots” are of little significance in the creation of a thriving society.35  
Yet, the “have-nots” have usually had to develop essential skills, such as the ca-
 ___________________________  
 29. See Azevedo & Bouillon, supra note 3; Portes & Hoffman, supra note 27, at 74-77. 
 30. DE SOTO, supra note 25, at 11-12. 
 31. See, e.g., WINTHROP R. WRIGHT, CAFÉ CON LECHE: RACE, CLASS, AND NATIONAL IMAGE IN 
VENEZUELA 125-31 (1990) (discussing how socio-economic class is a greater source of division and 
discrimination in Venezuela than racial diversity). 
 32. See Portes & Hoffman, supra note 27, at 44-50. 
 33. MARK GERZON, LEADING THROUGH CONFLICT: HOW SUCCESSFUL LEADERS TRANSFORM 
DIFFERENCES INTO OPPORTUNITIES 61-95 (2006) (arguing that an integral vision and systemic thinking 
allow for the resolution of conflict in a way that addresses the interests of all stakeholders). 
 34. When the “haves” try to address the problem of inequality by giving assistance to the disenfran-
chised, they end up, more often than not, disempowering the “have-nots” because their assistance does 
not address the structural causes of poverty and inequality.  See THE CHRONIC POVERTY REPORT, 
supra note 2 (describing historical and structural causes of poverty).  Assistance may take the form of 
redistrubution of wealth, but in most Latin American countries, redistribution alone is not a viable 
answer.  Even if all of the wealthy freely gave all of their resources to the poor, it would not be 
enough, nor would it be sustainable over the long-term. Richard M. Bird & Eric M. Zolt, Redistribu-
tion via Taxation: The Limited Role of the Personal Income Tax in Developing Countries, 52 UCLA L. 
REV. 1627, 1638 (2005); DE SOTO, supra note 25, at 19, 17-57 (observing that many poor citizens live 
on public land and are thus open to insecurity, not cured by minimal redistribution of wealth). 
 35. Mariana Hernández Crespo, Making Rights Reality: Children’s Welfare as a Cornerstone for 
Development (1999) (unpublished LL.M. thesis, Harvard University) (on file with author) [hereinafter 
Hernández Crespo, Making Rights Reality]. 
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pacity to innovate, collaborate, and effectively use natural resources, to compen-
sate for the lack of acquired resources.36  It would be an enormous waste of poten-
tial if the “have-nots” were unable to practically contribute these skills to their 
society.  
This dynamic manifests itself in both the private and public realm.  In the 
workplace, the “haves” generally hold positions of decision-making power. The 
“have-nots” usually occupy lesser posts,37 which minimize their ability to contrib-
ute to the decision-making process.  Regarding the public square, the same dy-
namic continues despite efforts to promote greater participation.38  Though the 
“have-nots” have, in some cases, been given a seat at the table, the “haves” are 
often better-equipped and have more resources to maneuver the decision-making 
process.39  This lack of capacity for full and effective participation in problem 
solving and deliberation, together with lack of appropriate channels for citizen 
engagement, may result in the type of exclusion that provides fertile ground for 
instability.40  
B. The De Facto Responses to Exclusion: Reactions of Citizens              
and Caudillos (Political Strongmen) 
Facing these complex situations of exclusion, citizens usually react in a varie-
ty of ways that have become predictable patterns in the region.  Given the level of 
instability, caudillos (political strongmen) emerge as a viable solution to promote 
order.  The following are some observable patterns of de facto responses. 
 ___________________________  
 36. See Marshall Ganz, Ganz Organizing Notes, HARVARD KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT 13 
(Fall 2009), available at http://annastarrrose.files.wordpress.com/2011/06/ganz-course-notes.pdf  
(differentiating “natural resources” such as “those [resources] we more or less came into the world 
with: our bodies, our minds, our spirit, our time, and our talents” from “[a]cquired resources” such as 
“land, skills, information, money, equipment, [and] status”).  
 37. See Portes & Hoffman, supra note 27, at 44-50.  
 38. See id. at 75-76. 
 39. See Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1076-78 (1984). 
 
The disparities in resources between the parties can influence the settlement in three ways. First, 
the poorer party may be less able to amass and analyze the information needed to predict the out-
come of the litigation, and thus be disadvantaged in the bargaining process. Second, he may need 
the damages he seeks immediately and thus be induced to settle as a way of accelerating pay-
ment, even though he realizes he would get less now than he might if he awaited judgment . . . . 
Third, the poorer party might be forced to settle because he does not have the resources to fi-
nance the litigation, to cover either his own projected expenses, such as his lawyer's time, or the 
expenses his opponent can impose through the manipulation of procedural mechanisms such as 
discovery. 
 
Id. at 1076. Marc Galanter, Why the Haves Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal 
Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 32-33 (1974); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Do the “Haves” Come Out 
Ahead in Alternative Judicial Systems?: Repeat Players in ADR, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 19, 
57-60 (1999) (discussing various concerns such as bias and repeat players). Overprofessionalization 
may also benefit those with resources and experience using ADR methods.   
 40. See Richard Reuben, Democracy and Dispute Resolution: The Problem of Arbitration, 67 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 279, 309 (2004) [hereinafter Reuben, The Problem of Arbitration] (“[F]rustration 
of expectations regarding access to the law and courts can lead to a loss of trust in the courts and rule 
of law, contributing to the erosion of the social capital necessary for a vibrant and effective democra-
cy.”). 
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1. Citizen Responses:  Riots, Immigration, Guerilla Insurrection,      
Drugs, Corruption, and Hopelessness 
The dynamic of marginalization and exclusion of the invisible majorities re-
sults in tremendous dissatisfaction.  The inability to get out of the favelas and 
barrios, despite hard work and determination, leads to desperate reactions from 
citizens who have almost nothing to lose, increasing their tendency to take high-
risk actions. 
This desperation often manifests itself in predictable ways.  When life in the 
favelas reaches a point that is no longer bearable, such as when there is currency 
devaluation or when inflation spirals out of control, citizens usually react by riot-
ing in the streets.41  When riots fail to bring the desired long-term relief, however, 
as is usually the case, or when citizens no longer find opportunities in their own 
country, some opt to escape the situation by emigrating legally, or, if necessary, 
illegally, at the risk of their own lives.42  Others respond to the exclusion by join-
ing paramilitary groups, which they see as a way to force change.43  Still others 
attempt to make enough money to get out of the barrios through corruption and 
craft, gangs and drug trafficking.44  For those left behind in the barrios, the alter-
native to flight, corruption, or violence is resignation to the status quo and a life of 
poverty with little hope for better opportunities. 
2. The Caudillo de Turno (Strongman of the Moment): Wasting Social 
Capital and Furthering Political Instability 
The majority of Latin Americans, who lack structural channels as well as the 
experience of participating in political and social processes, have had limited op-
portunity to contribute meaningfully within those processes.45  Thus, when pro-
tests and riots fail to bring about a desired change, citizens typically look to a 
political strongman—the caudillo—to deliver order and change, typically handing 
power over to him.  The caudillos tend to present themselves as the people’s sav-
iors, and the citizens believe they will bring about a better life for them.46  But, in 
 ___________________________  
 41. See Portes & Hoffman, supra note 27, at 76 (discussing favelas, villas miserias, and other squat-
ter settlements as the source of mobilization and protest); see also sources cited supra note 4. 
 42. See Portes & Hoffman, supra note 27, at 70-74; Exodus, supra note 4; and U.N. Development 
Report, supra note 4. 
 43. See DE SOTO, supra note 25. 
 44. See Portes & Hoffman, supra note 27 at 66-70; Sanchez, supra note 4, at 179 (“At the same 
time, the situation of the poor and the young deteriorated, and many of them turned to criminal vio-
lence in the form of youth gangs, criminal mafias, and drug cartels.”); Jorge Correa Sutil, Moderniza-
tion, Democratization and Judicial Systems, in JUSTICE DELAYED: JUDICIAL REFORM IN LATIN 
AMERICA 97, 102 (Edmundo Jarquin & Fernando Carrillo eds., 1998) (discussing drugs in Colombia) . 
 45. Jorge I. Dominguez, The Politics of Hope: Free Politics and Free Markets in Latin America, 5 
ST. THOMAS L.J. 625, 626-37 (2008) (discussing the reign of dictators and the resulting lack of in-
volvement by most citizens in the government). 
 46. See Democracy and the Downturn: Latin Americans are Standing Up for Their Rights, THE 
ECONOMIST, Nov. 13, 2008, available at http://www.economist.com/node/ 
12607297?story_id=12607297; see also The Return of Populism: A Much-Touted Move to the Left 
Masks Something Much More Complex: The Rebirth of an Influential Latin American Political Tradi-
tion, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 12, 2006, available at 
http://www.economist.com/node/6802448?Story_ID=E1_GRDNQQR. 
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a society of prevailing patterns of exclusion, such as Latin America, authoritarian 
caudillos often exacerbate the problem of marginalization by making decisions 
with little or no input from their constituents.47  Furthermore, they are not often 
inclined to open space for other leaders to develop or to participate and the system 
has no embedded incentives encouraging them to do so.  In this paradigm, the 
leadership of another tends to be perceived as a threat.48 
Latin America has a long history of domination by caudillos.49 They have ex-
isted on every side of the aisle and political spectrum; the structures underpinning 
their power remain virtually the same.  From Bolivar to Pinochet to Castro, cau-
dillos have kept a stalwart presence on the Latin American political stage for cen-
turies.  Some Latin Americans still believe caudillo rule is a workable solution, in 
part because of this long-established presence.50 
The lack of broad-based engagement contributes to the creation of political 
instability, which scares away local and foreign investment,51 hindering economic 
development and job creation.  The constant changing and rewriting of a nation’s 
constitutions is a particularly salient manifestation of the instability of caudillo 
rule.52 
To fully understand the issue of caudillo domination, it is important to grasp 
the notion of social capital.  According to Robert Putnam “social capital” de-
scribes the connections between individuals and the social networks that spring 
from these connections, as well as “the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness 
that arise from them.”53  Norms of reciprocity reinforce the relationships between 
people who trust and cooperate with each other within the network and can often 
 ___________________________  
 47. Joseph C. Bentley, New Wine in Old Bottles: The Challenges of Developing Leaders in Latin 
America, in CROSS CULTURAL APPROACHES TO LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT 29-48 (C. Brooklyn Derr 
et al. eds., 2002). 
 48. KENNETH E. BOULDING, THREE FACES OF POWER, 18-20 (1990). 
 49. See sources cited supra note 5.  
 50. See Marta Lagos, Public Opinion, in CONSRUCTING DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IN LATIN 
AMERICA 137, 151, table 7.4 (Jorge I. Dominguez & Michael Shifter eds., 2d ed. 2003). 
 51. Frank Shaw, Reconciling Two Legal Cultures in Privatizations and Large-Scale Capital Projects 
in Latin America, 30 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 147, 155-56 (1999). 
 52. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 6; sources cited infra note 445. 
 53. ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN 
COMMUNITY 19 (2001). The definitions and understanding of social capital are by no means univocal. 
The term “social capital” was first coined in 1916 by L.J. Hanifan, the supervisor of rural schools in 
West Virginia, who argued that the strengthening of social networks ultimately benefited the entire 
community.  
 
The individual is helpless socially, if left to himself . . . . If he comes into contact with his neigh-
bors, and they with other neighbors, there will be an accumulation of social capital, which may 
immediately satisfy his social needs and which may bear a social potentiality sufficient to the 
substantial improvement of living conditions in the whole community.  The community as a 
whole will benefit by the cooperation of all its parts, while the individual will find in his associa-
tions the advantages of the help, the sympathy, and the fellowship of his neighbors. 
 
Id. at 19.  While for Robert Putnam, trust is an essential component of social capital, and social capital 
is essential to the success of democracy, Theda Skocpol and Morris Fiorina evaluate and analyze 
democracy from a different perspective.  To them, democracy is a result of centuries of historical 
struggle among social groups: “democracies were a product of organized conflict and distrust.”  They 
argue that civil rights institutions grew out of this struggle.  Theda Skocpol & Morris P. Fiorina, Mak-
ing Sense of the Civic Engagement Debate, in CIVIC ENGAGEMENT IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 6, 13-
14 (Theda Skocpol & Morris P. Fiorina eds., 1999). 
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create value even for those outside the network.  The networks can be small or 
large, formal or informal, and can promote the exchange of information, collective 
action, and the formation and solidification of group identity, among other bene-
fits.54 
Within the broad concept of social capital, networks organize themselves 
along two basic lines.  Social networks tend to be either horizontally or vertically 
oriented. Putnam’s study of these differences in a comparative analysis between 
northern and southern regions in Italy illustrates this point.55  He found that, in the 
north, societies, guilds, soccer clubs, and the like formed formal, “horizontal civic 
bonds.”  This type of social capital made higher levels of economic and institu-
tional performance possible than in the south, where civic bonds were more verti-
cally oriented.  The horizontal bonds were found more often in civic regions that 
had dense networks and active engagement.  The less civic regions were more 
informal and vertically bonded, based on family or neighborhood connections.  
There, suspicion and corruption were considered normal, lawlessness was more 
widely accepted, and involvement in associations was minimal.  The citizens in 
the less civic regions “felt powerless and exploited,” while in the other regions, 
“the more civic the context, the better the government.”56  Thus, the organization 
of social capital, whether formal or informal, horizontal or vertical, deeply influ-
ences the public sphere. 
Vertical social capital is primarily hierarchical and lacks the active engage-
ment and dense networks in civic associations that are typically found in more 
horizontally oriented regions.57  It concentrates decision-making power in the 
hands of the powerful and discourages the associative bonding required for robust 
civic engagement.  In this regard, the hierarchical mentality reflected in caudillo 
domination could be understood as an example of vertical social capital, which 
stifles the participation of stakeholders and thus wastes social capital.   
 ___________________________  
 54. See Social Capital Primer, THE SAGUARO SEMINAR: CIVIC ENGAGEMENT IN AMERICA, 
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/saguaro/socialcapitalprimer.htm (last visited June 17, 2011). The debate 
over the issue of declining social capital in the United States and what can be done about it has become 
more rousing amongst sociologists, political philosophers, communitarians, and others since the publi-
cation of Robert Putnam’s provocative work, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF 
AMERICAN COMMUNITY.  See PUTNAM, supra note 53. 
 55. See generally ROBERT D. PUTNAM ET AL., MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK: CIVIC TRADITIONS IN 
MODERN ITALY (1993) [hereinafter PUTNAM, MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK].  Putnam’s study is espe-
cially relevant here, because the action research project conducted in Venezuela through the clinical 
projects drew similar results.  When participants were asked to map their communities, the horizontal 
bonding was weak and the vertical bonding was strong, suggesting a similarity to social bonds in 
southern Italy.  HLS Clinical Projects 2001-02 (on file with author). 
 56. PUTNAM, MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK, supra note 55, at 182. 
 57. Putnam conducted a comparative analysis of differences in organizing social capital between 
northern and southern Italy.  He observed that in the north, societies, sport clubs, and the like formed 
“horizontal civic bonds,” which increased the level of economic and institutional performance.  By 
contrast, in the south, vertically-oriented bonding led to less civic engagement and greater lack of trust 
and acceptance of lawlessness. Id. 
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C.  The De Jure Responses to Instability: ADR in the Context of            
International Efforts to Promote Rule of Law 
The instability produced by the patterns of exclusion has prompted interna-
tional efforts in Latin America.  Unlike the de facto responses, the de jure efforts 
have been long-term, strategic interventions.  These efforts mainly relate to the 
promotion of rule of law through democratic processes, legal and procedural re-
form as well as judicial reform, and the use of ADR as a way to enhance access to 
justice.58  This section elaborates on the framework under which ADR has been 
promoted and how it fits as part of this larger agenda. 
1. Efforts to Promote Stability through Democratic Processes 
Latin American countries began to move toward democracy in the late 
1970s.59  IFIs and foreign aid organizations have therefore made efforts to con-
tribute to the promotion of processes that would foster democracy in the region.60  
Except for a few countries, notably Costa Rica, the judicial systems were “treated 
as adjuncts to the regime in power.”61  Theorists such as Jorge Dominguez have 
emphasized the role stable democracies play in producing stable markets, which 
could ultimately promote development.62  For this reason, IFIs, foreign aid organi-
zations, and investor nations have focused on promoting the rule of law and refin-
ing democratic institutions.63   
One of the aims of foreign aid organization and IFI-backed legal reform has 
been to create more representative democratic institutions,64 in the hope that their 
efforts would lead to greater social and political stability.65  To this end, it has 
been assumed that the majority vote would result in widely accepted, popular 
outcomes.  However, in the Latin American context, deeply shaped by exclusion, 
the majority vote runs the risk of becoming a power game of the caudillos,66 espe-
cially in a region where the average citizen has usually had little influence on the 
political caudillos’ agenda.67  This is due in part to the citizens’ primary focus 
 ___________________________  
 58. See generally GABRIEL PELÁEZ GANTIER, LAS MENTIRAS DE LA REFORMA JUDICIAL (1993); 
Edgardo Buscaglia, Corruption and Judicial Reform in Latin America, 17 POL'Y STUD. 273 (1996); see 
also Thomas J. Moyer & Emily Stewart Haynes, Mediation as a Catalyst for Judicial Reform in Latin 
America, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 619, 657 (2003); Shaw, supra note 51, at 156. 
 59. ACHIEVEMENTS IN BUILDING AND MAINTAINING THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 10, at 1. 
 60. See generally STEPHEN E. HENDRIX, THE NEW NICARAGUA: LESSONS IN DEVELOPMENT, 
DEMOCRACY, AND NATION BUILDING FOR THE UNITED STATES (2009) [hereinafter HENDRIX, THE 
NEW NICARAGUA] (discussing the process and challenges of promoting democracy). 
 61. ACHIEVEMENTS IN BUILDING AND MAINTAINING THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 10, at 2. 
 62. Dominguez, supra note 45, at 631-33. 
 63. Shanker Satyanath & Arvind Subramanian, What Determines Long-Run Macroeconomic Stabil-
ity? Democratic Institutions 34, (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper WP/04/215, 2004) available at 
http://cdi.mecon.gov.ar/biblio/docelec/fmi/wp/wp04215.pdf. 
 64. HENDRIX, THE NEW NICARAGUA, supra note 60, at xii (stating that promoting democracy in 
Latin America and the Caribbean is a top priority of the U.S. Department of State). 
 65. See id. at 9-11. 
 66. Schor, supra note 5, at 15 (political elites use legitimate votes to sanction whatever actions they 
wish to take). 
 67. See, e.g., HENDRIX, THE NEW NICARAGUA, supra note 60, at 30 (describing the repetitive inter-
change of power among a group of caudillos in the Venezuelan context). 
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being on the leader’s charisma, with little concern for the issues. An underdevel-
oped organization of civic society exacerbates the problem further.  Even though 
democratic efforts attempt to redistribute power from one leader to a broader pop-
ular base, the outcomes are all too often far from satisfactory68 and the power 
imbalances remain.69 
Although the effort to promote democratic processes is a step in the right di-
rection,70 structures and processes alone have proven insufficient.  In the Latin 
American context, the underlying issue of exclusion will remain unresolved unless 
the scope is broadened.71  In this regard, Richard Reuben has suggested that, when 
evaluating the democratic nature of a system, it is important to go beyond proce-
dural values and examine the substantive values, which include political, legal, 
and social capital values. Within the political category, Reuben mentions partici-
pation, accountability, transparency, and rationality. The legal values category 
highlights equality and due process. He suggests “social capital values are public 
trust, social connection and cooperation, and reciprocity.”72 Although these values 
are far less tangible than institutions or procedural structures, they are no less 
important. As standards of behavior and interaction, they shape the quality of 
participation and can help ensure the sustainability of rule of law.  In this regard, 
theorists such as Robert Ackerman have suggested dispute resolution methods can 
contribute to the enhancement of social capital, as will be discussed later in this 
article.   
 ___________________________  
 68. Many Latin Americans are frustrated with the inability of their governments to ensure stability 
and development.  See Dominguez, supra note 45, at 636-37. 
 69. Schor, supra note 5 at 16 (saying that, despite efforts to implement constitutions, “social and 
economic inequality remains pervasive”). 
 70. HENDRIX, THE NEW NICARAGUA, supra note 60, at 245-56 (quoting Ortega y Gasset, “The 
health of any democracy, no matter what its type or status, depends on a small technical detail: the 
conduct of elections. Everything else is secondary.”) For the original words of Ortega y Gasset, see 
José Ortega y Gasset, La rebelión de las masas, available at http://mgarci.aas.duke.edu/cgi-
bin/celestina/sp/searchcontent.cgi?conttype=text&pala=Milc%EDades&pos=312053&libroId=1560&s
ection=%20P%20II%20--%20XIV%20--%207%20--%20&sectionid=89740&hook=n (“La salud de 
las democracias, cualesquiera que sean su tipo y grado, depende de un mísero detalle técnico: el proce-
dimiento electoral. Todo lo demás es secundario . . . . Sin el apoyo de auténtico sufragio las institucio-
nes democráticas están en el aire.”). 
 71. In a society with prevailing patterns of exclusion, democratic processes have proven to be unable 
to rectify inequality and instability. Powerful disaffected minorities can still disrupt the stability of 
young democracies. See generally Schor, supra note 5; see also Larry Diamond, Consolidating De-
mocracy in the Americas, 550 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 12, 40 (1997); Luisa Blanco & 
Robin Grier, Long Live Democracy: The Determinants of Political Instability in Latin America, at 13-
15, http://www.ou.edu/cas/econ/wppdf/instabilityinla%20rg.pdf (last visited June 19, 2009) (data 
analysis shows that while democracy reduces instability, inequality and ethnic fractionalization are 
related to instability).   Politically disaffected groups, such as the FARC and Shining Path, operating at 
the fringes of Latin American society, have demonstrated a tremendous power to destabilize govern-
ments.  See also DE SOTO, supra note 25, at 17-57. 
 72. Reuben, The Problem of Arbitration, supra note 40, at 286; see also Richard Reuben, Democra-
cy and Dispute Resolution: Systems Design and the New Work Place, 10 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 11, 
29-39 (2005). 
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2. Strengthening Rule of Law through Legal and Procedural Reform,    
and Access to Justice through ADR 
In addition to promoting democratic processes,73 international organizations 
have often directed their efforts more broadly to strengthening the rule of law 
through ADR.74  To better understand these efforts, it is important to place them in 
the Latin American context, where judicial systems are typically overburdened 
and undermined by backlog, congestion, and corruption.75  The most prevalent 
objectives that have been pursued include improving efficiency while lowering 
costs and increasing access to justice for the groups that the formal system does 
not typically reach.76  To accomplish these objectives, institutions such as the 
World Bank and USAID have invested substantial resources in advancing legal 
and procedural reform,77 training judges, improving judicial infrastructure,78 and 
promoting ADR.79   
 ___________________________  
 73. See DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW (José María Maravall & Adam Przeworski eds., 2003) 
(discussing the relationship between rule of law and democracy, with special emphasis on the rationale 
behind government compliance or noncompliance with the law). 
 74. For a general discussion of how ADR has been exported and implemented to promote rule of 
law internationally, see Sternlight, ADR Consistent, supra note 10, at 572-77.  See also Shaw, supra 
note 51, at 155-56 (discussing how investors have sought ADR mechanisms in Latin America because 
of concerns about local judicial systems). 
 75. Alejandro Ponieman, How Important is ADR to Latin America?, 58 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 65, 65 
(2003). 
 76. The authors of the USAID ADR Practitioners Guide note that their efforts toward the promotion 
of rule of law  
 
over the last decade has led to an interest in the use of . . . ‘ADR.’  Several reasons underlie this 
interest.  ADR is touted as more efficient and effective than the courts in providing justice, espe-
cially in countries in which the judiciary has lost the trust and respect of the citizens.  Moreover, 
ADR is seen as a means to increase access to justice for populations that cannot or will not use 
the courts system, to address conflicts in culturally appropriate ways, and to maintain social 
peace. 
 
Sternlight, ADR Consistent, supra note 10, at 572 (citing Scott Brown et al., Alternative Dispute Reso-
lution Practitioners’ Guide 1 (USAID Ctr. For Democracy & Governance 1998), available at 
http://www.usaid.gov/policy/ads/200/200sbe.pdf); Brown et al., supra.  The authors acknowledge that 
ADR “cannot be a substitute for a formal judicial system” since “[it] cannot be expected to establish 
legal precedent or implement changes in legal and social norms.”  Id. at 3. 
 77. See USAID Promotes the Rule of Law in Latin America and Caribbean Democracies, .DOCSTOC 
available at http://www.docstoc.com/docs/673300/USAID-PROMOTES-THE-RULE-OF-LAW (last 
visited Feb. 26, 2013) [hereinafter USAID Promotes the Rule of Law] (discussing efforts in Guatemala, 
Honduras, El Salvador, Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, Nicaragua, Venezuela, Costa Rica, and Chile). 
 78. David M. Trubek, The “Rule of Law” in Development Assistance: Past, Present, and Future, in 
THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 74 (David M. Trubek & 
Alvaro Santos eds., 2006); Shaw, supra note 51, at 155-56; Sternlight, ADR Consistent, supra note 10, 
at 572. 
 79. See generally Mariana Hernández Crespo, A Systemic Perspective of ADR in Latin America: 
Enhancing the Shadow of the Law through Citizen Participation, 10 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 91 
(2008) [hereinafter Hernández Crespo, Shadow]. 
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a. Rule of Law: A Multi-Faceted Term 
Since all these efforts revolve around the notion of rule of law, it is important 
to address what reformers mean by this term, which has developed over time into 
a flexible concept with many definitions.80  Its origins can be traced to Western 
political thought81 and a “vision of the ‘ideal’ or ‘just’ state,”  starting with Aristo-
tle, Montesquieu, and Locke—all of whom present contrasting visions of what 
rule of law means and what ideals are enshrined in it.  For Aristotle, the only way 
to ensure rule by reason and to avoid the danger of arbitrary, passionate decisions 
was to set up a structure that ensures rule by law instead of rule by a citizen.  
Montesquieu shared Aristotle’s caution about the dangers of giving one citizen too 
much power over others.  To protect the citizens from coercive rule, he proposed a 
system of checks and balances to limit the government’s exercise of power. 
Locke, in turn, focused on the protection of personal property, which required 
three conditions: a law established by the common consent of citizens; an inde-
pendent judge to settle disputes by the law; and a competent authority to execute 
the judiciary’s decisions. These three thinkers, among others, laid the groundwork 
for what we understand today as “rule of law.” From the start, they present three 
contrasting views of what rule of law entails, and there is still little research about 
how each of these conceptions of rule of law are interrelated.82 This is especially 
relevant since it marks the beginning of a path in which the term has remained 
equivocal.83 
Even though the term remains equivocal in the present day, there have been 
efforts to provide a theoretical framework to categorize the different interpreta-
tions. To this end, scholars have suggested the rule of law spans a continuum from 
thin to thick interpretations.84  By the notion of a “thin” rule of law, theorists refer 
to the supremacy of the law over individual preferences.  Essentially, they refer to 
 ___________________________  
 80. BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY 3 (2005) (citing N.S. 
MARSH, INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS - THE RULE OF LAW IN A FREE SOCIETY vii (1959))  
 
Notwithstanding its quick and remarkable ascendance as a global ideal, however, the rule of law 
is an exceedingly elusive notion. Few government leaders who express support for the rule of 
law, few journalists who record or use the phrase, few dissidents who expose themselves to risk 
of reprisal in its name, and few of the multitude of citizens throughout the world who believe in 
it, ever articulate precisely what it means.  Explicit or implicit understandings of the phrase sug-
gest that contrasting meanings are held. Some believe that the rule of law includes protection of 
individual rights. Some believe that democracy is part of the rule of law. Some believe that the 
rule of law is purely formal in nature, requiring only that laws be set out in advance in general, 
clear terms, and be applied equally to all. Others assert that the rule of law encompasses the ‘so-
cial, economic, educational, and cultural conditions under which man’s legitimate aspirations and 
dignity may be realized. 
 
Id. 
 81. Id. (exploring the history of the theory of rule of law from classical Greece until the present, and 
pointing out the tension between liberal and conservative interpretations). 
 82. Alvaro Santos, The World Bank’s Uses of the “Rule of Law” Promise, in THE NEW LAW AND 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 253, 257 (David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 
2006) [hereinafter, Santos, The World Bank’s]. 
 83. Id. at 257.  
 84. William Lucy, Abstraction and the Rule of Law, 29 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 481, 493-509 
(2009); see also Reuben, ADR and the Rule of Law, supra note 8, at 4.   
19
Hernandez-Crespo: Hernandez-Crespo: From Noise to Music
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2012
File: Crespo FINAL (061113) Created on:  6/12/2013 6:17:00 PM Last Printed: 6/12/2013 6:21:00 PM 
354 JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION [Vol. 2012 
 
the notion of governments and citizens abiding by the law as a universal standard 
that defends them from arbitrary use and abuse by the most powerful. In contrast, 
“thick” definitions tend to go beyond the procedural aspects of rule of law, em-
phasizing substantive ideals and values such as the notion of human rights or law 
and order.85 The fact that such widely varying interpretations are encompassed 
within the same term makes “rule of law” a remarkably elastic concept, which can 
be invoked to justify diametrically opposed policies: conservative politicians may 
use it to push for strong capitalist economic markets, while liberals may use it to 
support a human rights and equality agenda.86  
The interpretations of the term “rule of law” given by international institu-
tions such as the World Bank and USAID are essential, since they play a signifi-
cant role in programs that foster rule of law in developing countries.87  Even 
though the interpretations of rule of law by USAID and the World Bank may lack 
authoritativeness in academic circles, they cannot be ignored in the Latin Ameri-
can context given the prominent role of these institutions in rule of law projects.   
USAID has referred to both the UN’s definition of rule of law and the U.S. 
State Department’s description to establish the concept of rule of law and its uni-
versality as a principle.88 According to the UN, rule of law:  
refers to a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and 
entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to 
laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently 
adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights, 
norms and standards.89  
Furthermore, the U.S. State Department’s description makes a distinction be-
tween rule of law and rule by law, stating that rule of law protects “fundamental 
political, social and economic rights.”90 Despite using these definitions to assert 
the universality of the term rule of law, USAID also acknowledges the ambiguity 
of its interpretation, as circles of scholars and practitioners have yet to agree upon 
a uniform definition.91 
 ___________________________  
 85. Id. 
 86. Alvaro Santos notes how this has allowed the term to be used differently by various groups to 
advance their agendas. Santos, The World Bank’s, supra note 82, at 256. See also Thomas Carothers, 
The Many Agendas of Rule of Law Reform in Latin America, in RULE OF LAW IN LATIN AMERICA: THE 
INTERNATIONAL PROMOTION OF JUDICIAL REFORM 4, 4-16 (Pilar Domingo & Rachel Sieder eds., 
2001); Frank Upham, Mythmaking in the Rule of Law Orthodoxy (Carnegie Endowment for World 
Peace, Democracy and Rule of Law Project), Working Paper No. 30, 2002), available at 
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/wp30.pdf. 
 87. TAMANAHA, supra note 80. Even though the notion of rule of law is well established in devel-
oped nations, developing countries tend to underestimate its importance.  For a comprehensive descrip-
tion of how USAID has promoted rule of law in Latin America, see USAID Promotes Rule of Law, 
supra note 77. 
 88. Office of Democracy and Governance, Rule of Law Division, Guide to Rule of Law Country 
Analysis: The Rule of Law Strategic Framework 5 (USAID 2008), available at 
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADM700.pdf [hereinafter USAID Guide to Rule of Law]. 
 89. United Nations Rule of Law Website and Document Repository, UNITED NATIONS (2004), 
http://www.un.org/en/ruleoflaw/index.shtml (last visited Aug. 24, 2011). 
 90. USAID Guide to Rule of Law, supra note 88, at 5 (citing U.S. Dept. of State). 
 91. Id. 
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When explaining its rationale for the promotion of rule of law, USAID points 
to its importance for democracy, referring to it as a cornerstone. It elaborates on 
how rule of law can help lead to “a free and fair political system, protection of 
human rights, a vibrant civil society, public confidence in the police and the 
courts, and economic development.”92 It also discusses how rule of law can partic-
ipate in the reconstruction of post-conflict societies.93 This commitment to rule of 
law springs from “several vital and strategic U.S. interests.”94 In the post-Cold 
War era, for example, the U.S. sees the greatest threats to its foreign and domestic 
interests as coming “not from conquering states, but from failing ones.”95 To this 
end, it is essential the U.S. assists in establishing sustainable rule of law in foreign 
nations. 
USAID emphasizes five “essential elements” of rule of law that play a critical 
role in fostering social and economic growth. These elements include order and 
security, legitimacy, checks and balances, fairness and effective application. Order 
and security provide a foundation for rule of law in the public sphere; legitimacy 
ensures that laws reflect consensus; checks and balances enables separation of 
governmental power to support rule of law; fairness, through the inclusion of four 
sub-elements—equal application, procedural fairness, protection of human rights 
and civil liberties, and access to justice—seeks to empower the disenfranchised; 
and effective application enables laws to be consistently enforced.96  Finally, even 
though there is consensus about the importance of rule of law, USAID points out 
that the objectives donors have in supporting the program can vary substantially.97  
Although the World Bank explains rule of law in terms of “formal character-
istics,” “substantive outcomes,” or “functional considerations,”98 like USAID, its 
interpretation remains ambiguous.  “Formal” definitions of rule of law are meas-
ured against standards such as judicial review of government actions independent 
of the judiciary, the absence of laws that apply retroactively, and absence of laws 
that target particular citizens or groups of citizens.  One of the most significant 
advantages to these definitions of rule of law is objective clarity.  On the other 
hand, one of the main disadvantages is lack of emphasis with regard to “law in 
action.”99  “Substantive” definitions of rule of law focus less on making sure a 
judicial system abides by a set of standards and opt, instead, to focus upon end 
goals such as “justice” or “fairness.”  One of the main characteristics of these 
 ___________________________  
 92. USAID Democracy and Governance: Rule of Law, USAID, http://www.usaid.gov/what-we-
do/democracy-human-rights-and-governance/promoting-accountability-transparency (last visited Nov. 
26, 2012) [hereinafter USAID Democracy and Governance]. 
 93. Id. 
 94. USAID Promotes the Rule of Law, supra note 77. 
 95. Id. (citing Congressional Budget Justification, FY 2005 at 1, Office of Democracy and Govern-
ance, Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance, USAID (2004)). 
 96. USAID Democracy and Governance, supra note 92. See also Strengthening the Rule of Law and 
Respect for Human Rights, USAID, http://www.usaid.gov/what-we-do/democracy-human-rights-and-
governance/promoting-accountability-transparency (last visited Nov. 26, 2012). 
 97. USAID Guide to Rule of Law, supra note 88, at 4. 
 98. For more information on rule of law according to the World Bank as a goal of development 
policy, see Matthew Stephenson, Rule of Law as a Goal of Development Policy, THE WORLD BANK, 
http://go.worldbank.org/DZETJ85MD0 (last visited Feb. 26, 2011). For more information on rule of 
law and development, see Rule of Law and Development, THE WORLD BANK (Sept. 3, 2009), 
http://go.worldbank.org/9OTC3P5070 (last visited July 10, 2011). 
 99. Stephenson, supra note 98. 
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definitions, which has also been a source of criticism, is the subjective nature of 
defining the ideal considered to be “good” government.100  The “functional” defi-
nitions of rule of law are similar to the “substantive” definitions in that they are 
both outcome oriented.  The difference is that the “functional” definitions, rather 
than attempting to create subjective normative standards, revolve around the com-
pletion or non-completion of a certain legal “function,” which is usually defined 
as “the constraint of government discretion, the making legal decisions predicta-
ble, or some combination of both.”101  For example, determining how much or 
how little discretion government officials have in a given society would lead to a 
determination of the level of rule of law in that nation.  Yet, as a criticism, it has 
been argued these specific factors may not necessarily be negative.  Discretion, for 
example, may not lead to arbitrariness, but rather to flexibility which may be de-
sirable.102 
In the end, the World Bank leaves the definition of rule of law unresolved and 
calls for clarity on the part of policymakers and donors with regard to their defini-
tions of rule of law.103   It is interesting to note the Bank does not attempt to define 
rule of law, but rather makes the point that “rule of law has a number of different 
possible meanings . . . which one is appropriate will depend on the task at 
hand.”104  By providing a spectrum of definitions and articulating the positives and 
negatives of each approach, the World Bank leaves room for flexibility in the 
definition of the term, so it can be tailored to the goals of specific projects.105 Al-
varo Santos describes this state of affairs as a “conceptual hodge-podge” that 
“bonds under the same rubric different agendas and competing interests.”106 
In analyzing the World Bank’s articulation of rule of law, Santos suggests a 
theoretical framework and argues that the different departments of the Bank have 
adopted different interpretations of rule of law at various times.107  In this regard, 
Alvaro Santos identifies four competing categories of conceptions of the term 
“rule of law”: the institutional versus the substantive108 and the instrumental ver-
sus the intrinsic.109 The institutional view of rule of law focuses on whether the 
rules comply with certain legal requirements that make a law efficacious.  It is not 
concerned with passing a moral judgment on the content of the laws, but only 
focuses on whether they are enforceable and “legal.”  Thus, this view proposes 
that rule of law can exist even if the rules are unjust.110 On the other hand, the 
 ___________________________  
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Stephenson, supra note 98. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Santos, The World Bank’s, supra note 82, at 256. 
 107. Id. at 278.  For a full analysis of the different rule of law projects and the different conceptions 
of rule of law that different departments have adhered to, see id. at 267-95. 
 108. Id. at 258 (distinguishing “the degree of autonomy of the legal order from other orders like 
morals and politics”). 
 109. Id. (distinguishing “the degree of relative value against competing considerations”). 
 110. Id. at 258-60. Santos describes the thought of Joseph Raz, an advocate of an institutional concep-
tion of rule of law, whereby what matters for law is not the content, but the “qualities and mechanisms 
of the rules in a legal system.”  Raz identifies two fundamental aspects of this conception.  “First, 
government action should be authorized by law, and second, laws should be capable of guiding peo-
ple’s conduct for them to plan their life.  This conception emphasizes the formal characteristics of a 
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substantive conception of rule of law looks more closely at the values and moral 
content of the law, focusing less on their technical aspects and more on whether 
the laws uphold certain human rights.111 The second set of conceptions set in op-
position to each other is the instrumental conception of rule of law versus the in-
trinsic conception.112 As the name suggests, the instrumental conception focuses 
on whether rule of law is an effective means to the higher ends of providing social 
order, organizing government power, etc. In this conception, laws can be bent or 
broken when other, higher values are at stake, such as in a national emergency.113 
The intrinsic conception of rule of law takes the opposite view. Instead of viewing 
the law as a means to an end, it views rule of law as an end in and of itself, as the 
expression of society’s highest values of justice, freedom, and democracy. Propo-
nents of the intrinsic conception believe rule of law cannot be breached without 
damaging the very foundations of a just society.114 
Santos posits that the classification of the different interpretations of the rule 
of law he provides is based on the conceptions of Max Weber, A.V. Dicey, Frie-
drich Hayek, and Amartya Sen.115  Max Weber’s view of rule of law, according to 
Santos, encompasses both the instrumental and institutional view. In other words, 
Weber views rule of law strictly in terms of technical viability and as a means to 
an end.116  Sen takes the opposing view on both points. He states, “the legal sys-
tem ought to be judged according to whether it enables peoples’ capacity to exer-
cise their rights.”  Thus, enhancing citizens’ freedoms is not a means but an end of 
itself.  Therefore, for Sen, rule of law is a substantive value, since the moral con-
tent of the law matters and has intrinsic value as an end in itself.117  A.V. Dicey 
takes a midway approach between these two poles, asserting the institutional and 
intrinsic views.118  For Dicey, the English system, in contrast to continental Eu-
rope, has the three characteristics of rule of law: lack of arbitrariness by the gov-
ernment; legal equality and decisions made by a judge regarding the constitution; 
and rights of individuals.  Finally, Friedrich Hayek aligns himself with the sub-
stantive and instrumental views of rule of law.119  For Hayek, “the rule of law as a 
system that articulates a free market economy”120 allows citizens to calculate their 
interactions with each other and with the government.121 
Using this framework, Santos argues the World Bank has moved gradually 
from an instrumental conception of rule of law, which was both institutional and 
 ___________________________  
legal system that ensure that the rules are available and that they are susceptible of being followed.  
What are these characteristics?  There is of course no definitive list, but among the elements generally 
included are: 1) generality, 2) notice or publicity, 3) prospectivity, 4) clarity, 5) noncontradictoriness, 
6) conformability, 7) stability, and 8) congruence.” Id. at 259-60 (citing Joseph Raz, The Rule of Law 
and its Virtue, 93 LAW QUARTERLY REVIEW 195, 196 (1977); LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 
33-94 (1969)). 
 111. Id. at 258. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 258-59. 
 114. Id. at 259. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 260-61. 
 117. Id. at 265-66. 
 118. Id. at 261-63. 
 119. Id. at 263-64. 
 120. Id. at 263. 
 121. Id. at 264. 
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substantive, to a broader rhetoric that includes the intrinsic as well as the institu-
tional.122  He suggests the change in focus from instrumental to intrinsic, however, 
has merely been a change in rhetoric since the projects have remained the same.123  
Thus, it seems from all the angles examined that rule of law will remain an 
ambiguous term.  Its broad range of interpretations has allowed for a wide variety 
of projects to be promoted under the same agreeable goal.  Yet, according to Da-
vid Trubek, the fact that “social concerns”124 are now included opens up new pos-
sibilities for rethinking development strategies.125  He encourages those concerned 
with the well-being of all citizens, not just the economic elite, to join efforts in 
framing these new strategies.126  As will be discussed below, this Article aims to 
broaden the scope of the use of ADR to include social concerns.  
b. Access to Justice as an Essential Requirement for Rule of Law 
Despite the ambiguity of the term “rule of law,” experts seem to agree that for 
the rule of law to be advanced in any society, there must be widespread access to 
justice.127  Furthermore, according to the United Nation Development Program 
(UNDP), establishing access to justice is a significant factor that could lead to 
more success in efforts to promote democracy and reduce poverty.  The UNDP 
notes that, when people do not have access to justice, citizens cannot participate in 
the public square, processes lack transparency, and government has no accounta-
bility.128 
 ___________________________  
 122. Id. at 266. 
 123. Id. 
 124. See generally Kerry Rittich, The Future of Law and Development: Second Generation Reforms 
and the Incorporation of the Social, 26 MICH. J. INT’L L. 199 (2004) (arguing that what she has called 
the “incorporation of the social” happens as a result of the World Bank Comprehensive Development 
Framework (CDF) in which this financial institution has started to encompass a social structural and 
human component to the development agenda, which translates into broader concerns than the merely 
economic, to include also human rights, poverty, democracy and access to justice, and arguing that this 
marks the second generation reform of law and development).   
 125. Trubek, supra note 78, at 93. 
 126. Id. at 94. 
 127. See Access to Justice Is the Key to Advancing the Rule of Law, Experts at World Justice Forum 
Agree, ABA NOW http://www.abanow.org/2008/07/access-to-justice-is-the-key-to-advancing-the-rule-
of-law-experts-at-world-justice-forum-agree/ (last visited Aug. 24, 2011);  see also Rule of Law & 
Access to Justice, UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME,  available at 
http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/ourwork/democraticgovernance/focus_areas/focus_justice
_law/legal_empowerment/focus_areas/rule_of_law_accesstojustice.html; William Davis, Access to 
Justice: Lessons from the Field, UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI SCHOOL OF LAW, available at 
http://law.missouri.edu/csdr/symposium/rol/docs/WilliamDavis.pdf [hereinafter Davis, Lessons]. 
Willingness to comply is important for rule of law in a pluralistic democracy;  lack of trust resulting 
from a lack of participation or access decreases this willingness to comply with the rule of law and, in 
turn, increases alienation from the judicial process. Reuben, The Problem of Arbitration, supra note 
40, at 310-12.  For an empirical study on the positive effects of increasing access to justice through 
formal systems of justice, see Micaela Sviatschi et al., The Impact of Improving Access to Justice on 
Conflict Resolution: Evidence from Peru (Inter-Am. Dev. Bank, Working Paper No. OVE/WP-01/10, 
2010), available at http://idbdocs.iadb.org/WSDocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=35586312. 
 128. MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK & RONALD J. DANIELS, RULE OF LAW REFORM & DEVELOPMENT: 
CHARTING THE FRAGILE PATH OF PROGRESS 236-40 (2008) [hereinafter TREBILCOCK & DANIELS, 
RULE OF LAW REFORM]. The authors suggest three normative justifications:  “The importance of equal 
access to the justice system from the point of view of liberal values and social solidarity; the necessity 
of access for the survival of the rule of law itself; and the role that the justice system plays in establish-
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However, as noted by Mauro Cappelletti and Bryant Garth in the “Florence 
Access to Justice Project,” published in 1978, ensuring access to justice presents 
many obstacles.  In this work, the authors address some of the hurdles faced by 
the Access to Justice Movement to promote methods to make the rights of citizens 
“effective and enforceable.”  Utilizing a metaphor of “three waves,” Cappelletti 
and Garth outline the three stages of addressing the issue of lack of access to jus-
tice: the first wave addresses economic obstacles, which keep citizens from either 
accessing information or obtaining representation; the second wave touches on 
organizational obstacles, which include the vindication of rights when interests are 
collective and diffused; the third wave responds to procedural obstacles, where the 
judicial system might not be the best forum for the vindication of rights.  They 
also point out that these issues take place both in developed and developing coun-
tries, though they are more acute in the less-developed world.129  Additionally, 
Michael Anderson has noted that members of low-income communities generally 
show resistance to the justice system, avoiding it due to negative stigmas associat-
ed with engaging the legal system, the incomprehensibility of legal language, and 
the inability of citizens to represent themselves in legal proceedings.130 
Similarly, the World Bank has identified some of the challenges of providing 
access to justice, including social and institutional exclusion, inadequate record 
keeping, lack of access to information, the cost of justice, corruption, and organi-
zational deficiencies; also noted is a lack of awareness on the part of decision-
makers about the importance of the good maintenance of court facilities, which 
generally have run-down conditions and lack space.131   
Even though there is consensus about the need for access to justice, there is 
no consensus about how access to justice should be provided, especially given the 
unique circumstances of each country.  Nonetheless, best practices, which provide 
some guidance, have been developed.  Legal aid has been a significant option for 
addressing economic difficulties.  To surpass organizational obstacles, a series of 
options have been developed by governments to enforce collective rights.  To 
overcome lack of knowledge, efforts have been directed to educate citizens about 
their rights and how to obtain redress.  Regarding procedural issues, ADR has 
emerged as a viable solution.132  However, despite ADR’s promise, its implemen-
tation has not been without controversy.133   
 ___________________________  
ing and maintaining patterns of resource distribution.” Id. at 236 (citing RONALD J. DANIELS & 
MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, RETHINKING THE WELFARE STATE: THE PROSPECTS FOR GOVERNMENT BY 
VOUCHER 76-77 (2005)). 
 129. Id. at 242. See also Kim Economides, 2002: A Justice Odyssey, 34 VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON L. 
REV. 1, 11 (2002) (discussing MAURO CAPPELLETTI & BRYAN GARTH, ACCESS TO JUSTICE (1978)). 
 130. TREBILCOCK & DANIELS, RULE OF LAW REFORM, supra note 128, at 242-43. 
 131. Waleed H. Malik, Access to Justice: Approaches for Bringing Services Closer to the People at 
the Justice Reform 101 Course (Nov. 11, 2010), available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAWJUSTINST/Resources/AccesstoJustice_101_Malik_Nov2
010.pptx (Power Point presentation); see Marc Galanter, Access to Justice in a World of Expanding 
Social Capability, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 115, 118 (2010) (stating access may be prevented when an 
injured party fails to perceive an injury, fails to attribute an injury to a human agency, remains ignorant 
of his or her options or intimidated away from pursuing justice, cannot afford to seek resolution, or 
lacks resources and staying power). 
 132. TREBILCOCK & DANIELS, RULE OF LAW REFORM, supra note 128, at 247-49. 
 133. See, e.g., Mattei, infra note 143. 
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c. ADR in Relation to Rule of Law: An Ongoing Debate 
Even though ADR has been utilized extensively as a means to give citizens 
greater access to justice within the context of rule of law efforts, especially in the 
international setting, its relationship to the rule of law remains contentious.  Aca-
demic debate about whether, or in which circumstances, ADR truly supports rule 
of law continues. For decades, some ADR theorists have expressed concerns that 
the privatization and informalization of dispute resolution processes could inhibit 
the courts’ ability to protect and enforce rights, given the lack of accountability134 
and lack of public outcomes.135  For example, Marc Galanter136 and David Lu-
ban137 have commented on the risk that private ADR settlements could result in 
fewer judicial statements, thus weakening the law’s power to clarify specific legis-
lative acts and to guide practical behavior.  
Similarly, others have posited that the privatization of justice is detrimental to 
those who have less power and fails to establish public norms.138 In this regard, 
the classic piece “Against Settlement” by Owen Fiss saw ADR as being at odds 
with public value resulting from due legal processes,139 noting ADR’s potential to 
be influenced by disparities of power and wealth.140 He also raised the issue of 
authoritative consent, in which a person’s consent may be coerced, and the agree-
ment may be sealed by someone lacking legitimate authority.141 Laura Nader,142 
 ___________________________  
 134. See generally Harry T. Edwards, Commentary, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or 
Anathema?, 99 HARV. L. REV. 668 (1986). 
 135. David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619, 2622-23 
(1995). 
 136. Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal 
and State Courts, 1 J. OF EMP. LEG. STUD. 459 (2004). Galanter concludes his extensive empirical 
study on the decreasing number of trials in the United States and observes that judicial pronounce-
ments have indeed decreased.  However, the overall body of law is still growing, as are commentaries 
and analyses of the law; although we have a “shrinking number of trials,” we also have a “profusion of 
legal information.”  Galanter also points out how the “shadow” under which bargaining happens is 
much broader than just a shadow cast by the substantive law; it includes contingencies such as the cost 
of litigation, attractiveness of certain witnesses, etc.  Galanter concludes that the consequences of these 
changes in the legal system “remain hidden from us.” Id. at 522-31. 
 137. David Luban argues that private settlements can undermine the public goods of adjudication.  
Adjudication sets rules and precedents and keeps the advocacy skills of lawyers tuned.  With each 
settlement, the authority of the courts is eroded.  Settlement allows for questionable conduct, such as a 
lawyer buyout, and may prevent useful information discovered from being used in future cases by 
potential litigants.  Luban, supra note 135, at 2622-26. 
 138. LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 38-39 (1964). 
 139. Owen Fiss argues that courts, which have the legal authority to interpret and enforce public 
values expressed in the Constitution and statutes, are deprived of the opportunity to pronounce judg-
ments when parties settle.  Society pays for this because, while resolution and peace is reached, justice 
may be left undone.  For example, the settlement of a school suit may bring peace but not racial equali-
ty. Fiss, Against Settlement, supra note 39, at 1085-86; but see generally Michael Moffit, Three Things 
to Be Against (“Settlement” Not Included), 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1203 (2009). Moffitt acknowledges 
several possible nuanced readings of Fiss’s Against Settlement, but says that the language chosen by 
Fiss makes it hard to read Against Settlement as anything but urging a choice between settlement and 
litigation.  Moffitt does not view settlement and litigation as opposed to each other, but as necessary in 
light of each other. 
 140. Fiss, Against Settlement, supra note 39, at 1076.   
 141. Id. at 1078 (observing that those acting on behalf of parties, such as lawyers, insurance agencies, 
etc., may seek self-interested settlements that the parties would not have accepted if the choice were 
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Ugo Mattei,143 and Richard Delgado,144 among others, echo Fiss’s concern that 
ADR would simply play into the hands of the most powerful, reinforcing class 
disparities—a concern that is especially legitimized in places where the rule of 
law is already weak or vitiated by corruption and violence.145   
Other theorists, however, when examining the tensions between ADR and 
rule of law, have brought different interpretations into the discussion.  In this re-
gard, Carrie Menkel-Meadow has argued that even though private disputes can 
have public repercussions in some cases, it should be up to the parties to select 
what they consider the most appropriate dispute resolution forum for their case.146  
Moreover, Menkel-Meadow writes, “ . . . some offer hopes that ‘the rule of law’ 
can be universalized as a principled way to resolve conflicts, domestically and 
internationally.  Others of us see law as often conflictual, indeterminate and politi-
cally contested or manipulable, or so focused on the need for regulation of the 
aggregate that it cannot always do justice “justice” in particular cases.  “Legal 
justice is not always actual justice.”147     
Jean Sternlight has pointed out that the domestic concern that ADR practices 
undermine the rule of law does not apply in the same way to the international 
sphere, where ADR seems to be widely accepted as an effective means for ad-
vancing the task at hand.148  Furthermore, Sternlight proposes viewing the rela-
 ___________________________  
entirely theirs, and that when a party is a group, it is difficult to discern who actually holds the authori-
ty to settle). 
 142. See generally Laura Nader, Controlling Processes in the Practice of Law: Hierarchy and Pacifi-
cation in the Movement to Re-Form Dispute Ideology, 9 OHIO S. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1 (1993) (arguing 
that the ADR movement would rather “trade justice for harmony” and that the movement is utilized to 
control populations through pacification). 
 143. See Ugo Mattei, Emergency-Based Predatory Capitalism: The Rule of Law, Alternative Dispute 
Resolution, and Development, in CONTEMPORARY STATES OF EMERGENCY: THE POLITICS OF 
MILITARY AND HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTIONS 89 (Didier Fassin & Mariella Pandolfi, eds., 2010) 
(arguing that ADR essentially gives those with enough resources the ability to set their own rules and 
follow their own processes; it is especially dangerous in an individualistic culture because the out-
comes tend to favor the strong, and like “rule of law,” ADR is a concept that both the political right 
and left support, even though it has a tendency to simply protect existing social structures and inequali-
ties). 
 144. See Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in Alter-
native Dispute Resolution, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1359, 1388-89 (citing studies, which show that formali-
ties and procedures in adversarial adjudication counteract bias and strengthen the resolve of minorities 
to pursue legal rights). 
 145. Fiss, Against Settlement, supra note 39, at 1077-78 (observing that judges can take steps to 
lessen the impact of distributional equalities; steps that, although small, should not be ignored). 
 146. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?: A Philosophical and Democratic De-
fense of Settlement (In Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663, 2689-91 (1995) (arguing that allowing in-
formed parties to decide which dispute process is more appropriate is far more democratic than adjudi-
cation or coerced “public” settlement).  See also Donna Shestowsky, Procedural Preferences in Alter-
native Dispute Resolution, 10 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 211, 228 (2001). Procedural preference may 
give advantage to lower status parties.  Manipulation of lower status parties can be avoided by: a) 
allowing the lower status party to have veto power over a third-party’s decision as to the outcome; b) 
process control that allows disputants to present evidence on their own behalf or with help from a 
representative; and c) party control over the rules.  Id. 
 147. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, From Legal Disputes to Conflict Resolution and Human Problem 
Solving: Legal Dispute Resolution in a Multidisciplinary Context, 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 7, 8 (2004) 
[hereinafter Menkel-Meadow, From Legal Disputes]. 
 148. Jean Sternlight proposes three possible paths to resolution of this contradiction: first, that domes-
tic critics of ADR would remain critics in the international context, and advocates would remain sup-
portive.  Pointing to Brown v. Bd. of Ed., these groups acknowledge some tensions.  Yet in the interna-
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tionship between ADR and rule of law in a different light. Instead of simply being 
used to resolve the inadequacies of court systems, ADR should be understood in 
light of social norms. It should be considered as a supporting element for rule of 
law, as part of a larger vision of justice that has more to do with promoting social 
harmony than strict adherence to rules. “By labeling ADR projects as rule of law 
projects and using them to achieve or work toward peace, perhaps we are begin-
ning to recognize that our definition of justice ought to be broadened to include 
harmony and social equality as well as individual rights,” she writes, noting Ros-
coe Pound’s observation that “while law may serve justice, justice is broader than 
law.”149 This broader view of justice allows rule of law and ADR to be conceived 
as complementary means toward the same goal. 
Furthering the discussion, theorists such as Richard Reuben have argued that 
the issue should be reframed from whether or not ADR supports the rule of law, to 
the circumstances under which it does so.  He contends that, although it may ap-
pear ADR could subvert rule of law by diverting dispute resolution to the private 
sphere, it can actually uphold it when implemented consistently with procedural 
justice values.150  In this regard, Reuben refers to some of the ways in which ADR 
supports the rule of law, including using ADR for smaller cases, which frees the 
judiciary to handle cases that interpret constitutions or statutes or otherwise estab-
lish important precedents. This would also help to cut back on the problem of 
backlog and inefficiency and would foster methods more in accordance with par-
ticular cultures.  Yet, he emphasized that only when ADR is implemented in ac-
cordance with procedural justice values can it create greater investment and confi-
dence in rule of law.151 He further notes that procedural justice research shows 
that, when rule-making processes and dispute resolution are carried out in a way 
that citizens perceive as fair and in which their voice and dignity are respected, 
they are more likely to be compliant and invested in upholding them.152   Moreo-
 ___________________________  
tional arena, pointing to specific examples in Nicaragua and Nepal, Sternlight observes that ADR can 
promote rule of law.  A second way would argue for ADR as a “second-best” alternative to dysfunc-
tional judiciaries, which Sternlight finds problematic because it fails to differentiate the significant 
differences between ADR and the courts.  If access to justice is the rationale behind the application of 
ADR to international rule-of-law efforts, why is this same rationale unacceptable in the domestic 
context? Sternlight, ADR Consistent, supra note 10, at 569-72, 577-90.  
 149. Id. at 592. 
 150. Reuben, ADR and the Rule of Law, supra note 8, at 6-7.   
 151. Id.   
 152. Reuben, The Problem of Arbitration, supra note 40, at 312. For more on the procedural justice, 
see Nancy Welsh, Making Deals in Court-Connected Mediation: What’s Justice Got to Do with It?, 79 
WASH U. L.Q. 787, 817 (2001) (citing Leigh Thompson & Janice Nadler, Judgmental Biases in Con-
flict Resolution and How to Overcome Them, in THE HANDBOOK OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 41-42 
(Morton Deutsch & Peter T. Coleman eds., 2000) (“Procedural Justice is concerned with the fairness of 
the procedures or processes that are used to arrive at outcomes.”)); see also id. at 820 (citing ALLAN 
LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 101-04, 214, 263 (1988); 
JANE ADLER ET AL., SIMPLE JUSTICE: HOW LITIGANTS FARE IN THE PITTSBURGH COURT ARBITRATION 
PROGRAM 65 (1983)). Four factors lead to the experience of procedural justice:  
 
First, perceptions of procedural justice are enhanced to the extent that disputants perceive that 
they had the opportunity to present their views, concerns, and evidence to a third party and had 
control over this presentation (“opportunity for voice”). Second, disputants are more likely to 
perceive procedural justice if they perceive that the third party considered their views, concerns, 
and evidence. Third, disputants' judgments about procedural justice are affected by the perception 
that the third party treated them in a dignified, respectful manner and that the procedure itself was 
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ver, he states that “the rule of law in a democracy derives its greatest source from 
citizens’ willingness to voluntarily comply.”153  Reuben further suggests that, if 
governance is understood as the “process of societal conflict management,” con-
sensual ADR processes, given their participatory nature, could foster rule of law 
more effectively than traditional, top-down rule of law processes such as litiga-
tion.154  
When examining use of ADR as a means of promoting rule of law efforts in 
the international context, significant attention should be given to the implementa-
tion methods and the degree to which they are consistent with procedural justice 
values. Furthermore, the extent of citizen engagement also seems to be of critical 
importance since increased participation can lead to high levels of ownership and 
sustainability of rule of law. 
d. Efforts to Promote Rule of Law through ADR in Latin America 
Promotion of the rule of law began to be advanced as an essential component 
for democracy in Latin America in the 1980s.155   In the preceding decades, U.S. 
assistance to the region was carried out through law and development, focusing on 
legal education at the university level and public safety.  These efforts were 
deemed to be of little effectiveness.156   In 1983, the U.S. State Department began 
to develop the role of rule of law in promoting democracy in the region.157  The 
next year, a report by the U.S. National Bipartisan Commission on Central Ameri-
ca encouraged the promotion of “strong judicial systems to enhance the capacity 
to redress grievances concerning personal security, property rights and free 
speech.”158   Before the end of 1984, the U.S. Congress passed legislation that 
 ___________________________  
dignified. Although it seems that a disputants' [sic] perceptions regarding a fourth factor--the im-
partiality of the third party decision maker--also ought to affect procedural justice judgments, it 
appears that disputants are influenced more strongly by their observations regarding the third par-
ty's even-handedness and attempts at fairness. 
 
Id. See also Tom R. Tyler & Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Procedural Justice in Negotiation: Proce-
dural Fairness, Outcome Acceptance, and Integrative Potential, 33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 473, 477 
(2008) (writing that psychological research shows that individuals place high value on the fairness of 
processes, independent of the value placed on outcomes and distributive justice); Nancy Welsh, Dispu-
tants’ Decision Control in Court-Connected Mediation: A Hollow Promise Without Procedural Jus-
tice, 2002 J. DISP. RESOL. 179, 187-91 (2002) (arguing that procedural justice, although typically 
arising out of a Constitutional obligation in non-consensual criminal proceedings, should be just as 
much part of a consensual process).  A system should not only involve procedural justice, but also 
involve the appearance of procedural justice to build social capital.  See Robert M. Ackerman, Vanish-
ing Trial, Vanishing Community? The Potential Effect of the Vanishing Trial on America’s Social 
Capital, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 165, 167-68 [hereinafter Ackerman, Vanishing] (arguing that the public 
needs to perceive procedural fairness and access to justice if it will participate and build social capital). 
 153. Reuben, The Problem of Arbitration, supra note 40, at 311-12.  Reuben argues that compliance 
must be voluntary, since the power to enforce the law is limited, and the cost of individualized deter-
rence is too high. Id. 
 154. See generally Richard Reuben, ADR and the Rule of Law: Paradox and Potential, J. DISP. 
RESOL. (forthcoming) (on file with author). 
 155. ACHIEVEMENTS IN BUILDING AND MAINTAINING THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 10, at 1-2. 
 156. Id. at 1. 
 157. Id.  
 158. Id. at 2. 
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provided for a justice program in El Salvador, and in 1985, for the entire Latin 
American region.159  
USAID was the government agency charged with carrying out the legislative 
mandates. To this end, the organization has engaged local experts and provided 
training, equipment, and technical assistance with the collaboration of the U.N.-
affiliated Latin American Institute for the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of 
the Offender (ILANUD).160  USAID has also been involved in reforming laws and 
legal procedures and has placed special emphasis on the criminal procedural 
codes.  The strengthening and reform of the judicial system to promote transpar-
ency and accountability, as well as to provide training and court management, has 
been of central importance to the reform process.161  USAID has contributed to 
the promotion of access to justice in the region, primarily through Casas de Justi-
cia.162 They have established Casas de Justicia in Colombia, Guatemala, and Pe-
ru, with the goal of making the rule of law “more real for many who previously 
lacked practical access to the courts.”163  Other USAID efforts to promote access 
to justice have encompassed strengthening legal education, with an emphasis on 
non-traditional issues including professional ethics and ADR.164 Regarding ADR 
efforts, the emphasis has been on striving “to increase transparency, improve good 
governance and reduce corruption in government activity.”165  The agency has 
carried out projects in 15 countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mex-
ico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay.166    
The international firm DPK Consulting, among others, has played a signifi-
cant role in the design and implementation of ADR programs in the region: in the 
business sector, through the Chamber of Commerce in Chile and Ecuador; in the 
public sector, through the judicial system in Argentina, Costa Rica, the Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, and El Salvador; and in the community sector, as part of 
community-based organizations in Ecuador, Guatemala, El Salvador, Peru, and 
the Dominican Republic.167  One of the main strategies has been to develop a pilot 
project and engage local leaders.  DPK’s projects include a variety of programs 
that range from increasing the efficiency of the judiciary in Peru, Ecuador, Gua-
temala, and Bolivia to anti-corruption programs in Argentina.  DPK also provides 
standards regarding the design and maintenance of judicial infrastructure.168   
 ___________________________  
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 5-6. 
 162. Id. at 7. 
 163. Id.  
 164. Id.  
 165. USAID Supports Alternative Dispute Resolution in Latin America and the Caribbean, USAID 
(2004), available at http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACA631.pdf [hereinafter USAID Supports ADR]. 
 166. ACHIEVEMENTS IN BUILDING AND MAINTAINING THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 10, at 1. 
 167. See, e.g., William E. Davis & Razili K. Datta, Implementing ADR Programs in Developing 
Justice Sectors: Case Studies and Lessons Learned, 16 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 16 (discussing DPK’s 
involvement in El Salvador). 
 168. See Use of Pilot Programs in Rule of Law Projects 1, DPK CONSULTING (2002), available at 
http://www.dpkconsulting.com/core/uploaded//newsletterfeb02.pdf  (discussing DPK involvement in 
the judicial infrastructure of Bolivia, Ecuador, Honduras, and El Salvador, as well as various other 
locations around the world) [hereinafter DPK Consulting, Use of Pilot Programs]. 
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In addition to USAID, the World Bank has played a significant role in the 
promotion of rule of law and access to justice in the region as well.169  As part of 
their efforts, the World Bank has emphasized: the promotion of citizens’ educa-
tion regarding legal norms; the expansion of the budget for the judicial system, as 
well as reduction of cost proceedings; the improvement of incentive for judges 
and court personnel; the promotion of judicial services closer to the people; and 
the modernization of court buildings and processes. In this context, ADR efforts 
have also been carried out in the region.170    
The promotion of ADR in Latin America has focused specifically on arbitra-
tion, mediation, Casas de Justicia (justice centers), and justices of peace. Even 
though there has been some development in domestic arbitration in Latin Ameri-
ca, the main focus of ADR efforts has been in the area of commercial arbitra-
tion.171 In particular, international treaties in the region, such as MERCOSUR 
(Common Market of the South), have spawned a rise in the use of arbitration to 
settle business disputes.172 Among other reasons, the business sector opts for arbi-
tration primarily because it provides a more effective and efficient method for 
settling their disputes; it also acts as an alternative to the backlogged judicial sys-
tems. 173 In addition, foreign investors in international commercial arbitration 
often have concerns regarding local court bias.174  However, if either party—
domestic or foreign—wants to enforce the arbitration award, it has to turn to the 
local courts, which have the necessary authority to do so.  As a result, the local 
judicial backlog can hamper the enforceability of arbitration awards.175   
 ___________________________  
 169. Some of these efforts have been quite innovative.  For example, in attempting to address the 
problem of corruption, the Bank has used the Internet as a way to promote transparency and accessibil-
ity.  Similarly, in order to bring citizens closer to the judicial system, the World Bank has promoted 
Casas de Justicia as “one-stop-shop justice centers,” e-justice, and mobile courts. Malik, supra note 
131.   
 170. Id.  
 171. For an overview of arbitration in Argentina see JULIO CESAR RIVERA, ARBITRAJE COMERCIAL 
INTERNACIONAL Y DOMESTICO (2007); JORGE ALBERTO ROBIOLO, DERECHO ARBITRAL (2007).  See 
also Marcos Van Rafelghem, International Arbitration in South America, ASIA PACIFIC REGIONAL  
ARBITRATION GROUP, www.aprag.org/downloads/Arbitration_in_South_America_2_1.doc (last visit-
ed June 18, 2011); Julio Cesar Rivera, El Arbitraje en Argentina, 
http://www.rivera.com.ar/archivos/File/publicaciones/Rivera_El%20arbitraje%20en%20Argentina2.pd
f  (last visited Aug. 7, 2010) (citing Fernando Aguilar, ¿Para qué sirve una ley nacional de arbitraje?, 
REVISTA JURIDICA LA LEY  (Jan. 19-20, 2005)); Jose Maria Abascal, Mexico, LATIN LAWYER 2010, 
(forthcoming) www.latinlawyer.com (on file with the author).  
 172. Welber Barral, Evolução Recente da Arbitragem no Brasil, in ARBITRAJE Y MEDIACION EN LAS 
AMERICAS 67 (Juan Enrique Vargas Viancos & Francisco Javier Gorjón Gómez eds., 2006). 
 173. Gustabo Parodi, Arbitration—Argentina, LATIN LAWYER, http://www.latinlawyer.com 
/reference/article/40656/argentina/ (last visited June 18, 2011) (citing case backlog as a reason that 
companies choose arbitration). 
 174. “[B]usinesses typically do not choose arbitration in international settings because it is faster, less 
expensive, or more private than litigation.  They choose arbitration because they see no real litigation 
alternative.”  Don Peters, Can We Talk? Overcoming Barriers to Mediating Private Transborder 
Commercial Disputes in the Americas, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1251, 1261 (2008); see also Jill A. 
Pietroski, Enforcing International Commercial Arbitration Agreements—Post-Mitsubishi Motors 
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 36 AM. U. L. REV. 57, 57-58 (1986) (stating arbitration in 
international disputes can be a response to party distrust of foreign courts). 
 175. Cristian Conejero Roos, National Constitutions and International Arbitration in Latin America: 
A Dangerous Liaison, ARB. REV. AMERICAS 10 (2010).  
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The promotion of mediation in Latin America has been used, for the most 
part, as a way to provide access to justice for low-income communities176 and to 
reduce the cost of dispute resolution.177  Although mediation has been promoted 
through court-connected efforts in some countries,178 various mediation projects 
operate outside the judicial system.179  Yet, when parties from low-income com-
munities are unsatisfied with the results of their mediation processes, financial 
and, in many cases, geographical limitations can make it difficult for them to seek 
justice through adjudication.180  Furthermore, as with arbitration awards, a con-
gested judicial system can undermine the enforceability of the mediation agree-
ment.181   
Casas de Justicia have also been promoted in several countries of the region 
as part of efforts to expand access to justice, with the aim of advancing pro se, 
legal education, human rights, and the de-judicialization of dispute resolution.182  
The concept of the Casas de Justicia is a variation of the multi-door courthouse 
model, which has been developed to a lesser degree as oficinas multi-puertas 
(multi-door offices).183  The Casas de Justicia are generally located in marginal-
ized areas,184 whereas the oficinas multi-puertas are located in urban areas as part 
 ___________________________  
 176. See Maria Dakolias, Legal and Judicial Development: The Role of Civil Society in the Reform 
Process, 24 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. S26, S39 (2000). 
 177. See generally ELENA I. HIGHTON & GLADYS S. ALVAREZ, MEDIACIÓN PARA RESOLVER 
CONFLICTOS (1995); GLADYS S. ALVAREZ, MEDIACIÓN Y JUSTICIA (1996); GLADYS S. ALVAREZ, LA 
MEDIACION Y EL ACCESO A JUSTICIA, (2004). 
 178. Gladys Stella Álvarez, Hacia un Cambio de Paradigma Cultural en Resolución Alternative de 
Disputas. El Modelo de la “Mediación Prejudicial Obligatoria, Anexa o Conectada con Tribunales 
Civiles y Comerciales en Argentina”: Diez Años de Experiencia, in ARBITRAJE Y MEDIACIÓN EN LAS 
AMERICAS 29-37 (Juan Enrique Vargas Viancos & Francisco Javier Gorjon Gomez eds., 2006), 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/75278781/Arbitrage-y-Mediacion-en-las-Americas. 
 179. See, e.g., USAID Supports ADR, supra note 165 (discussing community mediation centers in 
Mexico and El Salvador). 
 180. Hernández Crespo, Shadow, supra note 79, at 98-100. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Lisa L. Bhansali, Access to Justice: Elements of Judicial Reform at the Core Course on Legal 




WlMDqlBVViA&sig2=E8GX45WefA3ieWSUYw8-XQ (Power Point presentation) [hereinafter 
Access to Justice Powerpoint]. 
 183. In Argentina, oficina multi-puerta are available at the national level.  See Multipuertas, CORTE 
SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA DE LA NACIÓN: REPÚBLICA ARGENTINA, 
http://www.csjn.gov.ar/accjust/docs/nacional.jsp#06 (last visited June 18, 2011); Neuquén, Oficina 
Multipuertas, CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA DE LA NACIÓN: REPÚBLICA ARGENTINA, 
http://www.csjn.gov.ar/accjust/docs/neuquen.jsp#multi (last visited June 18, 2011); Rio Negro, Oficina 
Multipuertas, CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA DE LA NACIÓN: REPÚBLICA ARGENTINA, 
http://www.csjn.gov.ar/accjust/docs/rionegro.jsp#multi (last visited June 18, 2011).    
 184. Casa de justicia in Argentina are available in Buenos Aires, Rio Negro, Santiago de Estero, and 
Tierra del Fuego. See, e.g., Buenos Aires Casa de Justicia, CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA DE LA 
NACIÓN: REPÚBLICA ARGENTINA, http://www.csjn.gov.ar/accjust/docs/buenosaires.jsp#02 (last visited 
June 18, 2011); Rio Negro Casa de Justicia, CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA DE LA NACIÓN: REPÚBLICA 
ARGENTINA, http://www.csjn.gov.ar/accjust/docs/rionegro.jsp#08 (last visited June 18, 2011); Santia-
go de Estero Casa de Justicia, CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA DE LA NACIÓN: REPÚBLICA ARGENTINA, 
http://www.csjn.gov.ar/accjust/docs/santiagodelestero.jsp#casas (last visited June 18, 2011); Tierra del 
Fuego Casa de Justicia, CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA DE LA NACIÓN: REPÚBLICA ARGENTINA, 
http://www.csjn.gov.ar/accjust/docs/tierradelfuego.jsp#08 (last visited June 18, 2011). 
32
Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2012, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2012/iss2/2
File: Crespo FINAL (061113) Created on: 6/12/2013 6:17:00 PM Last Printed: 6/12/2013 6:21:00 PM 
No. 2] From Noise to Music 367 
 
of the court system.  Casas de Justicia are one-stop shops, generally established in 
remote areas that have limited access to the court system. They provide a variety 
of administrative and legal services, including ADR,185 aimed at addressing fami-
ly, labor, juvenile, and criminal issues, as well as community disputes.  The Casas 
de Justicia tailor these services to the specific population, such as the indigenous 
population and other ethnic groups.186   
The basic model of Casas de Justicia in the region usually seeks to decentral-
ize justice and to integrate government services, making them more accessible to 
the community.187  Nonetheless, the implementation and functions of Casas de 
Justicia can sometimes be perceived as a deliberate effort of the government to 
impose itself on the communities.188 In addition, with regard to the implementa-
tion of justice through Casas de Justicia, citizens sometimes find the local norms 
and practices, which at times could controversially affect their individual well-
being, imbue some processes in the Casas de Justicia, such as the mediation pro-
cess (conciliadores en equidad).189  However, since the model of Casas de Justi-
cia varies from country to country, not all casas face the same difficulties. As will 
be discussed at greater length below, Casas de Justicia are a flexible model that 
can be used as one of the promising building blocks to promote citizens’ participa-
 ___________________________  
 185. For example, the Department of San Pedro, Paraguay has one of these systems. Proyecto 
‘Abriendo Puertas, Justicia y Equidad Social’… hacia un modelo de Casa de Justicia en el Depart-
mento de San Pedro, CENTRO DE ESTUDIOS JUDICIALES (Nov. 26, 2008), 
http://www.cej.org.py/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=185:proyecto-abriendo-
puertas-justicia-y-equidad-social-hacia-un-modelo-de-casa-de-justicia-en-el-departamento-de-san-
pedro&catid=52:justicia-y-redes-en-la-democracia&Itemid=78 (last visited Aug. 21, 2011). 
 186. Colombia is a good example of tailoring services to local populations and conditions. Casas de 
Justicia, MINISTERIO DEL INTERIOR Y DE JUSTICIA, http://www.mij.gov.co/eContent 
/newsdetailmore.asp?id=2976&idcompany=2&idmenucategory=226 (last visited June 18, 2011). 
 187. Access to Justice Powerpoint, supra note 182. 
 188. International Council on Human Rights Policy, When Legal Worlds Overlap, Human Rights, 
State and Non-State Law (2009), http://www.scribd.com/doc/61924941/When-Legal-Worlds-Overlap-
Human-Rights-State-and-Non-State-Law (last visited August 9, 2011).  
 
Similarly, the Casas de Justicia legal service centers in Colombia are sometimes perceived by 
shantytown dwellers as a device for smuggling the repressive arm of the state into their commu-
nities. This was the case in Ciudad Bolívar, barrio Jerusalén, where a Casa de Justicia was estab-
lished with no proper analysis, and without consulting the community. Reflecting the main objec-
tive of its promoters—to control outbreaks of violence—the two most prominent officials of the 
‘non-state’ mechanism were the local Police Inspector and Public Prosecutor.  
 
Id. at 125. 
 189. For example: 
 
[W]omen in two barrios of Bogota, Colombia, especially resent the ideology of conciliation pro-
moted by Casas de Justicia because they reaffirmed patriarchal patterns of domination. They 
claim, for example, that Casas de Justicia generally encourage female victims of domestic vio-
lence to continue living with their male partners who, for the sake of promoting harmony, are 
never punished. 
 
Id. at n.80.  However, USAID has made significant efforts to protect the legal rights of women in Latin 
America and the Caribbean. For example, Casas de Justicia in Colombia have been used as a commu-
nity based effort in which women can lead other women through the justice process.  WOMEN AND 
FAMILIES PROGRAM & PARTNERS OF THE AMERICAS, PROTECTING WOMEN’S LEGAL RIGHTS IN 
MEXICO, COLOMBIA AND DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: FINAL REPORT 7, 
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDABZ729.pdf. 
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tion through ADR in Latin America and to contribute to establishing a foundation 
for a more sustainable rule of law. 
Justices of peace, or lay magistrates, have existed in Latin American since the 
1800s, but only began to play a central role in access to justice efforts in the last 
few decades.190  Present mainly in poorer suburbs of the cities, small towns and 
rural areas, justices of peace usually work pro bono191 and act as conciliators with 
limited jurisdiction that, in almost all cases, covers small claims and family mat-
ters.192  Justices are often selected from members of the community who are high-
ly respected, but rarely have legal knowledge.193  They apply customary practice, 
as opposed to the law, and, given the informality of their role, can at times over-
step the bounds of their jurisdiction.194  Because of their cost effectiveness, justic-
es of peace have been promoted extensively throughout the region.195  Currently, 
many justices of peace are found in Casas de Justicia, though some operate as the 
sole source of justice in underserved areas that have limited access to the judici-
ary.196 The same arguments sometimes addressed at Casas de Justicia, regarding 
the controversial use of local practices, also apply to the justices of peace. 
Despite great efforts that have been made to use ADR as a significant means 
to advance rule of law through access to justice in the Latin American context, 
ADR has not yet reached its full potential and could be more effective if a more 
systemic approach to its implementation were adopted. I have argued elsewhere 
that the lack of a systemic approach and inclusion has produced unintended con-
sequences.197 Although the term “shadow of the law” originally referred specifi-
cally to the influence law has during the negotiation process, 198 I have used it in a 
broader sense to refer to the legal frame of reference that affects facilitative pro-
cesses—where there is effective access to the judicial system. In the Latin Ameri-
can context, there is a pale shadow of the law, meaning there is no practical re-
 ___________________________  
 190. Peru has been effective in the establishment of the Justices of Peace and its model has been used 
to establish similar programs in Colombia, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Venezuela with the financial support 
of the European Union.  See Julio Faundez, Non-State Justice Systems in Latin America Case Studies: 
Peru and Colombia 35-38, THE WORLD BANK (2003), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ 
INTLAWJUSTINST/Resources/Faundez.pdf. 
 191. In Colombia, for example, justices of peace can be compensated for some administrative ex-
penses.  Interview with Annette Pearson de Gonzalez, International Consultant for the USAID Justice 
Program in El Salvador: Improving the Administration of Justice Program, Checchi/USAID (Aug. 3, 
2011) (on file with author) [hereinafter Interview with Pearson de Gonzalez].  
 192. Id. 
 193. Id.  
 194. Id. 
 195. Id.; see, e.g., Steven E. Hendrix, Guatemalan “Justice Centers”: The Centerpiece for Advancing 
Transparency, Efficiency, Due Process, and Access to Justice, 15 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 813, 823 
(2000) [hereinafter Hendrix, Guatemalan Justice Centers]. 
 196. See Hendrix, Guatemalan Justice Centers, supra note 195, at 848 (describing efforts to place a 
justice of the peace in Guatemalan communities that lacked other channels to access justice).  Howev-
er, some programs have expanded to include urban areas.  For example, Justices of Peace currently 
serve in Chacao, part of the metropolitan area of Caracas, Venezuela. See Chacao cuenta con 77 jueces 
de paz, http://www.guia.com.ve/noticias/?id=49857 (last visited June 23, 2011). 
 197. See generally Hernández Crespo, Shadow, supra note 79. 
 198. See Robert Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of 
Divorce, 88 YALE L. J. 950 (1979) [hereinafter Mnookin, Bargaining].  Even though Mnookin was 
referring to a very practical approach of the impact of the shadow of the law during the negotiation 
process, I have argued elsewhere that the concept can be utilized on a larger scale when referring to the 
needs of a court system to protect citizens’ rights when they engage in facilitative processes. 
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course to the court system in many areas, which affects processes such as media-
tion. In this regard, when parties do not reach an agreement, they do not have the 
option of going to a method of adjudication through the courts. Rather, they utilize 
de facto powers, such as the drug traffickers in the Brazilian favelas, which act as 
the shadow of the law under which the mediation agreement takes place.199 I have 
also argued that, even though significant efforts have been carried out in the de-
velopment of arbitration, mediation, and reforms of the judicial system, one of the 
unintended effects has been the production of what I have called three tiers of 
justice: “private arbitration, for those who can afford an arbiter; the justice system, 
for those who can afford a lawyer; and mediation centers, for those who can af-
ford neither.”200 
The following sections of this Article suggest ADR could be more effectively 
implemented in Latin America if there were greater access to the judicial system 
and more emphasis on systemic inclusion.  Regarding greater access to justice, 
while ADR efforts have focused on providing access to a broader spectrum of 
dispute resolution methods, more attention should also be given to achieving time-
ly adjudication through the court system when cases require judicial decision-
making. This could be achieved by judicial reforms that lie beyond the scope of 
this Article and if the implementation of ADR through Casas de Justicia were to 
have a stronger connection to the judiciary. Casas de Justicia could further this 
endeavor by bringing the mediation process and the court system under the same 
roof, thus providing more direct access to the judiciary and enhancing the shadow 
of the law so as to alleviating the issue of enforcement. In this way, the casas 
could help address the issue of the three-tier justice system by increasing access to 
justice for all. Regarding the emphasis of systemic inclusion, the subsequent sec-
tions also expand on how ADR efforts could be better contextualized so as to 
address, rather than replicate, the prevailing patterns of exclusion.  To achieve 
 ___________________________  
 199. “[P]roponents of ADR in international rule of law projects may be unduly optimistic in their 
belief that ADR can solve problems of corruption, access to justice, and social inequality.” Sternlight, 
ADR Consistent, supra note 10, at 586-87; see also Andrea K. Schneider, Bargaining in the Shadow of 
(International) Law: What the Normalization of Adjudication in International Governance Regimes 
Means for Dispute Resolution, 41 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 789, 818-19 (2009) (citing Mnookin, 
Bargaining, supra note 198, at 968; Lisa J. Laplante, Bringing Effective Remedies Home: The Inter-
American Human Rights System, Reparations, and the Duty of Prevention, 22 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 324 
(2004) (explaining that in the United States we have confidence in our use of ADR because we “bar-
gain in the shadow of a longstanding body of law we can count on;” and that in international struc-
tures, where rule of law exists, more domestic and consensual processes may be used, but where there 
is a lack of rights and equality, steps must be taken to account for the missing shadow of the law)). 
 200. Hernández Crespo, Shadow, supra note 79, at 115. It is important to note that the three tiers of 
justice in Latin America occur in the context of ADR operating under a pale shadow of the law. This 
makes it distinct from the discussion of a two-tier justice system in the context of the United States. 
See Albert W. Alschuler, Mediation with a Mugger: The Shortage of Adjudicative Services and the 
Need for a Two-Tier Trial System in Civil Cases, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1808 (1986) (arguing for a two-tier 
civil trial system in the United States); see also Timothy Hedeen, The Evolution and Evaluation of 
Community Mediation: Limited Research Suggests Unlimited Progress, 22 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 101, 
102 (2004) (discussing the formation of “Neighborhood Justice Centers” that responded to the inade-
quacy of courts, as well as critiques of such community mediation efforts, describing them as more 
geared toward efficiency and harmony than justice, or calling community mediation second-class 
justice); see generally Thomas Christian, Community Dispute Resolution: First-Class Process or 
Second-Class Justice?, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 771 (1986) (arguing that community medi-
ation centers provide first class process and first class justice, given the number of agreements reached 
and the level of party satisfaction). 
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this, Casas de Justicia will be expounded upon as one of the building blocks for 
implementing ADR in the region and will be expanded to including all citizens, 
rather than serving only low-income communities.  Casas would assume a more 
prominent role in public conflict management and dispute resolution; casas would 
also take part in public policy making through collaborative governance in the 
policy continuum. The challenge lies in how to implement ADR, expanding its 
focus beyond access to justice, which is necessary but insufficient, in order to 
promote a more inclusive and participatory society that acts as the essential foun-
dation for a more sustainable rule of law.   
III. ADVANCING SYSTEMIC INCLUSION THROUGH PARTICIPATORY 
CONFLICT RESOLUTION: TAPPING INTO THE POTENTIAL OF THE MULTI-
DOOR COURTHOUSE MODEL IN LATIN AMERICA 
To address the prevailing issue of exclusion in Latin America and the chal-
lenges regarding the implementation of ADR, this section first argues for expand-
ing the traditional use of ADR in the region.  It suggests the focus of implementa-
tion should be broadened, from primarily being utilized as a means for access to 
justice for the poor, to include a more encompassing role that furthers systemic 
inclusion and public participation.  Next, it examines the current version of multi-
door efforts in the Latin American context, which will be used as the building 
blocks for advancing this goal. It then explores how to further develop the un-
tapped potential of Casas de Justicia, one of the main multi-door models. It sug-
gests the casas should be expanded to all citizens, focus on enhancing citizens’ 
self-determination and problem solving capacity, and be further used in public 
dispute resolution and other experiences of collaborative governance. Finally, 
drawing on the early multi-door courthouse model as a vehicle for delivery of 
integrated dispute resolution services, it explains how the proposed model could 
address systemic change in the Latin American context by: increasing the number 
of Casas de Justicia and expanding their connection with the judicial system; 
adapting the role of the multi-door screener into a conflict assessor to strengthen 
citizen participation; including an organizational ombuds function that could fos-
ter public dispute resolution and other experiences of collaborative governance; 
linking conflict assessors through state and national forums for the identification 
of systemic issues and the development of best practices; and addressing the iden-
tified systemic issues through collaborative governance. 
A. Harnessing Social Capital through Participatory Conflict Resolution 
As discussed in previous sections, ADR has been promoted extensively in 
Latin America as a means of fostering rule of law and access to justice.  However, 
if the ADR field were used to address the issue of exclusion by enhancing social 
capital201 and developing more effective channels for citizens’ participation, it 
 ___________________________  
 201. Xavier Briggs warns that social capital can have positive or negative results.  On the positive 
side, it can provide mutual support, cooperation, trust, and institutional effectiveness.  It can also, 
however, lead to sectarianism, ethnocentrism, and corruption. In order to maximize its constructive 
uses and minimize its destructive effects, it is necessary to have a thorough understanding of social 
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could have an even broader and more enduring effect upon the region. Now that 
reformers have expanded their focus from merely economic concerns to include 
the social dimension—what has been called the “second-generation reform” or the 
“post-Washington Consensus”—it seems the time is ripe to maximize the benefits 
that the ADR field can contribute to the promotion of inclusion in the region.  
As Kerry Rittich has articulated, the “second-generation reform” entails more 
participation and more actors to increase ownership in the development process.202  
In this regard, a greater focus on the development of social capital, especially 
horizontal social capital, could hold great promise for building more inclusive 
societies on the foundation of rule of law.  As mentioned earlier, however, there is 
a great deal of vertical social capital in the present day reality of Latin America, 
while horizontal social capital tends to be weaker, resulting in less civic engage-
ment.  The answer to this problem is to foster participation; so concludes Bernardo 
Kliksberg,203 a chief advisor to the Regional Bureau for Latin America and the 
Caribbean of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).  According 
to Kliksberg, the only way to build horizontal social capital is through genuine 
participation, since higher trust levels lead to increased connectivity and civic 
consciousness.204  He concludes the human person “was born to participate” (el 
ser humano nació para participar)205 and that participation should be regarded as 
an end in itself, not simply as a means to an economic or political goal.206 
Harnessing social capital for increased public participation in decision-
making and problem solving requires effective channels, as Latin American 
scholar Leonardo Avritzer has argued.  Avritzer contends these channels have an 
important role to play in fostering greater inclusion, social cohesion, and stability 
in the region.207  These channels can take different forms, depending on the type 
of participation and the level of citizen engagement.  In some cases, the channels 
may be public forums, such as town halls, where citizens can come together and 
discuss issues or make policy recommendations to lawmakers.208  In others, the 
 ___________________________  
capital and its twofold potential. See Xavier de Souza Briggs, Ties That Bind, Bridge and Constrain: 
Social Capital and Segregation in the American Metropolis, available at 
https://www.lincolninst.edu/pubs/dl/597_briggs.pdf; see also XAVIER DE SOUZA BRIGGS, DEMOCRACY 
AS PROBLEM SOLVING: CIVIC CAPACITY IN COMMUNITIES ACROSS THE GLOBE (2008) (examining the 
circumstances of six cities in different countries, Briggs argues that citizens can develop civic capacity, 
which plays an essential role in enhancing governance, and suggests that this can be done even in 
societies where cooperative civic action has not been the norm) [hereinafter BRIGGS, DEMOCRACY].  
 202. See Rittich, supra note 124. 
 203. Bernardo Kliksberg is advisor of the UN, UNICEF, and UNESCO, and has been director of the 
UN for the project of modernization of the government and social programs in Latin America, and 
coordinator of the Interamerican Insititute of Social Development of the IDB (the Interamerican De-
velopment Bank). He also served as general coordinator of the Interamerican Initiative about Social 
Capital, Ethics and Development of the IDB. 
 204. BERNARDO KLIKSBERG, EL CAPITAL SOCIAL 33-34 (2001). By way of example, he cites the case 
of the World Bank projects aimed at providing water to poor areas in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.  
Out of the 121 projects, the most successful of all were the participatory models, which produced 
“overwhelming” results. Id. 
 205. Id. at 33.  
 206. Id. at 37. 
 207. Leonardo Avritzer, DEMOCRACY AND THE PUBLIC SPACE IN LATIN AMERICA 165-70 (2002). 
 208. In the area of Dispute System Design this is considered “upstream processes.”  See Kirk Emer-
son et al., The Challenges of Environmental Conflict Resolution, in PROMISE AND PERFORMANCE OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION 3, 4 (Rosemary O’Leary & Lisa B. Bingham eds., 2003). 
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channels are oriented towards the resolution of disputes.209  The field of ADR can 
enhance the process of creating and implementing effective channels by using the 
methodology developed for Dispute System Design (DSD).  This process focuses 
on assisting a specific community, organization, or political entity in developing a 
system for managing its conflicts and resolving its disputes.210  Since the goal is to 
ensure citizens have the opportunity to participate fully,211 and as equal part-
ners,212 in rule making and dispute resolution, DSD emphasizes the active en-
gagement of the representatives of all stakeholders,213 given its participatory na-
ture.214 
Whichever channel is chosen must uphold and implement procedural justice 
values.  Studies have shown that citizens invest more in rules and laws when they 
feel that procedural justice values such as equal participation, neutrality, and re-
spect for participants’ dignity have been upheld. Laws imposed from above with-
out any citizen participation have a low trust quotient and are both less effective 
and more costly in the long run.215  In the specific area of dispute resolution, when 
citizens sense the dispute resolution process is conducted in a fair and participa-
tory manner, they are far more likely to view the decision as legitimate and com-
ply with it. As a result, greater participation, both in the process of making laws216 
 ___________________________  
 209. In the area of Dispute System Design this is considered “downstream processes.” See id. 
 210. WILLIAM URY, JEANNE M. BRETT & STEPHEN B GOLDBERG, GETTING DISPUTES RESOLVED: 
DESIGN SYSTEMS TO CUT THE COSTS OF CONFLICT (1993) [hereinafter URY, GETTING DISPUTES]; 
CATHY COSTANTINO & CHRISTINA SICKLES MERCHANT, DESIGNING CONFLICT MANAGEMENT 
SYSTEMS (1995).  
 211. Not all participation is equal; the degree of citizen participation can differ substantially.  The 
International Association of Public Participation developed the “IAP2 Spectrum of Public Participa-
tion.”  This spectrum describes five levels at which the public can participate.  The first and lowest 
level is “inform.”  This describes the effort and promise to keep the public informed with balanced and 
objective information to assist them in understanding problems, alternatives, opportunities and/or 
solutions.  Informing the public may be through, for example, fact sheets, web sites, or open houses.  
At the second level, “consult,” public feedback on analysis, alternatives, and/or decisions is obtained.  
Examples of “consult” in action could be public comment, public meetings, surveys and focus groups.  
The third level is “involve.”  This level describes actually working with the public while developing 
solutions and identifying problems; this level involves public input, not just feedback.  The public is 
assured that its “concerns and aspirations are directly reflected in the alternatives developed” and 
feedback is provided detailing how public input influenced decisions.  This may be done through 
workshops or deliberative polling.  The fourth level, “collaborate,” involves a graduated level of input.  
The public is involved in each aspect of decision-making, both the development of alternatives and the 
identification of preferred solutions.  Input is treated as advice and incorporated to the “maximum 
extent possible.”  Manifestations include citizen advisory committees, consensus-building and partici-
patory decision-making.  Finally, the fifth stage is “empower.”  At this stage, the public does not 
provide feedback or input, but actually makes the decision and the powers that be implement the pub-
lic’s decision.  Examples include citizen juries, ballot decisions and delegated decisions. See THE 
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION, IAP2 SPECTRUM OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION 
(2007), available at http://www.iap2.org/associations/4748/files/spectrum.pdf; see also Bingham, 
Collaborative Governance: Emerging Practices, supra note 14, at 291-92 (examining the IAP2 Spec-
trum of Public Participation, Arnstein’s Ladder of Participation, and Archon Fung’s categorization of 
participation). 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. 
 214. See generally COSTANTINO & SICKLES MERCHANT, supra note 210.  
 215. See Ackerman, Vanishing, supra note 152, at 176-77 (discussing the value of jury participation 
in the trial system). 
 216. In a preceding article, I have argued that the creation of laws in Latin America needs to be more 
participative in order for them to be the most sustainable.  It is necessary that the cultural norms be 
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and settling disputes, tends to uphold the rule of law since citizens are more likely 
to abide by a law they helped to create that actually represents their interests.  As a 
result, the network of relationships and the norms underlying those relationships 
are strengthened and channeled. 
Even though channels are essential, they are not sufficient; it is of critical im-
portance to also focus on enhancing social capital.  As Robert Ackerman points 
out, the ADR field can contribute substantially to these tasks.  Yet, he contends 
that, in order to enhance social capital, processes should be managed in a way that 
“allow[s] the parties to discover a common bond that is deeper than [the] process 
alone.”217  That “common bond,” Ackerman says, can bring people together above 
and beyond their differences.  He adds that it takes an experience of finding “in 
shared experience a shared history through which disputants recognize in each 
other common elements of the human condition.”218   
Moreover, Ackerman argues participatory dispute resolution can actually 
bring out the best of social capital’s potential, helping transform an experience of 
social “noise” to the “music” of civic cooperation.  “The ultimate promise for 
dispute resolution is that it can harness and nurture the will to play together so that 
society is more than the sum total of disparate notes, but rather a cohesive—albeit 
sometimes discordant—tune.”219   Developing living harmony of cooperation is 
similar to the method of creating jazz music that jazz players such as Wynton 
Marsalis have described:  “In order for you to play jazz, you've got to listen to [the 
other musicians]. The music forces you at all times to address what other people 
are thinking and for you to interact with them with empathy and to deal with the 
process of working things out.”220  Yet, the best of jazz music is built on years of 
practice and experience.  In the same way, social capital takes hard work.  “In the 
end, social capital is the product not of spontaneous combustion,” Ackerman 
writes, “but of history, experience, and effort.”221 
In addition, other theorists have noted the ADR field can contribute to en-
hancing social capital by developing citizens’ capacities to assess conflict and, 
when appropriate, resolve disputes for themselves without necessarily having to 
wait for the courts to solve their problems for them.  It teaches citizens that they 
can be effective protagonists and can create a better future for themselves.222  As 
Sharon Press has said:  “For too long, the metaphors have been those of ‘The Peo-
ple’s Court’: ‘Don’t take it into your own hands, take them to court,’ rather than, 
 ___________________________  
intimately related to sustainable domestic laws, which are obtained through an all-encompassing con-
sensus building process, in order to enhance the shadow of the law.  Hernández Crespo, Shadow, supra 
note 79, at 94-95. 
 217. Robert M. Ackerman, Disputing Together: Conflict Resolution and the Search for Community, 
18 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL 27, 89-90 (2002) [hereinafter Ackerman, Disputing Together]. 
 218. Id.  
 219. Id. at 91. 
 220. Id. at 89 (citing Wynton Marsalis, in JAZZ A FILM BY KEN BURNS: EPISODE 10-A MASTERPIECE 
BY MIDNIGHT (Florentine Films 2000). 
 221. Id. at 90. 
 222. For example, Andrea Schneider and Natalie Fleury observed an educative advantage to media-
tion in the foreclosure process.  Homeowners left the process better understanding the foreclosure 
process, and the lenders and lenders’ counsel learned the value of listening and developed listening 
skills.  See generally Andrea K. Schneider & Natalie C. Fleury, There’s No Place Like Home: Apply-
ing Dispute System Design Theory to Create a Foreclosure Mediation System, 11 NEV. L.J. 368 
(2011). 
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‘You have the capability of resolving your disputes yourself.’”223  In this regard, 
Carrie Menkel-Meadow has noted that when people learn to be protagonists in 
their own lives, society is enriched with greater mutual understanding and peace.  
“Being able to truly participate in the decisions that affect our lives is a human 
necessity for legitimate societal outcomes and for peaceful coexistence of people 
with divergent values . . . .”224  Yet, despite all the benefits the ADR field could 
produce in enhancing social capital through the development of citizens’ capaci-
ties, Amartya Sen reminds us that helping people to develop their capacities and 
skills is a worthwhile undertaking in itself.225 
In addition to building capacities and assisting citizens in becoming protago-
nists in the resolution of their own disputes, the ADR field has expanded to also 
include public decision-making processes. In response to representative democra-
cies that seem to fail in the way they address public policy conflicts, citizens have 
demanded more participatory ways for sharing in governance,226 thus beginning 
the development of what has come to be called collaborative governance.227 One 
distinctive feature of collaborative governance is the use of deliberation and dia-
logue. 228  
Even though, to date, the fields of deliberative democracy and democratic de-
liberation “on the ground,” have had little or no interchange, John Forester and 
David Kahane argue the experiences of democratic practice can “enrich” and even 
“reorient” deliberative democracy theory.229 For example, even though facilitators 
and mediators play a critical role in the majority of “structured deliberative demo-
cratic exercises,” they are “strikingly absent from most deliberative democracy 
theory.”230 
To foster such interactions, innovative processes that include the latest com-
munication technology, such as e-democracy and e-government, have been used. 
 ___________________________  
 223. Sharon Press, Institutionalization: Savior or Saboteur of Mediation, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 903, 
917 (1997). 
 224. Menkel-Meadow, From Legal Disputes, supra note 147, at 26. 
 225. See generally SEN, supra note 1.  
 226. Leighninger notes: 
 
The mayor and city manager just didn’t understand how taxpayers could be dissatisfied with a 
city administration that had won awards for efficiency and innovation. Finally, someone said it: 
‘Look, we know you’re working hard for us, but what we’ve got here is a parent-child relation-
ship between the government and the people. What we need is an adult-adult relationship.’ It was 
the perfect summary of what I’d been watching in communities all over North America for the 
last ten years: a dramatic, generational shift in what people want from their democracy.  
 
MATT LEIGHNINGER, THE NEXT FORM OF DEMOCRACY: HOW EXPERT RULE IS GIVING WAY TO 
SHARED GOVERNANCE…AND WHY POLITICS WILL NEVER BE THE SAME 1 (2006) “We seem to be 
moving from a dispute about big government to a difficult conversation about how to achieve big 
governance.” Id. at 4. “In an increasingly busy and sophisticated world, we seem to be headed toward a 
new form of democracy, in which public officials bring politics to the people, politics takes place in 
small groups, and people take active roles in problem solving.” Id. at 22.  
 227. Bingham, Collaborative Governance: Emerging Practices, supra note 14, at 277. 
 228. Id. at 278.  
 229. See generally John Forester & David Kahane, The Micropolitics of Deliberation: Beyond Argu-
mentation to Recognition and Justice, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY IN PRACTICE 209 (David Kahane 
et al. eds., 2010) (arguing that this may be due to the fact that deliberative democracy often remains 
abstract and based on propositional argumentation).  
 230. See id. at 229. 
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These forms of technology could play an essential role231 in Latin America, where 
most countries usually lack the infrastructure and resources necessary for systemic 
travel and ongoing communication. Encouraging citizens to participate in public 
policy processes, collaborative governance has become an “alternative to tradi-
tional command-and-control approaches” to policy making.232 
Lisa Bingham illustrates how collaborative governance offers a variety of 
processes for citizen participation in designing, implementing, and enforcing pub-
lic policy.233  She utilizes the metaphor of a flowing stream to distinguish different 
stages throughout what she refers to as the “policy continuum.”234 Upstream forms 
focus on different methods of participatory policy-making that include dialogue 
and deliberation, such as deliberative polling, study circles, public conversations, 
deliberative town meeting groups, and round tables.235 Midstream refers to im-
plementation of the said policies, which is quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial and 
involves collaborative public management networks and public policy ADR. Ex-
amples include LA neighborhood236 councils and the U.S. Institute for Environ-
mental Conflict Resolution.237 Downstream encompasses policy enforcement, 
which is judicial or quasi-judicial, and includes a broad spectrum of ADR meth-
ods as well. Court-connected ADR programs and private ADR providers are ex-
amples of downstream collaborative governance.238  In this context, Bingham has 
emphasized any of these models of citizen participation and deliberation in col-
laborative governance should be a well-designed and well-implemented system.239 
Even though it is currently “widely affirmed that public deliberation leads to 
more effective and legitimate policy making, increases public trust and social 
capital, cultivates citizen character and engagement, and reduces controversy 
 ___________________________  
 231. It is important to note, however, that better technological infrastructure does not guarantee citi-
zen participation. In the U.S. context, in spite of a strong infrastructure, political agents are few, and 
scholars have pointed to the need for researchers to “learn why so few political agents exist in the mass 
public and whether e-deliberation could help create such political agents.”  Peter Muhlberger, Human 
Agency and the Revitalization of the Public Sphere, 22 POL. COMM. 163, 176 (2005) [hereinafter 
Muhlberger, Human Agency]. 
 232. Lisa Blomgren Bingham, The Next Generation of Administrative Law: Building the Legal Infra-
structure for Collaborative Governance, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 297, 300 (2010). 
 233. Bingham, Collaborative Governance: Emerging Practices, supra note 14, at 273. 
 234. Bingham suggests 15 steps in the continuum, divided into groups that fall under each segment of 
the continuum. For upstream in the policy process, which entails legislative and quasi-legislative uses 
of dialogue and deliberation, she suggests: 1. Identifying a policy problem, 2. Identifying approaches 
for solving the policy problem, 3. Setting priorities among solutions to a policy problem, 4. Selecting 
among the priorities, 5. Drafting proposed legislation, 6. Enacting legislation, 7. Identifying policy 
problems for executive powers to resolve within the boundaries of the legislation, 8. Identifying ap-
proaches or tools for regulations. For midstream in the policy process, which encompasses deliberative 
or participatory governance, collaborative public or network management and ADR, she suggests: 9. 
Setting priorities for regulations, 10. Selecting from among priorities for regulations, 11. Drafting 
proposed regulations, 12. Enacting regulations, 13. Implementing regulations. Downstream in the 
policy process, which uses ADR to resolve conflict among identified disputants, entails 14. Enforcing 
legislation and regulations, executive administrative agencies, and 15. Enforcing legislation and regu-
lation through judicial power.  Id. at 291-306.  
 235. Id. at 287. 
 236. Terry L. Cooper et al., Citizen-Centered Collaborative Public Management, 66 PUB. ADMIN. 
REV. 76, 82 (2006). 
 237. See U.S. INSTITUTE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION, http://www.ecr.gov (last 
visited Aug. 10, 2011). 
 238. Bingham, Collaborative Governance: Emerging Practices, supra note 14, at 304-06. 
 239. Id. at 273. 
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when policies are implemented,”240 Bettina von Lieres and David Kahane suggest 
that to enable marginalized groups to participate in deliberative processes, the 
design choices are of critical importance. In this regard, they suggest the following 
three key features play a significant role in achieving this goal:  
1. The extent to which the process is reflexive, in the sense of giving par-
ticipants a deliberative say in defining the terms of their participation, the 
issues they will address, and the form deliberation will take. 2. The ex-
tent to which public involvement is recursive, so that citizen deliberation 
takes place from the beginning, applying to the range of decisions made. 
3. The existence of separate spaces in which members of marginalized 
groups can reflect on dynamics of power and exclusion, and negotiate 
questions of common agendas, strategies and identities. These separate 
spaces can take many forms, from parallel deliberative processes to op-
portunities for caucusing within heterogeneous deliberations.241   
It is therefore possible that, through capacity building and well-designed and well-
implemented experiences of collaborative governance, the ADR field could play a 
significant role in forging a path that harnesses social capital in the Latin Ameri-
can context to foster a more sustainable rule of law. 
B. Participatory Conflict Resolution in Latin America: The Contribution of 
the Multi-Door Courthouse Model 
Regarding the promotion of participation in Latin America, the multi-door 
courthouse model is one of the most promising concepts, which, if further 
adapted, could significantly contribute a foundation for a more sustainable rule of 
law.  Since the 1990s, the multi-door courthouse model has been adapted and used 
in Latin America primarily in the form of Casas de Justicia (justice centers), 
which have been part of access to justice efforts in marginalized and rural com-
munities.  The multi-door courthouse model began as an idea to promote dispute 
resolution within the judiciary, but, in Latin America, the concept has been sub-
stantially expanded to also promote social services in marginalized communities.  
This model has just begun to show what it can accomplish in the area of building 
citizens’ capacities, strengthening private and public conflict resolution, and de-
veloping other experiences of collaborative governance. 
 ___________________________  
 240. Bettina von Lieres & David Kahane, Inclusion and Representation in Democratic Deliberations: 
Lessons from Canada’s Ramanow Commission, in SPACES FOR CHANGE? 131 (Andrea Cornwall & 
Vera Schattan Coelho eds., 2007). 
 241. Id. at 133 (exploring how the success and shortcomings of the Romanow Commission’s inclu-
sion of Aboriginal people in the deliberative process is linked to the three features of deliberative 
design). The Romanow Commission took place in April 2001, addressing citizens’ health care in 
Canada. Even though these guiding principles were developed in the context of the disenfranchised in 
Canada, the design elements can also help overcome similar challenges faced by the disenfranchised 
majority in Latin America. 
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1. Origins and Development 
The multi-door courthouse model originated in the early 1970s in the context 
of concern about judicial backlog in the United States.242  Its founder, Frank Sand-
er, envisioned a center for dispute resolution in which cases could be rerouted to 
the most appropriate forum for resolution based on the needs of the parties and 
specifics of the case; for example, cases could be routed to early neutral evalua-
tion, mini-trial, mediation, or arbitration.243  This would allow for a more tailored 
experience of the justice system,244 rather than a one-size-fits-all approach.245  In 
Sander’s original conception, a court clerk would screen and then route the cases 
to the most appropriate forum.  While Sander’s main interest was to provide a 
variety of options for the resolution of disputes,246 others saw the potential to alle-
viate backlogs because of its nature as a routing mechanism.247 
Over thirty years later, the multi-door courthouse model has been implement-
ed in varying ways in a number of jurisdictions within the U.S and abroad.248  The 
implementation of the model began with an American Bar Association (ABA) 
task force,249 who promoted its development and eventual adoption by the judicial 
system in various states.250  Moreover, the concept has spread to foreign coun-
 ___________________________  
 242. Frank E. A. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, in THE POUND CONFERENCE: 
PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE 65, 83-84 (A. Leo Levin & Russell R. Wheeler eds., 1979) 
[hereinafter Sander, Varieties]; Transcript, A Dialogue Between Professors Frank Sander and Mariana 
Hernández Crespo: Exploring the Evolution of the Multi-Door Courthouse, 5 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 665, 
669 (2009). 
 243. Sander explains that the ABA coined the term “multi-door courthouse” for an article on the 
concept.  This image proved useful for the promotion of the concept. Id. at 670. 
 244. Jaqueline M. Nolan-Haley, The Merger of Law and Mediation: Lessons from Equity Jurispru-
dence and Roscoe Pound, 6 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 57, 58–59 (2004) (arguing that equity and 
mediation can provide “individualized justice,” which can introduce mercy in a process often focused 
mainly on rules). 
 245. See Frank E. Sander & Steven B. Goldberg, Fitting the Forum to the Fuss: A User-Friendly 
Guide to Selecting an ADR Procedure, 10 NEGOT. J. 49 (1994) (suggesting the lawyer and client 
should analyze their conflict and choose from the spectrum of ADR options available) [hereinafter 
Sander, Fitting]; Frank E. A. Sander & Lukasz Rozdeiczer, Matching Cases and Dispute Resolution 
Procedures: Detailed Analysis Leading to a Mediation-Centered Approach, 11 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 
1 (2006) (suggesting that mediation should be the default choice amidst the ADR options excepting 
specific cases where mediation is unsuitable) [hereinafter Sander, Matching]. 
 246. Sander, Varieties, supra note 242. 
 247. See, e.g., Simon H. Rifkind, Are We Asking too Much of Our Courts?, in THE POUND 
CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE 51 (A. Leo Levin & Russell R. Wheeler, eds., 
1979). 
 248. For a brief history of the Multi-Door Courthouse in the U.S. and abroad, see Transcript, supra 
note 242, at 667. 
 249. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF POUND CONFERENCE FOLLOW-UP TASK FORCE, 74 
F.R.D. 159, 175 (1976). 
 250. See, e.g., Dispute Resolution Program, THE PHILADELPHIA COURTS, 
http://courts.phila.gov/municipal/civil/#drp (last visited June 18, 2011) (Pennsylvania); Thomas F. 
Christian, Running Statewide Dispute Resolution Programs—The New York Experience, 81 KY. L.J. 
1093 (1993) (New York); Peter W. Agnes Jr., A Reform Agenda for Court-Connected Dispute Resolu-
tion in Massachusetts, 40 BOSTON B.J. 4 (1996) (Massachusetts); William H. Erickson & Cynthia A. 
Savage, ADR In Colorado, 54 DISP. RESOL. J. 60 (1999) (Colorado); ADR Staff, Superior Court of 
California, County of San Mateo, Multi-Option ADR Project Evaluation Report July 2007-July 2008, 
available at http://www.sanmateocourt.org/documents/adr/2007_2008_evaluation_report.pdf (last 
visited Jan 17, 2013) (California); Tara Shockley, Two Decades of Justice: The Dispute Resolution 
Center and Houston Volunteer Lawyers Program Have Been Serving the Houston Community for Over 
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tries.251  While many look to the multi-door courthouse model to improve the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the judiciary, the institution also has the potential 
to bring benefits that go beyond judicial improvements.  In particular, the multi-
door courthouse model could provide citizens with a new experience in dealing 
with disputes by empowering them to be the protagonists in their resolution. 
Trends in the implementation of the multi-door courthouse model have 
demonstrated it to be a fairly malleable concept that can take many shapes, adapt-
ing to the needs of the users.  The multi-door model in Washington, D.C., for 
example, has developed into a dispute resolution center that offers many doors for 
mediation, including family mediation, landlord-tenant mediation, tax mediation, 
and some social services.252  In Latin America, many of the doors also lead to 
service programs.253  Even though most multi-door models are oriented toward 
private conflict resolution, recent initiatives such as the Colombia model have also 
incorporated de facto experiences of participatory public conflict resolution. In 
fact, the models in most countries have taken a leading role in substantial commu-
nity involvement.  Neither of these trends were part of the original conception of 
the multi-door courthouse model, yet these innovations begin to show its poten-
tial.  Perhaps one of the most interesting developments has been the use of the 
multi-door model as part of the Internal Dispute System Design of the World 
Bank and the United Nations.  Where the multi-door concept will lead in another 
40 years remains to be seen. 
2. The Implementation of the Multi-Door Courthouse Model in Latin 
America: Oficinas Multi-Puertas (Multi-door Offices)                             
and Casas de Justicia (Justice Centers) 
The multi-door courthouse model in Latin American has taken the form of 
Casas de Justicia (justice centers) and, to a lesser degree, oficinas multi-puertas 
(multi-door offices). Significant efforts to establish Casas de Justicia have been 
carried out in several countries in the region, and a few have also established 
 ___________________________  
20 Years, 39 HOUSTON LAW. 18 (2002) (Texas); Multi-Door Dispute Resolution Division, DISTRICT OF 
COLUMBIA COURTS,  http://www.dccourts.gov/internet/superior/org_multidoor/main.jsf (last visited 
June 18, 2011) (District of Colombia); Sue Darst Tate, Alternative Dispute Resolution System 2009 
Annual Report (2009), available at http://www.oscn.net/static/adr/Documents/ADRSReport2009.pdf 
(last visited June 18, 2011) (Oklahoma); Alternative Dispute Resolution in Superior Court of Dela-
ware, DELAWARE STATE COURTS,  http://courts.delaware.gov/Superior/ADR/adr_choice.stm (last 
visited June 18, 2011) (Delaware); GEORGIA COMMISSION ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION, 
http://www.godr.org/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2013) (Georgia); Mediation in the Alaska Court System, 
ALASKA COURT SYSTEM, http://www.courts.alaska.gov/mediation.htm#programs (last visited June 18, 
2011) (Alaska); KIMBERLY ANN KOSCH, 2005 FLORIDA MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION PROGRAMS: A 
COMPENDIUM, (2005) (Florida); STEVEN H. CLARKE, ELIZABETH D. ELLEN & KELLY MCCORMICK, 
COURT ORDERED CIVIL CASE MEDIATION IN NORTH CAROLINA: AN EVALUATION OF ITS EFFECTS 
(1996) (North Carolina); Complementary Dispute Resolution, NEW JERSEY COURTS, 
http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/services/cdr.htm (last visited June 18, 2011) (New Jersey); Daniel E. 
Klein, Jr., Mediation and Handbook for Maryland Lawyers, MEDI MD-CLE I-1 (1999) (Maryland). 
 251. The Washington, D.C., multi-door courthouse is the one most often observed, and on which 
most foreign countries model their own implementations. See Transcript, supra note 242, at 273. See 
also, Gladys Kessler & Linda J. Finkelstein, The Evolution of a Multi-Door Courthouse, 37 CATH. U. 
L. REV. 577, 590 (1988). 
 252. Id. 
 253. See, e.g., information regarding Casas de Justicia in Colombia, infra note 281. 
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oficinas multi-puertas. To date, casas and oficinas have been adapted to satisfy 
the needs of individual locations and have gradually developed and progressed at 
varying rates in different areas. This section of the Article does not seek to pro-
vide a comprehensive report on these institutions in Latin America, but rather, to 
give an overview of some of the most significant developments in various coun-
tries; in so doing, this overview seeks to portray some of the actual characteristics 
involved and to explore the undeveloped potential of Casas de Justicia as a build-
ing block for a more sustainable rule of law. 
Guatemala, where the need for a more sustainable rule of law became impera-
tive as a result of the Guatemalan Civil War (1960-1996), was one of the first 
countries where Casas de Justicia, originally called justice centers, emerged.254  
USAID began its efforts to establish Casas de Justicia in 1995,255 as a new model 
that would depart from the traditional structures of justice256 to bring justice closer 
to all people and to fight violence and impunity, 257 incorporating the views of 
indigenous communities and other groups as well as overcoming structural issues 
of communication between the justice system and the citizens.258 The Casas de 
Justicia were originally called “Focus Centers”—due to their specific connection 
with a geographic area—and were designed to provide training. USAID soon 
realized, however, that more than training was needed and expanded the concept 
of the casas to be a full institution.259 The centers therefore became “laboratories 
of positive activities consisting of concepts that were introduced, tested and 
demonstrated.”260 
The Casas de Justicia differ among themselves, as the model is adapted to 
satisfy the needs of each geographic location. Nonetheless, they share a common 
essence:  
A justice center is not a physical location, but an entire concept that in-
volves bringing together civil society and local justice sector officials to 
address access concerns at the local level. The purpose of the Justice 
Centers is to increase the quality of justice sector services, especially for 
historically marginalized people, such as the poor, women, indigenous 
people, and children. The justice center methodology calls for local par-
ticipants to discuss issues and arrive at a consensus to address local prob-
lems.261  
 ___________________________  
 254. Interview with Stephen Hendrix, Assistant Director of USAID Paraguay (July 25, 2011) (on file 
with author) (explaining that the original name was “Justice Centers” but, in places like Colombia, 
became Casas de Justicia, and articulating how, even though the concept varies from region to region 
and even country to country, the “spirit” is the same).  For more on the challenges faced in Guatemala 
and efforts to bring about public safety through strengthening the law since the Civil War, see Milburn 
Line, Seguridad Ciudadana: Guatemala y Colombia, Joan B. Kroc Institute for Peace and Justice. 
 255. See Hendrix, Guatemalan Justice Centers, supra note 195, at 823.  
 256. Id. at 823-24. 
 257. See USAID From The American People, ASSESSMENT OF USAID/COLOMBIA’S JUSTICE 
REFORM AND MODERNIZATION PROGRAM 25 (2010), http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACR349.pdf 
[hereinafter ASSESSMENT OF JUSTICE REFORM PROGRAM]. 
 258. See Hendrix, Guatemalan Justice Centers, supra note 195, at 821. 
 259. Id. at 819. 
 260. Id. at 820. 
 261. Id. at 821. 
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People are at the core of the Casas de Justicia. The centers aim to further an 
interchange of ideas and voluntary efforts. They focuse on bringing together vari-
ous constituents, such as police, prosecutors, judges, public defenders, members 
of local civil society, and lawyers, to work in a collaborative manner to resolve 
some of the difficulties in Guatemala’s justice system.262 To this end, the casas 
have the following fundamental objectives:  
(1) organizational and administrative structures that reduce delay, mini-
mize exposure to corruption, and create accountability; (2) improved 
functioning of key actors in their assigned roles and management struc-
tures and techniques that promote team approaches; (3) use of standard-
ized, user-friendly forms; (4) user-friendly case management and records 
systems that reduce opportunities for corruption, improve the quality of 
case supervision, and generate accurate statistics; (5) interpreters and cul-
turally-appropriate outreach and education programs in local languages 
to make the system truly accessible to non-native Spanish speakers; and 
(6) promotion of alternative dispute resolution, plea bargaining (“criterio 
de oportunidad”), stay of prosecution (“suspension condicional”), and 
other mechanisms to settle cases identified through improved case intake 
and diversion programs.263  
ADR was also established as an essential component of the Casas de Justicia 
model. In this regard, mediation was promoted to advance access to justice by 
enabling citizens to reach “more equitable and accessible justice, while maintain-
ing a sense of respect for local leadership and customary law.”264 The Peace Ac-
cord on indigenous rights mandated that the Guatemalan government recognize 
Mayan or customary law practice within the legal system, as long as such actions 
are not in violation of human rights.  As a result, ADR, and specifically the media-
tion process, emerged as a way to integrate elements of local practices into the 
justice system.265  
In addition, mediation was promoted as a means of increasing access to jus-
tice and reducing backlog in the courts. To this end, it “provides decentralized 
justice at the community level, providing more power to individuals and civic 
organizations in resolving their own disputes.”266 Moreover, mediation, as a sig-
nificant element of Casas de Justicia, was intended to be a mechanism through 
which citizens could not only save time and money, but also gain access to justice 
“in their own community and language.”267 
In post-civil war Guatemala, Casas de Justicia were founded in various Gua-
temalan regions, including Nebaj, Escuintla, Quetzaltenango, San Benito (Petrn), 
Santa Cruz, Santa Eulalia (Huehuetenango), and Zacapa.268 Promoters of the casas 
 ___________________________  
 262. Id. at 814. 
 263. Hendrix, Guatemalan Justice Centers, supra note 195, at 814. 
 264. Id. at 850 (citing Cable from Embassy of Guatemala to the United States Secretary of State, 
USAID-Guatemala Activity Advancing Conflict Resolution). 
 265. See id. 
 266. Id. at 851. 
 267. Id. 
 268. See id. at 825. 
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were aware that, despite these efforts, achieving their goal of bringing about a 
more sustainable rule of law would require a significant amount of time. Never-
theless, they believed the casas would be an essential element in promoting rule of 
law that “is extended to all citizens.”269 
Since the Guatemalan experience, various countries have used Casas de Jus-
ticia for diverse purposes and have adopted differing interpretations of the multi-
door model. Regarding the diverse purposes of casas, even though most countries 
follow the Guatemalan model, Paraguay has recently developed a new model of 
Casas de Justicia, with a different purpose. While the Guatemalan model was 
founded to increase access to justice, the Paraguay model, which is not directly 
connected to the judiciary, goes beyond this objective, also seeking to strengthen 
democracy. Regarding differing interretations, Casas de Justicia in most Latin 
American countries offer a variety of options, which include governmental ser-
vices and criminal prosecution and defense as well as a strong focus on mediation. 
In Argentina, however, ADR options have been further developed and include, for 
example, arbitration services, together with mediation.  
It is also important to note that, even though casas in most countries are pub-
lic in nature and are established and ultimately run by the local government agen-
cies, some casas, such as those in the Dominican Republic, result from the private 
initiatives of a non-profit organization in coordination with judicial and public 
insitutions.270  Similarly, the number of Casas de Justicia and the cases they han-
dle in each country differs substantially, based on need and resources. While Co-
lombia efforts, which started in the 1995, have already established 76 casas, 
which have handled approximately 11 million cases,271 Paraguay has just begun 
efforts in the last couple of years and has only one casa, which has already han-
dled over 128 cases.272 While most Casas de Justicia deal with cases that “pertain 
to everyday life,” such as personal identity issues, family conflicts, domestic vio-
lence, and disputes between neighbors,273 in Paraguay, they also include land dis-
putes.274 Although most casas currently focus primarily on private conflict resolu-
tion, some, such as in Argentina and Colombia, also include cases of public con-
flict resolution. Casas de Justicia in Paraguay go beyond public conflict resolution 
to foster other experiences of collaborative governance as well. Despite these 
differences, most Casas de Justicia throughout Latin America, except for those 
that use the term differently, share the goal of offering a “one-stop shop,” provid-
ing multiple options for conflict resolution.  
In addition to differences in the interpretation, purposes, and nature of the 
multi-door models, the essential understanding of the meaning of the term “Casas 
de Justicia” is not uniform within the region.  A few countries, such as Nicaragua 
 ___________________________  
 269. See id. at 815. 
 270. See Interview with Pearson de Gonzalez, supra note 191. 
 271. See Orlando Muñoz, Justice Houses (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) [hereinafter 
Muñoz, Justice Houses]. 
 272. Maria Victoria Rivas, CASA DE JUSTICIA SAN PEDRO Abriendo Puertas, Justicia y Equidad 
Social—Segunda Fase San Pedro—Paraguay Centro de Estudios Judiciales (unpublished manuscript) 
(on file with author) [hereinafter Rivas, CASA DE JUSTICIA].  
 273. See Interview with Pearson de Gonzalez, supra note 191. See also Luz Alba Londoña et al., 
Casa Regional de Justicia del Sur del Tolima, USAID (on file with author). 
 274. See Interview with Maria Victoria Rivas, Executive Director of the Center of Judicial Studies in 
Paraguay (Aug. 8, 2011) (on file with author) [hereinafter Interview with Rivas]. 
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and Venezuela, have institutions referred to as Casas de Justicia that do not re-
semble the multi-door models found in other countries. In Nicaragua during the 
1990s, over 100 “Casas de Justicia” were built with funds from Sweden, Italy, 
and Holland, administrated by the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP); it is important to note that this project aimed to improve the precarious 
infrastructure of the judicial system by providing physical space for the courts and 
additional living arrangements for the judges in the same location.275 These casas 
were developed as a means to increase the efficiency of the judiciary, making it 
more impartial and accessible.  In Venezuela, the political party Primero Justicia 
has implemented a project called “Casas de Justicia For Everyone.”276 However, 
these institutions look more like community centers than centers of conflict reso-
lution and offer a broad range of non-legal services, such as medical and dental 
assistance, a community library, seminars, and community meetings.277  Located 
in rural areas, the main goal of these casas, in addition to the non-legal services, is 
to empower citizens to resolve their individual and community issues.  
One of the most significant programs for the establishment of Casas de Justi-
cia in the region has been developed in Colombia. The 1991 Colombian Constitu-
tion played a significant role in shaping the administration of justice, ADR, and 
the transfer of responsibilities and resources to municipalities, thus enhancing the 
decentralization process. Additionally, there was a demand for the coordination of 
the justice system’s institutions, in order to facilitate access to all citizens.278 
USAID initially invested 15 million dollars into 69 out of the 76 Casas de Justi-
cia.279 However, over time the Colombian government has assumed partial finan-
cial responsibility for the continuation of Casas de Justicia. 
Casas de Justicia were intended to address local daily conflicts faced by the 
average citizen. It is important to note in the Colombian context that some of them 
had been established in areas with prior history of paramilitary presence.280 Insta-
 ___________________________  
 275. Interview with Luis Ubeda, Development Project Specialist in the Democracy and Government 
Office, (Aug. 11, 2011) (on file with author).  For a diagnostic look at the system of justice in Nicara-
gua and what role Casas de Justicia play in expanding access to justice, see Programa del Apoyo 
Institucional, LA JUSTICIA EN NICARAGUA: DIAGNÓSTICO DEL SISTEMA DE JUSTICIA 66, 128-29, 
(2003), available at http://www.poderjudicial.gob.ni/arc-pdf/La%20justicia%20en%20Nicaragua% 
20270906.pdf.  
 276. See Jose Alexander Superlano Jaimes, Más De 20 Casas De Justicia Para Todos Fueron Inau-
guradas En El País, PRIMERO JUSTICIA LIBERTADOR, (Aug. 27, 2007, 9:10AM), 
http://pjlibertador.blogspot.com/2007/08/ms-de-20-casas-de-justicia-para-todos.html. 
 277. Id. 
 278. E-mail from Annette Pearson, Colombia Community Justice Houses National Program Consult-
ant, National Justice House Program, to author (Feb. 08, 2013, 05:04 UTC) (on file with author).  
 279. See Muñoz, Justice Houses, supra note 271. 
 280. Annette Pearson explained: 
 
All factions of the Colombian armed conflict have a presence in the region. The insurgency oper-
ates in the area organized as the Dario Ramirez Castro Unit of the Ejercito de Liberacion Nacion-
al (ELN) and the IV Front of the Bloque del Magdalena Medio of the FARC-EP. The paramili-
tary fronts known as the Northeast and Lower Cauca of Antioquia and Magdalena Medio, them-
selves part of the Bloque Central Bolivar, were demobilized towards the end of 2005 and the be-
ginning of 2006. Nonetheless, members of these defunct groups remain in the urban areas of Se-
govia and Remedios. Attacks against the civilian population included infamous crimes against 
humanity such as the ‘Massacre of Segovia,’ which occurred on the 22nd of April of 1996, per-
petrated by paramilitary groups. This massacre took place in the billiard parlors ‘Flay’ and ‘El 
Paraiso,’ as well as on the street of that municipality, where 14 people were killed, a further eight 
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bility has characterized the country due to decades of conflict arising from an-
tigovernment insubordinate factions, notably the Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia (FARC ).281 The thriving Colombian drug trade had aided the insurgen-
cies, but by 2006 a significant number of groups demobilized.282 Even though 
Casas de Justicia were established in 1995,283 they were mainly established in 
large cities, and it was not until the mid-2000s when Casas de Justicia were estab-
lished in rural areas where the Colombian government has regained control.284 In 
this regard, one of the goals of Casas de Justicia in Colombia was to “[c]ombine 
with other national government strategies to strengthen state presence and recover 
the rule of law in areas of the country where the armed conflict diminished the 
capacity of the justice agencies to deal with a growing culture of illegality.”285  
The Casas de Justicia in Colombia act as inter-institutional units, where citi-
zens can access information, guidance, and services to resolve their disputes 
through litigation and ADR processes.286 These Casas are part of an effort to de-
centralize public services and enhance cohesive citizen interaction.287 To this end, 
they aim to decentralize justice to low-income communities, offer pro bono legal 
representation, provide “one-stop shop” locations for justice services, contribute 
to local development plans, impart legal guidance and education on topics of 
justice, and foster two-way dialogues between the justice center and the 
community.288 The Casas also promote ADR in order to solve everyday problems, 
 ___________________________  
were wounded, and two more were kidnapped. During the period from 1996 to 1997, 140 mur-
ders were committed against community and social leaders and inhabitants. On the other hand, 
on Sunday the 18th of October, 1998, the Cimarrones group of the ELN dynamited the oil pipe-
line ‘Oleoducto Central de Colombia,’ which crosses through the Fraguas area, or Machuca, 
which is part of the Segovia Municipality. This terrorist attack resulted in a fire that killed 84 
peasant farmers and left another 30 gravely wounded. To date, 1200 victims of paramilitary forc-
es have been registered with the Public Prosecutor´s Office, within the terms of the Justice and 
Peace Law. 
 
Annette Pearson, Colombian National Justice House Program 3, unpublished manuscript (2009) (on 
file with author) [hereinafter Pearson, Colombian National Justice House]. 
 281. See CIA World Fact Book, Colombia, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/co.html  (last visited Aug. 15, 2011). 
 282. Id. 
 283. USAID Colombia Administrative Justice Program (2001-2006), FINAL REPORT (2006), availa-
ble at http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACH987.pdf [hereinafter COLOMBIA FINAL REPORT]. 
 284. E-mail from Annette Pearson, Colombia Community Justice Houses National Program Consult-
ant, National Justice House Program, to author (Feb. 08, 2013, 05:04 UTC) (on file with author). 
 285. See supra note 281. 
 286. For more information regarding Casas de Justicia in Colombia, see El Ministerio del Interior de 
Justicia, http://www.mij.gov.co/eContent/newsdetailmore.asp?id=2976&idcompany=2&idmenucate 
gory=226 (last visited June 18, 2011).  
 287. See Annette Pearson, El Programa Nacional de Casas de Justicia y la Atención Integral a Vícti-
mas en Comunidades Locales de Colombia. El Caso de las Víctimas de la Violencia Intrafamiliar, 
VOL. 14 NO. 27 ILANUD AL DÍA 149, 149-50 (2006), available at http://www.ilanud.or.cr/A113.pdf.  
 288. See Pearson, Colombian National Justice House, supra note 280, at xiv.   
 
1. Decentralization of justice services to low-income communities located on the outskirts of cit-
ies to facilitate access to non-violent conflict resolution alternatives. 2. All services are free of 
charge and do not require clients to hire their own lawyer. 3. The combination of various justice 
services under a single roof avoids sending the Justice House client from one place to another for 
different aspects of his or her proceedings. 4. The strategic link established with other institutions 
in the same part of the city seeks to make the Community Justice House a contributor to overall 
development plans. 5. Legal guidance for the client, and community education on justice topics 
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thus seeking to change the cultural approach to conflict. Through the moderniza-
tion of the administration, management, and technology, Casas seek to provide 
better quality services.289 To support these goals, the Casas have established a 
structure that generally includes the municipal agencies of: the House Coordina-
tor, Reception, and Information Desk; Municipal Neighborhood Disputes Office; 
Municipal Family Affairs Office; Municipal Representative Charged with Protect-
ing and Promoting Human Rights; the Community Development Office; national 
justice services such as the Local Office of the Public Prosecutor; the Public De-
fender’s Office; the National Institute of Legal Medicine and Forensic Sciences; 
the Colombian Family Welfare Institute; and other entities, including the Ethnic 
Community Matters Office and Community Justice Mediation and Conciliation.290 
It is important to note that even though judges work closely with the Casas, they 
are not part of the Casas in the Colombian model. 
By 2005, Colombia developed approximately 40 Casas de Justicia, mainly in 
urban areas, with the goal of providing integration of services, strengthening the 
social fabric, and fostering a better perception of the justice system through decen-
tralization, and, when necessary, special jurisdiction for the indigenous popula-
tion.291 These Casas have specifically focused on both criminal procedure to pre-
vent crime and reduce impunity292 and on ADR efforts, which have included work 
with chambers of commerce, non-profit organizations, universities, and justices of 
peace, among others.293 In addition, the Casas have provided restorative justice in 
appropriate cases294 and have worked closely with the local government, specifi-
cally the mayoral offices, to further sustainability.295 As a result of these efforts, 
the Casas de Justicia in Colombia are perceived as 
much more than a simple relocation from downtown; much more than 
the decentralization on an institution-by-institution basis, and far more 
than a means of relieving the heavy caseloads of the courts and the public 
prosecutor’s offices. It proposes a new relationship between basic justice 
services and the local community and its citizens, for solving everyday 
problems and enhancing community life.296 
 ___________________________  
are fundamental functions of the Justice House. The fact that the Justice House is immersed in 
the neighborhood helps to make it sensitive to local problems and to focus training and advice 
activities appropriately. 6. Information on the particular features of the local community served 
by the Justice House, and a communications approach that emphasizes a two-way dialogue with 
the client helps to clarify the diverse dimensions of the disputes and conflicts brought to the 
House for attention. 
 
Id. at xv-xvi.  See also Annette Pearson, Ponencia Casas de Justicia 10 Años: Retos y Logros, 
unpublished manuscript (2007) (on file with author).  
 289. Pearson, Colombian National Justice House, supra note 280, at xv.  
 290. Id. at xvi; see also Juan Faundez, Non-State Justice Systems in Latin America 44-45, THE 
WORLD BANK, available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAWJUSTINST/Resources/Faun 
dez.pdf. 
 291. Pearson, Colombian National Justice House, supra note 280, at xvi. 
 292. Muñoz, Justice Houses, supra note 271. 
 293. See, e.g., COLOMBIA FINAL REPORT, supra note 283. 
 294. See Pearson, Colombian National Justice House, supra note 280. 
 295. See COLOMBIA FINAL REPORT, supra note 283, at iii. 
 296. Pearson, Colombian National Justice House, supra note 280, at xvii. 
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After 2006, Colombia also began establishing regional Casas de Justicia to 
reach marginalized communities,297 which are often characterized by lack of gov-
ernmental presence and high levels of conflict. To date, the country has over 20 
Casas that fall in this category. In addition to the common objectives shared 
among all Colombian Casas, the regional centers interconnect both rural and 
urban communities; strengthen the presence of the government in areas affected 
by armed conflict to reestablish rule of law; coordinate local development 
programs and justice efforts; and specifically focus on increasing access to justice 
within the indigenous and afrocolombian communities by linking their traditional 
practices to the national justice system.298 The scope of these Casas only 
encompasses “everyday disputes”; if they were to include land disputes or drug 
related offenses, they would face resistance from the guerillas and drug traffick-
ers.  
Another significant model has been implemented in Argentina, which has 
been a pioneer in the development of the multi-door model in Latin America.299 
This model has not only taken the form of Casas de Justicia, but also as oficinas 
multi-puertas. Fundación Libra300 has been one of the essential players for the 
implementation of the Argentinean multi-door model, which is closest to the orig-
inal multi-door concept, as a means to strengthen the judiciary301 and to promote 
access to justice302 by decentralizing the judicial system and “de-judicializing” 
conflict resolution.  Oficinas multi-puertas form part of the judicial system, oper-
ating at the national level and at the provincial level in Rio Negro and Neuquén.303 
While the oficinas multi-puertas operate in the urban areas, Casas de Justicia 
have mainly been developed in rural communities, in provinces that lack access to 
the court system due to geographical distance. They offer citizens access to the 
courts, dispute resolution processes, social services, necessary information, and 
 ___________________________  
 297. For more information on Casas de Justicia 2006-2010, see USAID Justice Reform and Modern-
ization Project, FINAL REPORT 2006-2010, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACR351.pdf. 
 298. Pearson, Colombian National Justice House, supra note 280, iv. 
 299. See André Gomma de Azevedo, La Mediación en Brasil, in ARBITRAJE Y MEDIACIÓN EN LAS 
AMÉRICAS 73 (Juan Enrique Vargas Viancos & Francisco Javier Gorjón Gómez eds., 2006). 
 300. Gomma de Azevedo provides more background: 
 
The Houses of Justice is the brainchild of Gladys Álvarez and Elena Highton, and implementa-
tion of the idea was proposed first in 2003 at the La Mesa del Diálogo Argentino, which was ini-
tiated by the president of Argentina in 2001, and coordinated by the Catholic Church and the 
United Nations Development Program (UNDP).  In 2004 the judiciary signed a couple of agree-
ments with the Libra Foundation for technical assistance in the implementation and monitoring of 
the Houses of Justice, first in Rio Negro and then in Tierra del Fuego.  Currently, there are Hous-
es of Justice in the provinces of Buenos Aires, Rio Negro, Santiago del Estero and Tierra del 
Fuego. 
 
Id. at 484. 
 301. For more information, see Improve the Operation of the Argentine Courts including Strengthen-
ing Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution, DPK CONSULTING, http://www.dpkconsulting.com 
/index.php/en/component/content/article/85-argentina/153-improve-the-operation-of-the-argentine-
courts-including-strengthening-use-of-alterative-dispute-resolution (last visited Aug. 26, 2011). 
 302. For more information on Iniciativa para el Acceso a la Justicia in Argentina, see Casas de Justi-
cia en General Pico, La Pampa, ALIHUEN, http://www.alihuen.org.ar/index2.php?option=com_ con-
tent&do_pdf=1&id=969(last visited Aug. 3, 2011). 
 303. Id. 
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counsel.304  Even though Argentina does not face challenges similar to the ones in 
Guatemala or Colombia, in terms of conflict and unrest, the Casas de Justicia in 
this country have developed other significant traits and functions; for example, 
Casas de Justicia have become a place where citizens convene, not just for the 
resolution of their disputes, but also for community building.305    
In Brazil, individual judges have taken it upon themselves to experiment with 
and implement a multi-door model in their courts, similar to the oficinas multi-
puertas in Argentina, to promote efficiency and reduce backlog.306  This has been 
possible due to the fact that, under the civil procedure code in Brazil, judges have 
broad discretion in the promotion of ADR,307 allowing them the flexibility to in-
novate and expand their role beyond adjudicating to resolving disputes.  The goal 
of these efforts has been to produce satisfactory results for those involved and to 
promote “social pacification”308 for society at large.309  One example of this or-
ganic and innovative development has been the move to ease confidentiality re-
quirements in home financing mediation cases; this rare gesture aided those in-
volved in home financing mediation by allowing them to gather information re-
garding their options for resolving their own disputes.310 Apart from the activity of 
individual judges, there has been a recent resolution to advance ADR issued by 
the National Council of Justice in Brazil.311  It is important to note that before the 
resolution was issued representatives of various sectors of Brazilian society, in a 
 ___________________________  
 304. Casas de Justicia have been established in the provinces of Buenos Aires, Rio Negro, Santiago 
del Estero and Tierra del Fuego.  See Modos de Acceso a Justicia, COMISIÓN NACIONAL DE 
ACCESO A JUSTICIA,  http://www.csjn.gov.ar/accjust/docs/cuadro.jsp (last visited Aug. 26, 2011).  
A video on Casas de Justicia is available online. PODER JUDICIAL PROVINCIA DE RIO NEGRO, 
http://www.jusrionegro.gov.ar/inicio/casajusticia/video.php (last visited Dec. 18, 2012). See also Pro-
grama “Defensorias Decentralizadas en Casas de Justicia,” DEFENSA PÚBLICA DE LA PROVINCIA DE 
BUENOS AIRES, www.defensapublica.org.ar/CasadeJusticia/Res_y_PROGRAMA.doc (last visited Dec. 
18, 2012) (discussing the formation of Casas de Justicia in Buenos Aires). 
 305. For a video on Casas de Justicia in Argentina, see Casas de Justicia—Poder Judicial del Río 
Negro, PODER JUDICIAL PROVINCIA DE RIO NEGRO, http://www.jusrionegro.gov.ar/inicio 
/casajusticia/video.php (last visited Aug. 20, 2011). 
 306. See Gomma de Azevedo, supra note 299.  Examples of Brazilian systems similar to the multi-
door courthouse in the United States:  The Forense Mediation Service of the Tribunal of Justice of the 
Federal District, the Conciliation Nucleus Previous to the Process of the Tribunal of Justice of Bahia, 
the Mediation Service of Family of the Tribunal of Justice of Santa Catarina, the Program of Mediation 
of the Financial Housing System of the Regional Tribunal of Justice of Unit of Region No. 4, The 
Program of Community Mediation of the Tribunal of Acre, the Multi-door Courthouse in Curitiba 
established by the Special Justice in Curitiba by the Tribunal of Justice of Paraná.  See id. at 78.   
 307. “O juiz dirigirá o processo conforme as disposições deste Código, competindo-lhe: I - assegurar 
às partes igualdade de tratamento; II - velar pela rápida solução do litígio; III - prevenir ou reprimir 
qualquer ato contrário à dignidade da Justiça; IV - tentar, a qualquer tempo, conciliar as partes.” Lei 
No. 8.952 de 13 de Dezembro de 1994, Art. 125, available at 
http://www.jusbrasil.com.br/diarios/37942531/djpr-18-06-2012-pg-39.  
 308. “Social pacification” is a term broadly used in Brazilian society to refer to the need to address 
social violence. 
 309. See Gomma de Azevedo, supra note 299.   
 310. Id. 
 311. See Proposal for New Civil Procedure Code (2010), available at 
http://www.senado.gov.br/senado/novocpc/pdf/Anteprojeto.pdf (last visited June 18, 2011); see also 
Mariana D. Hernandez-Crespo, Securing Investment: Innovative Business Strategies for Conflict Man-
agement in Latin America, in ADR IN BUSINESS: PRACTICES AND ISSUES ACROSS COUNTRIES AND 
CULTURES 449, 496-97 (Arnold Ingen-Housz ed., 2011). 
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series of recent consensus building single-text documents,312 had already ex-
pressed the potential they saw—not just to provide access to justice, but also to 
promote “social pacification.”313 
One of the most recent and systemic efforts to implement the multi-door 
model has taken place in Paraguay, where the establishment of Casas de Justicia 
has been part of an ongoing effort to strengthen democracy through citizen partic-
ipation. This unusual model was developed by the Centro de Estudios Judiciales, a 
non-profit organization, and functions with the support of the local executive 
branch of state government and The National Endowment for Democracy (NED) 
whose financial support and collaboration was vital for the development of this 
model in Paraguay.314 It departs from the USAID implemented model315 by estab-
lishing a relationship with the executive power and intensely focusing on the in-
clusion of collaborative governance, in addition to private conflict resolution, 
given the high polarization of that society. 316  In this way, the Paraguay model 
most closely resembles this Article’s proposal in its use of ADR for systemic in-
clusion and citizen participation in collaborative governance through all stages of 
the policy continuum—deliberative democracy, collaborative public management, 
and alternative dispute resolution in the policy process. 
The development of the first casa de justicia began in 2008 in the city of San 
Pedro, one of the poorest regions in the country, and is a project of the govern-
ment of the Department of San Pedro and the National Endowment for Democra-
cy (NED).317  Paraguay’s project to develop Casas de Justicia aims to integrate 
the governmental, business, and civic sectors through the resolution of disputes 
and the prevention and management of conflict.  The San Pedro casa de justicia 
seeks to address the barriers to access to justice in Paraguay, which includes a lack 
of access to the courts, an absence of knowledge of citizens’ rights, court backlog, 
corruption, fear of retaliation, and lack of channels for public dispute resolution.  
 ___________________________  
 312. One example of implementing a participatory and inclusive decision-making process was a 
consensus building project conducted by the University of St. Thomas School of Law in Brazil in 
2007-2008.  Through the use of mini-publics, which gather together representatives of different sectors 
of Brazilian society, the consensus-building project explored the potential of the multi-door courthouse 
in Latin America to build participatory capacity and to maximize their national dispute resolution 
systems. Hernández Crespo, Building, supra note 19, at 454.  
 313. They also noted how the multi-door courthouse could work to relieve the judicial system of 
cases better suited to an ADR process, thus leaving in the court system only those cases requiring 
public adjudication.  The representatives also considered the multi-door courthouse as generally in-
creasing the level of satisfaction with the outcome and the likelihood of compliance, therefore acting as 
an effective and efficient enforcement mechanism.  They noted that the multi-door courthouse could 
act as a catalyst to bring citizens into closer contact with the legal system, which could also serve to 
make the judiciary more transparent.  Similarly, the proximity of ordinary citizens to the judiciary 
could help close the gap between law on the books and law in action. Id.   
 314. Interview with Rivas, supra note 274.  
 315. Id.  
 316. Rivas, CASA DE JUSTICIA, supra note 272. 
 317. For more information on Casas de Justicia in Paraguay, see Marta Rivas et al., Modelo de Casa 
de Justicia en Paraguay San Pedro: Abriendo Puertas al acceso a la justicia y participación,  LA 
REVISTA JURÍDICA LA LEY PARAGUAYA, available at http://www.cej.org.py/files/06-09-10-
Revista%20la%20Ley-Casa%20de%20Justicia.pdf (last visited June 18, 2011); Modelo de Casa de 
Justicia en Paraguay, MEDIOS ALTERNETÍVOS DE RESOLUCIÓN DE CONFLICTOS, available at 
http://www.cej.org.py/files/06-09-10-Revista%20la%20Ley-Casa%20de%20Justicia.pdf (last visited 
June 18, 2011). For more information on the National Endowment for Democracy, see The National 
Endowment for Democracy, http://www.ned.org (last visited June 18, 2011). 
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Some of the issues addressed by the casa include land and environmental issues, 
housing, domestic violence, child support, and paternity.   
This multi-door model seeks to diminish levels of social conflict by promot-
ing methods of participatory justice, such as mediation, processes of social dia-
logue, and consensus building.  This is especially important given the polarization 
and antagonism that exists among different sectors in society, and is exacerbated 
when dealing with marginalized communities.  In this regard, the project in Para-
guay attempts to foster democracy by seeking solutions for common disputes, 
with a strong emphasis on inclusion, especially with regard to those that have been 
traditionally excluded from the decision-making process.  There is also an empha-
sis on the promotion of community mediators.318 A network of access to justice 
has been developed, including the following institutions: Judicial Power, Justice 
of Peace, Municipality, State Governing Authorities, Prosecution, Health Center, 
Institution of Education, National Police, social mediators, and community lead-
ers.  These organizations work together with the Casa to assist citizens that are 
referred to their services and to guide them throughout the process until the final 
resolution of their cases. This is accomplished through documentation, which 
helps register each case and therefore enables follow up by the institutions that 
participate in this network. In this way, the Casa promotes coordination among 
institutions outside of the center.319  
The first objective of the Casa de Justicia San Pedro is to improve access to 
justice, ADR, and mediation services. To this end, the Casa works to promote a 
more participatory perspective and methodology for the system of conflict resolu-
tion at the local level, where people are accustomed to top-down solutions that 
force citizens to assume a passive role and the government a paternalistic role. It 
is also important to note the involvement of women in the Paraguay Casa, which 
has empowered them to be protagonists in a participatory justice model.320 In 
addition to the presence of women mediators, women have accounted for 75% of 
the citizens who have approached the Casa for assistance and 80% of the partici-
pants involved when capacity building has been offered.321 The areas of conflict 
that have been resolved through mediation include child support and custody, 
family conflict, conflicts between neighbors, and breaches of contract.322 The 
facilitators and promoters of access to justice have screened 128 cases; out of 
those, 21 were sent to mediation and handled by the social mediators for the Casa. 
These cases directly benefitted 40 people and indirectly helped 200 more.323 The 
remaining 107 cases were directed to the following institutions: Public Defender 
for Children and Adolescents, Justice of Peace, Agency for Children’s Rights, 
Public Prosecutor, National Police, Birth Registry, Institute of Rural Develop-
ment, State Secretary of Social Programs, Direction of Social Welfare, Depart-
 ___________________________  
 318. Rivas, CASA DE JUSTICIA, supra note 272. See also Experiencias de Accesso a Justicia en San 
Pedro, http://www.cej.org.py/index.php/noticias/39-noticias-del-cej/585-jornadas-de-derecho-judicial 
(last visited June 18, 2011). 
 319. Rivas, CASA DE JUSTICIA, supra note 272.  
 320. Interview with Rivas, supra note 274.  
 321. Rivas, CASA DE JUSTICIA, supra note 272.  
 322. Id.  
 323. Id.  
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ment of Identification of the National Police, Ministry of Education, and the State 
Secretary of Health.324  
The second objective of the San Pedro Casa de Justicia is the prevention and 
management of social conflicts. The social mediators deal with current disputes 
and with conflicts that have not yet escalated into disputes. Among the types of 
conflict that social mediators have handled are issues over land and academic 
scholarships as well as internal issues within community organizations. The con-
stituents that have come to the Casa de Justicia for assistance regarding public 
conflict include teachers of public institutions, Administrators of the Local Public 
Health Center, the Committee of Women, an organization of farmers without land, 
student governments, and municipal governing authorities.325  Through the Casa, 
mesas de diálogo social (round tables of social dialogue) have been developed to 
assist in the resolution of these issues among social actors by enabling trained 
facilitators to help using participatory techniques.326 These mesas have been used 
not only to enhance public dispute resolution, but also to foster other experiences 
of democratic governance by incorporating citizen participation into the crafting 
of public policy.327 It is important to note that this is a region with an extensive 
degree of civic organization, which has given it the leverage to bring high-level 
decision makers to the table, pressuring them by measures such as closing the 
streets. Even though these measures have been primarily reactionary, more em-
phasis has currently been placed on making citizens part of the decision-making 
process, ex ante.328 To support these efforts, a new Paraguayan law has been is-
sued to help consolidate the role of the Casas in the promotion of citizen partici-
pation in policy-making at the municipal level.329 
Casas de Justicia have taken root in a number of other countries as well. Bo-
livia, for example, has developed a multi-door model with two institutions to pro-
vide inclusion of the formal judicial system as an option in dispute resolution for 
the poor and to offer alternative methods of conflict resolution and legal represen-
tation in the framework of protecting citizens’ constitutional and human rights.  
To this end, the institutions called Casas de Justicia offer information to citizens 
regarding their rights as well as legal representation to protect and enforce their 
rights before the court system and any other competent authority.  One of the in-
teresting features of the Casas de Justicia is that they provide a broad range of 
services in paternity cases, including legal, psychological, medical, and social 
assistance.  Additionally, these institutions serve as a community center where 
citizens can learn about their rights and civic duties.330  Bolivia has also imple-
mented a second institution within the multi-door model, called the Integrated 
Centers of Justice, which seek to provide access to justice and ADR processes 
through a co-participatory mechanism with the judicial system, the public defend-
 ___________________________  
 324. Id.  
 325. Id.  
 326. Interview with Rivas, supra note 274.  
 327. Rivas, CASA DE JUSTICIA, supra note 272.  
 328. Interview with Rivas, supra note 274.  
 329. SAN PEDRO ABRIENDO PUERTAS, http://www.cej.org.py/sanpedro/abriendopuertas.html (last 
visited Mar. 21, 2013).  
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er, and other governmental entities.  These efforts are a part of a broader strategy 
to strengthen the judicial system by improving organization and court perfor-
mance.331 
Ecuador and Peru have also developed adapted models of Casas de Justicia. 
The multi-door model established in Ecuador, called “Centers of Equity and Jus-
tice,” consist of a judge, prosecutor, and public defender.  The goal is to promote 
access to justice in marginalized communities. To carry out this initiative, there is 
a collaborative effort with universities to contribute with pro bono work through 
legal clinics.332 The Casas in Peru have been developed with the goal of increas-
ing access to justice in marginalized communities, to whom the court system has 
traditionally been remote and inaccessible given its level of complexity and frag-
mentation.333  The Casas de Justicia are an attempt to address domestic violence, 
especially given the affect it has on the well-being of children.  There is also a 
strong emphasis on the promotion of social inclusion.  Some of the key players 
have included the World Bank334 and the Inter-American Development Bank, who 
have collaborated with the Minister of Justice and the Minister for Women and 
Social Development. 
Casas de Justicia have also been established in El Salvador, a country which 
faced 12 years of civil war that ended with a peace accord in 1992.335  Similar to 
Casas de Justicia in other countries, the Casas in El Salvador, partnering with the 
local government, aim to improve access to justice in rural communities. These 
Casas de Justicia have been established primarily in places facing high conflict 
and judicial backlog. To support this cause, the judiciary has been greatly in-
volved in the Casas through committees of coordination. To date, the Casas in El 
Salvador have successfully assisted in reducing family and neighborhood cases.336 
In the Dominican Republic, the model of Casas de Justicia is run, promoted, 
and coordinated by a non-profit organization, Participacion Ciudadana, with im-
portant support from USAID funding.337 The UNDP report on National Human 
Development from 2005 indicated that “90% of the Dominican Republic citizens 
consider themselves as not having easy access to justice.”338 To address this chal-
lenge, Participacion Ciudadana began efforts to establish Casas comunitarias de 
 ___________________________  
 331. For more information on Integrated Centers of Justice in Bolivia, see USAID, SUPPORT TO 
SANTA CRUZ (2008), available at http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACL880.pdf (last visited Oct. 15, 
2012).  
 332. La comunidad tendrá más acceso a la Justicia, LA HORA (Jan. 10, 2011), 
http://www.lahora.com.ec/index.php/noticias/show/1101076279/-1/La_comunidad_tendrá_más_acceso 
_a_la_Justicia.html.  
 333. For more information on Casas de Justicia in Peru, see, e.g., Casas de la Justicia Inauguradas 
MINISTERIO DE JUSTICIADE PERÚ, http://www.minjus.gob.pe/casa-de-la-justicia/casas-de-la-justicia-
inauguradas/  (last visited Aug. 3, 2011).   
 334. Access to Justice Powerpoint, supra note 182. 
 335. See El Salvador, DPK CONSULTING NAVIGATING CHANGE IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 3 (February 
2002) (on file with author). For a comprehensive overview of the situation in El Salvador, see 
Achievements in Building and Maintaining the Rule of Law, supra note 10. 
 336. See William E. Davis & Razila K. Datta, La Implementacion de Programas de RAC en Sectores 
de Justicia en Desarrollo, available at http://www.sistemasjudiciales.org/content/jud/archivos/nota 
archivo/860.pdf; Davis, Lessons, supra note 127, at 9. 
 337. Interview with Pearson de Gonzalez, supra note 191.  
 338. Annette Pearson, Proyecto de la Casa de Justicia de Santiago, República Dominicana (2006) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (citing Resultados de la observación: “Acceso a la 
justicia”, año 2 no. 2 BOLETÍN OBSERVATORIO JUDICIAL 6 (2006)).  
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justicia (community justice houses) in the country. These Casas have been devel-
oped with the goal of disseminating knowledge regarding citizens’ rights, provid-
ing access to ADR processes and legal assistance, and fostering community de-
velopment.339  As part of the services available, they offer workshops on many 
topics including legal knowledge, access to justice, and participatory budgeting.  
The jurisdiction of Casas comunitarias de justicia is fairly broad, ranging from 
criminal cases, such as theft and fraud, to landlord-tenant disputes and issues re-
garding domestic violence, alimony, and child protection.340  Mediators have re-
ported the use of mediation has helped lower the instances of violence in the set-
tling of disputes within families and communities by strengthening those relation-
ships.341  When disputes are not resolved through the Casas comunitarias de justi-
cia, they are referred to the district attorney, the public defender, or to the appro-
priate competent agency or ministry, such as the Ministry of Family and Children, 
the Ministry of Public Health, or the Ministry of Telecommunications.342  Despite 
the recognition of the necessity of the Casas comunitarias de justicia, community 
leaders have noted the Casas lack the needed funds to operate and have requested 
further financial support from the private and public sectors.343 
Unlike the models previously discussed, the Casas de Justicia in Costa Rica 
are merely mediation centers where every “door” leads to mediation. In Costa 
Rica, Casas de Justicia are mainly community mediation centers,344 which offer 
no other dispute resolution method.345  The centers are characterized by the central 
role of the mediator who, through an open dialogue, guides the parties in the reso-
lution of their conflicts.  The service is free-of-charge, and lawyers generally do 
not assist parties.  The scope of the conflicts addressed in the Casas de Justicia 
ranges from small damages, nuisance claims, and conflicts among neighbors, to 
conflicts involving consumers, business, and labor.346  Cases such as felonies, 
misdemeanors, and child abuse can be referred to the appropriate governmental 
institution.347 
 ___________________________  
 339. See USAID, JUSTICE PROJECT QUARTERLY REPORT APRIL-JUNE 2009, 
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACO289.pdf (last visited June 18, 2011) (discussing the USAID 
Justice Project in the Dominican Republic, which involved the casas comunitarias de justicia); Casa 
Comunitaria de Justicia, PARTICIPACIÓN CIUDADANA (Aug. 18, 2010), 
http://www.pciudadana.org/documentos/proyectos/11/ccj.pdf; Marcelo Peralta, Casa Comunitaria de 
Justicia de Santiago asiste a 46 mil personas en dos años, EL NUEVO DIARIO, (Oct. 10, 2008), 
http://www.elnuevodiario.com.do/app/article.aspx?id=127839; Casa Comunitaria de Justicia Para 
Cobijar Nuestros Derechos, available at http://www.pciudadana.org/documentos/proyectos/11/ccj.pdf. 
 340. Juan M. Ramirez, Miles de conflictos se dirimen en Casas Comunitarias de Justicia, HOY (Nov. 
8, 2009), http://www.hoy.com.do/el-pais/2009/11/8/301142/. 
 341. Id. 
 342. Id. 
 343. Id. 
 344. For a discussion of community mediation centers and their benefits, see supra note 200. 
 345. Sofia Chacon, Casas de Justicia en Costa Rica, MINISTERIO DE JUSTICIA Y PAZ DE COSTA RICA, 
http://culturadepaz.mjp.go.cr/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=103%3Acasas-de-
justicia-en-costa-rica&catid=35%3Adinarac&lang=es (last visited Aug. 6, 2011); see also Casas de 
Justicia, MINISTERIO DE JUSTICIA Y PAZ DE COSTA RICA, 
http://www.mjp.go.cr/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=76&Itemid=59 (last visited 
Aug. 24, 2011). 
 346. Id.  
 347. See Chacon, supra note 345; see also Modernization of Judicial Branch Administration, Organi-
zation, and Procedures, TETRA TECH DPK, http://www.tetratechdpk.com/dpkconsulting/en/component 
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As can be seen through these examples, different countries have multiple and 
varied experiences of multi-door models. However, information about them is still 
scattered. Each effort seems to be, to some extent, isolated from other similar 
experiences in the region. If the aim is to optimize the potential of the multi-door 
models in each country, establishing both a consolidated source of information 
about Casas de Justicia and oficinas multi-puertas throughout the region as well 
as systemic lines of communication could be of great benefit among the develop-
ers of the multi-door model in each country. Such an exchange should be fairly 
effortless given modern advances in technology, as will be discussed at greater 
lengths below.  
C. The Untapped Potential of Casas de Justicia in the Promotion             
of Systemic Inclusion 
As discussed above, the multi-door courthouse model in Latin America is 
currently implemented through Casas de Justicia and, to a lesser degree, oficinas 
multi-puertas. The following sections of this Article will focus on the potential of 
the Casas de Justicia, since they incorporate higher levels of community engage-
ment. Nonetheless, some of the proposal suggested could also be adapted and 
applied to oficinas multi-puertas.  
While the current Casas de Justicia have allowed for the promotion of private 
and, to a limited extent, public dispute resolution—mainly in low-income com-
munities—it seems worthwhile to explore the untapped potential of an adapted 
form of Casas de Justicia to foster inclusion and broader participation.  First, it 
could promote inclusion by encompassing all citizens and integrating marginal-
ized practices into mainstream practices.  Second, this adapted model of the Casas 
de Justicia could contribute to the development of citizens’ capacity for decision-
making regarding the appropriate forum for private conflict management and dis-
pute resolution. Rather than maintaining the administrative routing of cases that is 
essential to the early multi-door courthouse model, the adapted casa de justicia 
could foster individual self-determination in the process of selecting dispute reso-
lution.  Third, using facilitative processes, citizens could not only have an experi-
ence of the maximization of joint gains, but also use it as an opportunity to devel-
op their problem-solving capacity in private conflict management and dispute 
resolution.  Fourth, the development of citizen capacities in the resolution of the 
private disputes could, in turn, be transferred to interactions in the public square, 
thereby affecting the caudillo mentality. In this regard, Casas de Justicia could 
play a more systemic role by assigning an organizational ombuds function to the 
conflict assessor and including greater public conflict resolution and other forms 
of collaborative governance.  
 ___________________________  
/content/article/61-costa-rica/90-modernization-of-judicial-branch-administration-organization-and-
procedures-.html (last visited June 22, 2011). 
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1. Encompassing All Citizens and Integrating the Mainstream and      
Marginalized Local Practices of the Invisible Majorities 
As examined earlier, there are significant structural issues preventing integra-
tion of the formal and informal sectors in Latin America.  ADR is no less influ-
enced by this reality, which results in a de facto segregation, due to lack of access 
to justice in low-income communities. While mediation has been used in an at-
tempt to remedy this situation, it has had limited effects as a result of lack of re-
course to the judiciary and the impact this has had on the mediation process as 
well as on the enforceability of the agreements. It is in this context that Casas de 
Justicia came into existence, addressing this issue and expanding access to justice 
for the poor by providing them with connections to the formal judicial system, 
thereby going beyond mediation to provide a fuller range of options to effectively 
deal with conflict.  
Casas de Justicia bridge the gap between legal discourse and local practices, 
especially in poor or remote areas.  They are singular in their creative approach 
when delivering governmental and legal services to marginalized populations 
who, whether because of cost, distance, or time, have not had access to them.348  
The creation and implementation of the infrastructure for Casas de Justicia have 
represented a significant investment in Latin America. Even though providing a 
fuller range of options for the poor has been a quantum leap forward, increasing 
access to justice, Casas de Justicia still have further potential to be a powerful 
tool in establishing a solid foundation for a more sustainable rule of law.  If Casas 
de Justicia were to encompass all citizens, rather than exclusively serving the 
disenfranchised majority, they would be able to provide participatory experiences 
for all sectors of society, which could, over time, lead to further enhancing dispute 
resolution and conflict management capacities.  
The expansion of Casas de Justicia to include all citizens could also provide a 
platform for interactions between the currently disenfranchised and the greater 
community. If, after this expansion, Casas de Justicia are connected with each 
other, it would be possible to integrate the marginalized local practices of the in-
visible majorities with mainstream practices.349 If a conflict arises between the 
local practices and mainstream practices, democratic deliberation could ensue.350 
Currently, there are ongoing efforts in some countries to link Casas de Justicia; 
but, to be more effective, these efforts should be formalized. By broadening the 
scope of Casas de Justicia and interconnecting them among themselves, there 
could be greater communication in which the invisible majorities could have a 
significant role in developing a foundation for a more sustainable rule of law. 
 ___________________________  
 348. The muti-door courthouse can address massive levels of social exclusion and contribute to the 
end of cycles of instability.  This happens, in part, because the multi-door courthouse provides a way 
for stakeholders to become active participants and develop capacities for conflict resolution.  This 
increased capacity could make its way into the public square and be applied to public conflicts. See 
Hernández Crespo, Securing Investment, supra note 311, at 476.  
 349. See generally Hendrix, Guatemalan Justice Centers, supra note 195 (articulating the importance 
of integrating local practices and traditional forms of justice, as long as they are not in violation of 
human rights). 
 350. Bingham, Collaborative Governance: Emerging Practices, supra note 14, at 277 (articulating 
the recent development of deliberation and dialogue). 
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2. Promoting Citizens’ Decision-Making and Problem-Solving Capacities 
in Private Conflict Resolution 
Second, while the adapted model would remain a vehicle for delivery of inte-
grated dispute resolution services, it would transform the role of conflict asses-
sors, enabling them to identify the root causes of systemic issues and empower 
citizens to select the most appropriate forum for the resolution of their disputes. 
Thus, it would foster self-determination, enhanced decision-making capacity, and, 
when facilitative processes are chosen, enhanced problem solving capacity as 
well.  The root cause identification, through the inclusion of an ombuds function, 
could provide the starting point for setting up agendas of collaborative governance 
efforts to address systemic issues. 
If Casas de Justicia are to be further utilized as an essential tool for contrib-
uting to a foundation for a more sustainable rule of law, their purpose needs to be 
expanded beyond managing conflicts and resolving disputes to empowering citi-
zens. To promote citizen decision-making and problem-solving capacities in pri-
vate conflict resolution, it is essential to focus not only on resolving the specific 
dispute or managing the specific conflict, but on deliberately emphasizing the 
enhancement of citizens’ capacities as well, which are also referred to as “civic 
capacity.” Xavier Souza Briggs defines “civic capacity” as:  
the extent to which the sectors that make up a community are (1) capable 
of collective action on public problems (the resource dimension), given 
the norms and institutional arenas for local action; and (2) choose to ap-
ply such capability (the dimension of effort, will and choice, or “agen-
cy”).351 
To this end, Peter Muhlberger emphasizes the need for the development of what 
he calls “human agency,” which he considers to be of critical importance for civic 
engagement. 352 Muhlberger defines human agency as “the capacity to choose and 
execute actions consistent with a coherent and reflexively determined identity.”353  
Citizens’ participation in the management of their own conflicts and resolu-
tion of their own disputes can contribute to building civic capacity and human 
agency. 354 Opening the spectrum of dispute resolution options for citizens, which 
fosters decision-making capacity, is especially important in the Latin American 
context because citizens generally consider their only options to be resignation to 
their plight, violent redress of wrongs, or, if they can afford it, recourse to the 
 ___________________________  
 351. BRIGGS, DEMOCRACY, supra note 201, at 13. 
 352. See Muhlberger, Human Agency, supra note 231, at 174 (arguing that new research is necessary 
in order to explore ways to revitalize the public square. Muhlberger offers the agency theory as a 
theoretical framework, “which helps identify facets of social processes vital for understanding how the 
e-public sphere might be vitalized. The key explanations considered here—the economy of attention, 
psychosocial structures, and development—represent some important targets for research, and agency 
theory suggests interrelations between these explanations.”). See also Peter Muhlberger, Democratic 
Deliberation and Political Identity: Enhancing Citizenship (2005) (paper prepared for the International 
Society of Political Psychology, 28th Annual Scientific Meeting), available at 
www.geocities.com/pmuhl78/PolIdentity.pdf. 
 353. See Muhlberger, Human Agency, supra note 231, at 164.  
 354. See Hernández Crespo, Building, supra note 19. 
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judiciary.  In this paradigm, citizens perceive themselves as incapable of effective-
ly working out their own private conflicts.  Force, either through personal violence 
or through the legitimate coercive power of the judiciary, is the only option other 
than resignation.  The middle ground between force and resignation—namely the 
spectrum of options for dispute resolution—is neither widely known nor consid-
ered in most countries in Latin America.   
Even though the multi-door courthouse model in several countries already of-
fers a broad spectrum of options for private dispute resolution, ranging from fa-
cilitative to adjudicative processes, the model can be altered to foster greater deci-
sion-making capacity in citizens.355  In the original multi-door courthouse model, 
a screener was the one to initially receive and reroute particular cases. This rerout-
ing of cases played an essential role in the model.  If, however, the aim is to build 
decision-making capacity regarding the selection of the appropriate forum, 356 the 
position of the screener needs to be altered in the new model to become a more 
sophisticated position of a conflict assessor.  This conflict assessor would use his 
or her conflict resolution expertise to guide citizens in the decision-making pro-
cess357 so that they are empowered to make an informed decision in the selection 
of the most appropriate dispute resolution forum.358  This would enhance parties’ 
self-determination,359 which is of critical importance for the promotion of partici-
 ___________________________  
 355. “Capacity building” as discussed in this article is based on Sen’s notion of development:  
 
Development has to be more concerned with enhancing the lives we lead and the freedoms we 
enjoy. Expanding the freedoms that we have reason to value not only makes our lives richer and 
more unfettered, but also allows us to be fuller social persons, exercising our own volitions and 
interacting with—and influencing—the world in which we live.   
 
SEN, supra note 1, at 14-15.  
 356. In learning to assess a conflict, parties can learn to identify the different sources of conflict (such 
as perceptions, interests, needs and/or values) and other criteria for selection of the forum, such as cost, 
speed, the need for precedent, remedies, preservation of the relationship and confidentiality, among 
others.  Sander, Fitting, supra note 245; Sander, Matching, supra note 245. 
 357. ROGER FISHER & DANIEL SHAPIRO, BEYOND REASON: USING EMOTIONS AS YOU NEGOTIATE 
72-93 (2005). As Fisher and Shapiro point out, too much autonomy can be overwhelming, but too little 
could have negative consequences. In order to increase the level of parties’ autonomy in the selection 
of the forum, their expectations and concerns need to be addressed, and information about their options 
needs to be provided. Even though it could be argued that educating parties about their options could 
be time-consuming, the benefits of enhancing parties’ autonomy through building their capacity to 
make decisions can outweigh the costs. Yet, the process of training in the basic characteristics of, and 
distinctions between, the various dispute resolution methods can be simplified through the use of 
visual media and the guidance of the screener and their lawyers.  As in other areas of life, parties 
engage regularly in efficient information-gathering to gain confidence in their decision-making.  
 358. Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Informed Consent in Mediation: A Guiding Principle for Truly 
Educated Decisionmaking, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 775, 776 (1999) [hereinafter Nolan-Haley, In-
formed Consent]. Although Nolan-Haley is addressing informed consent in mediation, the broad prin-
ciples of informed consent are applicable to the decision-making process in the selection of the appro-
priate forum. 
 359. Self-determination is defined and highly valued by the Model Standards of Conduct for Media-
tors:  
 
Self-determination is the act of coming to a voluntary, uncoerced decision in which each party 
makes free and informed choices as to process and outcome . . . . A mediator shall not undermine 
party self-determination by any party for reasons such as higher settlement rates, egos, increased 
fees, or outside pressure from court personnel, program administrators, provider organizations, 
the media or others.  
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pation in conflict management and dispute resolution.  It could also increase par-
ties’ sense of ownership over the conflict resolution process and over the outcome. 
It could also broaden their expectations of what could be achieved through a col-
laborative partnership within the context of conflict management and resolution. 
360    
Regarding problem-solving capacity, one of the advantages of the multi-door 
courthouse model is that cases that are suitable to be resolved through facilitative 
processes can provide citizens with an experience of the maximization of joint 
gains,361 which enables them to find options that will resolve their disputes and 
 ___________________________  
 
MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS Standard I. Nevertheless, there has been much 
debate about mandatory versus voluntary court-connected ADR. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, When 
Dispute Resolution Begets Disputes of Its Own: Conflicts Among Dispute Professionals, 44 UCLA L. 
REV. 1871, 1891-92 (1997) (summarizing the dispute).  See, e.g., Stephan Landsman, ADR and the 
Cost of Compulsion, 57 STAN L. REV. 1593 (2005) (arguing for voluntary court-connected ADR); Lisa 
Bernstein, Understanding the Limits of Court-Connected ADR: A Critique of Federal Court-Annexed 
Arbitration Programs, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 2169 (1993) (arguing for voluntary court-connected ADR); 
Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reflections on Judicial ADR and the Multi-Door Courthouse at Twenty: Fait 
Accompli, Failed Overture, or Fledgling Adulthood?, 11 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 297 (1996) 
(arguing for mandatory court-connected ADR); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Introduction: What Will We 
Do When Adjudication Ends? A Brief Intellectual History of ADR, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1613, 1618 
(1997) (arguing for mandatory court-connected ADR).  The voluntary nature of ADR itself is also 
being questioned. See Fiss, Against Settlement, supra note 39, at 1085-90; Amy Cohen, Revisiting 
Against Settlement: Some Reflections on Dispute Resolution and Public Values, 78 FORDHAM L. REV.  
1143, 1147, 1160-61 (2009).  Others have emphasized the principle of self-determination as a core 
foundational value in the mediation process.  See, e.g., Nancy A. Welsh, The Thinning Vision of Self-
Determination in Court-Connected Mediation: The Inevitable Price of Institutionalization?, 6 HARV. 
NEGOT. L. REV. 1 (2001) [hereinafter Welsh, Thinning Vision]; Joel Kurtzberg & Jaimie Henikoff, 
Freeing the Parties from the Law: Designing an Interest and Rights Focused Model of Land-
lord/Tenant Mediation, 1997 J. DISP. RESOL. 53 (1997); James Alfini, Mediation as a Calling: Ad-
dressing the Disconnect Between Mediation Ethics and the Practicies of Lawyer Mediators, 49 S. TEX. 
L. REV. 829, 830-31 (2008) (“Party self-determination is the most fundamental principle of mediation . 
. . .”). Also, several scholars have argued for self-determination as a fundamental principle in ADR at 
large. See, e.g., Lisa Blomgren Bingham, Self-Determination in Dispute System Design and Employ-
ment Arbitration, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 873 (2002) [hereinafter Bingham, Self-Determination].  Final-
ly, there is a connection between the experience of self-determination and the experience of procedural 
justice, which promotes the rule of law.  For more on the connection, see supra note 152.  See Welsh, 
Thinning Vision, supra at 7-8 (citing E. Allan Lind, Procedural Justice, Disputing, and Reactions to 
Legal Authorities 2-5 (Am. B. Found. Working Paper No. 9403, 1994); Stephen Bundy, The Policy in 
Favor of Settlement in an Adversary System, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 43-44 (1992); Robert A. Baruch 
Bush, “What Do We Need a Mediator For?”: Mediation’s “Value-Added” for Negotiators, 12 OHIO 
ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 18-21 (1996); Welsh, Thinning Vision, supra, at 7-8 (“Self-determination in 
mediation has deep significance for the parties who participate in the process because the meaning and 
implementation of self-determination almost certainly affects parties’ judgments regarding the proce-
dural justice furnished by the mediation process, as well as their level of commitment to the settlement 
they reach in mediation.”). 
 360. See John Lande, Using Dispute System Design Methods to Promote Good-Faith Participation in 
Court-Connected Mediation Programs, 50 UCLA L. REV. 69, 114 (2002) (citing Jody Freeman & 
Laura I. Langbein, Regulatory Negotiation and the Legitimacy Benefit, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 60, 69 
(2000)) (increased participation is a result of implementing DSD methods in decision-making, citing 
research showing that “people who participate in a process are more likely to comply with the resulting 
decisions”) [hereinafter Lande, Good-Faith]. 
 361. Yet, as pointed out earlier, the courts are in a unique position to encourage petitioners to explore 
other avenues for resolution, in which their specific needs might be better addressed. 
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satisfy their interests.362  A facilitated participatory experience of private conflict 
resolution may lead citizens to learn that there are options beyond mere winning 
and losing.363  Even those that opt for an adjudicative process, and thus will not 
have the same exposure to participatory problem solving, will at least have gained 
an overview of the options and benefits of facilitative processes.  
The role of a skilled facilitator could make the difference between citizens be-
ing guided as passive spectators in the resolution of their own disputes and citi-
zens being active participants.  Given the significance of the potential experience 
of the maximization of joint gains to be had in the dispute resolution process, it is 
essential for the facilitators to focus not merely on the resolution of the specific 
dispute, but also on the development of the citizens’ problem-solving capacity.  
The different facilitative processes, such as negotiation, mediation, Arb-Med, and 
 ___________________________  
 362. Fisher and Ury offer the classic example of two children asking their mother to settle a dispute 
over an orange: when the mother adjudicated the dispute, she simply cut the orange in half.  But a lot 
of value was wasted, because one child wanted the peel to make a pie, while the other wanted the pulp 
to make juice.  As Fisher and Ury point out, had the mother asked the children why each one wanted 
the orange, thus moving discussion about the conflict from position to interests, the outcome could 
have gone beyond fairness to maximization of joint gains.  One child would have gotten the entire peel 
and the other the entire pulp, with nothing wasted and with a higher level of satisfaction. ROGER 
FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN 56–57 (2d 
ed. 1991). Facilitated participatory experience of conflict resolution can also enhance the scope of what 
issues are dealt with.  Parties can address issues underlying the dispute that an adjudicative proceeding 
might overlook, and address a greater number of issues in an agreed to settlement.  This can not only 
satisfy the interests of the parties but also prevent future disputes.  See Andrea Schneider, Building a 
Pedegogy of Problem-Solving: Learning to Choose Among ADR Processes, 5 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 
113,  131 (2000) (describing how negotiation and mediation allow implementation of ideas from pre-
ventative law, by addressing issues beyond what the parties are litigating or might litigate, “so that all 
of the elements of the dispute are discussed, evaluated, and dealt with in a final agreement”) [hereinaf-
ter Schneider, Pedagogy]. 
 363. Those who opt for facilitative ADR processes, such as negotiation, mediation, Arb-Med, and 
mini-trial, among others, will, with the assistance of a skilled facilitator, be introduced to the distinc-
tions between positions, interests, values and needs, the distinction between value creation and value 
claiming, the process of generation and evaluation of options, and the drafting of an agreement.  Those 
who opt for an adjudicative process will not have the same exposure to participatory problem-solving, 
but will at least have gained an overview of the options.  Insofar as the Casas de Justicia are similar to 
community mediation centers, a number of benefits, such as in increased capacity to deal with local 
issues and leadership, will be realized.  See Beth Gazley et al., Collaboration and Citizen Participation 
in Community Mediation Centers, 23 REV.  POL’Y RES. 843, 844 (2006) (“Community mediation 
describes an array of community-based services and activities aimed at resolving interparty disputes . . 
. community mediation has been viewed increasingly by many of its practitioners as having the poten-
tial to be something more than simply a means of keeping disputants out of the court system.”); see 
also id. (citing Raymond Shonholtz, Justice from another perspective: The Ideology and Developmen-
tal History of Community Boards Program, in THE POSSIBILITY OF POPULAR JUSTICE, 201, 201-38 
(1993)) (stating that community mediation services are first-resort settlement systems for citizens 
alienated from the formal legal system); see also id. (citing Tim Hedeen & Patrick G. Coy, Community 
Mediation and the Court System: The Ties that Bind, 17 MEDIATION Q. 351 (2000)) (observing that 
community mediation is an empowerment tool of local citizenry, and is used to develop “community 
capacity for dealing with local issues and leadership”). Bingham concludes that community mediation 
is increasingly viewed as able to be more than just a way to keep disputants out of the court system. 
She identifies two dimensions into which community mediation goals can be divided: the first is relat-
ed to the “fair and efficient resolution of disputes,” and the second involves giving “individuals and 
communities power over their lives.” The first dimension goals include decreasing the caseload of 
courts, reducing costs, promoting efficiency, increasing accessibility, implementing more appropriate 
processes and providing justice that is based upon community values.  The second dimension involves 
the decentralization of decision-making, indigenous community leadership and responsibility, and 
reduced community tensions. Id. 
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mini-trial, among others, can serve as an opportunity to introduce citizens to the 
distinctions between positions, interests, values, and needs; the distinctions be-
tween value creation and value claiming; the process of generation; the evaluation 
of options; and the drafting of an agreement.  The process could provide citizens 
not only with the resolution of their private dispute, but also with a learning expe-
rience. 
3. The Potential of Casas de Justicia to Include Collaborative Governance 
Currently, Casas de Justicia primarily focus on private dispute resolution, yet 
they have untapped potential to also include public dispute resolution and other 
forms collaborative governance.  While Casas de Justicia were founded to fulfill a 
significant role within the community as a whole, in addition to at the individual 
level, they do not yet have a formal structure in place for effective public dispute 
resolution. To further develop this public function, it is important for the proposed 
role of the conflict assessor to also include an organizational ombuds function, 
performing root cause analysis. This function could not only help in uncovering 
the underlying conflict, but also in identifying systemic issues that could serve as 
a starting point for public conflict resolution and other forms of collaborative gov-
ernance. Public conflict resolution would help address current issues, while other 
forms of collaborative governance would allow citizens to participate in crafting 
and implementing public policies.  
Even though Casas de Justicia are not formally set up to deal with collabora-
tive governance, the immanent needs of the people, the success the Casas de Jus-
ticia have had in addressing private conflict, and lack of other viable alternatives 
have made them a natural option for dealing with public conflict. In Colombia, for 
example, several areas had a dispute over water supply in recent years. Citizens 
approached the mediators from the Casas de Justicia, who then met with commu-
nity leaders from the different neighborhoods and facilitated a process upon which 
the parties reached a mutual agreement.364 While this mediation successfully re-
solved the immediate public dispute, the proposed model of Casas de Justicia 
could go beyond this to also involve citizens in developing public policies that 
would implement long-term solutions. In the Colombian dispute, for example, 
Casas de Justicia could serve as a strategic point where citizens could come to-
gether to regularly discuss all pressing needs and communicate not only with the 
local authorities, but also with national government agencies that deal with strate-
gic planning.  In this example, additional experiences of collaborative governance, 
through deliberative democracy and collaborative public management, could have 
ensued, had these agencies learned that the neighborhoods needed a greater water 
supply and provided the communities with long-term solutions in addition to the 
immediate arrangements that were mediated by the Casas de Justicia. 
Citizen participation in collaborative governance is becoming increasingly 
common.365 The experiences range from study circles to public conversations and 
 ___________________________  
 364. Interview with Orlando Muñoz, Manager of the USAID Access to Justice Program in Colombia 
(July 26, 2011) (on file with author) [hereinafter Interview with Muñoz]. 
 365. See, e.g., UK CITIZENS ADVICE BUREAU, http://www.citizensadvice.org.uk/index/policy.htm 
(last visited Aug. 3, 2011) (describing the process of affecting policy, through what they call the “Evi-
dence Cycle,” which encompasses the following: client contacts a bureau for practical advice, problem 
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e-government.366 Specifically, in the case of Latin America, citizens are becoming 
more involved in public decision-making. For example, Brazil’s successful expe-
riences in participatory budgeting are particularly noteworthy, since, in addition to 
meeting the immediate needs of the people, these experiences have been able to 
connect the people with the government and hold the government more accounta-
ble by establishing a more transparent decision-making process.367 The Casas de 
Justicia could be an ideal institutional setting for these experiences. The capacities 
for decision-making and participatory problem solving, developed in private con-
flict management and dispute resolution through the Casas de Justicia, are build-
ing blocks for more effective engagement in collaborative governance. Neverthe-
less, there remain inherent asymmetries of power and information, adding layers 
of complexity to public collaboration; this would have to be considered when 
implementing these experiences.  
Collaborative governance is of special significance in this context because 
citizens are more likely to uphold a system they are a part of. By connecting all 
citizens, especially the disenfranchised majorities, to the government and by pro-
moting empowerment and public participation, Casas de Justicia can contribute to 
establishing the necessary foundation for a more sustainable rule of law. This is 
essential in Latin America, where the role of government needs to be strengthened 
and brought closer to the citizens. When this is not the case, de facto powers, such 
as guerillas, drug traffickers, and paramilitary groups, often usurp governmental 
roles. 
 ___________________________  
recorded in evidence database, policy team identifies a trend and prepares a case, campaigns team 
mobilizes support for it, policy makers lobby on proposed solutions, amended policy comes into 
force).  
 366. Lisa Blomgren Bingham provides examples of how new forms of participatory governance are 
being used at the “upstream” stage of the policy process: 
 
These new forms include deliberative democracy, e-democracy, public conversations, participa-
tory budgeting, citizen juries, study circles, collaborative policy-making, and other forms of de-
liberation and dialogue among groups of stakeholders or citizens. They also include focus groups, 
roundtables, deliberative town meeting forums, choice work dialogues, national issues forums, 
cooperative management bodies, and other partnership arrangements. 
 
Bingham, Collaborative Governance: Emerging Practices, supra note 14, at 287-88. In her article, 
Bingham provides information on actual programs and undertakings that exemplify different forms of 
participatory governance. For example, at the “Identifying a Policy Problem” stage, the Public Conver-
sations Project uses facilitated, face-to-face dialogue to foster communication and mutual understand-
ing to reduce stereotyping, defensiveness, and polarization.  The goal of this program “is not agree-
ment, but enhanced communication.” Id. at 292 (Public Conversations Project, available at 
http://www.publicconversations.org/project/?q=node/4 (last visited Aug. 4, 2011)).  At the fourth 
stage, “Selecting from among the Priorities,” Bingham gives the example of Choice-Dialogues, pro-
moted by Daniel Yankelovich.  Choice-Dialogues takes participants through three stages: conscious-
ness-raising, working through a problem, and decision-making or resolution.  Choice-Dialogues em-
phasizes the distinction between dialogue and debate with dialogue being about “respectful exchanges 
of information and views in which people listen to find common ground and build consensus; debate is 
about winning and losing, in which people listen to find weaknessess and counterarguments.” Id. at 
296 (Choice-Dialogue, available at http://www.viewpointlearning.com/our-approaches/choice-
dialogue/ (last visited Aug. 4, 2011)).   
 367. See, e.g., The Experience of the Participative Budget in Porto Alegre Brazil, UNESCO, 
http://www.unesco.org/most/southa13.htm (last visited Aug. 3, 2011). 
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D. Utilizing Latin American Building Blocks 
Having established some of the untapped potential that the multi-door court-
house model could have for Latin America, some ideas of how this potential could 
be achieved are as follows:  first, if Casas de Justicia would serve all citizens, not 
just the poor, and offer an option for public adjudication through the judiciary, 
they could help address the issue of the three tiers of justice;  second, if the role of 
conflict assessors would be broadened, they could both assist citizens in develop-
ing decision-making capacity in the selection of the appropriate method for the 
resolution of their disputes and assist with the identification of the root cause of 
the conflict;  third, by linking the conflict assessors through regional and national 
forums, they could collectively identify systemic issues and develop best practic-
es; and finally, the issues identified could serve as a starting point for collabora-
tive governance efforts, in which representatives of stakeholders could engage in 
the process of suggesting policy to legislative bodies or governmental agencies to 
address those systemic matters.  
1. Increasing the Number of Casas de Justicia and Expanding              
their Connection with the Judicial System 
Increasing the number and expanding the reach of the Casas de Justicia to in-
clude other socio-economic communities, particularly the middle class, would 
give the model more visibility.  Furthermore, this expansion would give them 
greater legitimacy, preventing the stigmatization of the Casas de Justicia as “poor 
man’s justice” or as a marginal service to the marginalized.  If Casas de Justicia 
were to have a presence in a wide variety of communities, the inclusion would be 
observable in physical terms and would help halt any perception of three-tiered 
justice.  
The mere presence of the Casas de Justicia sends an unmistakable message 
that justice goes beyond adjudication.  By resolving specific cases in ways other 
than adjudication, they are already shaping public values because the criteria for 
resolving those particular disputes are sometimes extra-legal.  Even though this is 
of fundamental importance, it is equally essential that Casas de Justicia include an 
option for judicial adjudication to guarantee citizens’ rights.  Currently, Casas de 
Justicia in some countries include one door or option that leads to adjudication 
through the judicial system.  Adding this option to all Casas de Justicia in the 
region is of critical importance, since facilitative processes cannot guarantee the 
resolution of all cases. 
2. Adapting the Role of the Multi-Door Screener into a Conflict Assessor 
to Strengthen Citizen Participation 
Drawing on the multi-door courthouse models vision of the integrated deliv-
ery of dispute resolution services, Casas de Justicia can have a broader and more 
systemic influence, going beyond private conflict management, private dispute 
resolution community services, and governmental services to include community 
conflict management, public dispute resolution, and other experiences of collabo-
rative governance. To this end, the role of the conflict assessors would be trans-
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formed to include an organizational ombuds function that uncovers underlying 
conflicts and identifies systemic issues.  
Conflict assessors could become a more qualified version of the original mul-
ti-door screener. While in the original multi-door courthouse model, the screener 
was in charge of rerouting the cases to the appropriate forum for resolution, but 
the conflict assessors could take on an expanded version of this role. To achieve 
this, the role of the conflict assessors could be transformed to include leading root 
cause identification and offering guidance to citizens in the decision-making pro-
cess of selecting the most appropriate forum for dispute resolution.  Providing this 
guidance could be the key to strengthening citizen participation by encouraging 
citizens to become protagonists in the decision-making process for resolving their 
own disputes. Identifying the root cause of the conflict could be used to manage 
the underlying conflict of the particular disputes, as well as to uncover systemic 
issues. These systemic issues could be addressed through public dispute resolu-
tion. They could also serve as the starting point for developing an agenda for ex-
ercising other forms of collaborative governance.  
Conflict assessors could assist in performing root cause analysis by asking 
questions to understand why the conflict arose and, ultimately, uncover the under-
lying root of the problem through persistent questioning.368  Asking “why” first 
generates immediate and superficial reasons, but persistently asking “why” gradu-
ally reveals deeper reasons underlying an issue.369  Along with the identification 
of root causes of conflict, “critical reframing”370 is also essential in identifying 
systemic issues.  Critical reframing helps to uncover the nature of the issue and 
possible interaction strategies based on critical questioning, continually revisiting 
the scale and objective of any such interactions.  This process would help the par-
ties examine possible solutions and evaluate the outcomes, allowing for greater 
knowledge of the conflict’s different dimensions and potentially leading to a more 
effective resolution. 
In addition, conflict assessors could significantly contribute to enhancing the 
parties’ decision-making capacity with regard to choosing the most appropriate 
forum for the resolution of their dispute. Even though it could be argued citizens 
already make choices about everyday life, Jacqueline Nolan-Haley stresses lack of 
informed decisions in the mediation process can lead to undesirable results.371 
Citizens could therefore benefit from learning a process that emphasizes the steps 
to making informed decisions, including identifying the goal in terms of interests, 
needs, and values; gathering information about the options available for dispute 
resolution and the consequences of each; analyzing the comparative differences 
between the options in terms of articulated goal; and selecting the option that best 
satisfies the stated goal or criterion.  Equipping citizens with an understanding and 
experience of this decision-making process could lead to the selection of more 
satisfactory choices. 
 ___________________________  
 368. Susan Sturm & Howard Gadlin, Conflict Resolution and Systemic Change, 2007 J. DISP. RESOL. 
1, 43 (2007) [hereinafter Sturm & Gadlin, Systemic]. 
 369. Id. at 39-42; see also John Paul MacDuffie, The Road to “Root Cause”: Shop-Floor Problem-
Solving at Three Auto Assembly Plants, 43 MGMT. SCI. 479, 494 (1997). 
 370. Sturm & Gadlin, Systemic, supra note 368, at 45. 
 371. See generally Nolan-Haley, Informed Consent, supra note 358. 
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Given the essential role that the conflict assessors fill, they will need adequate 
training, which will be discussed below. Moreover, greater accountability must be 
built into the system to ensure quality performance from the conflict assessors. To 
achieve this, ongoing evaluations by community members who use the Casas de 
Justicia could be performed. Those involved in designing the system would need 
to determine the most appropriate form of evaluation. 
3. Linking Conflict Assessors through State and National Forums for the 
Identification of Systemic Issues and the Development of Best Practices 
It is important to note Casas de Justicia could function as “institutional in-
termediaries” in the communities where they have been established, given their 
strategic location as the principal place where citizens bring their disputes.  Susan 
Sturm and Howard Gadlin define an “institutional intermediary” as being “located 
at the intersection of multiple, interrelated systems.”  These “boundary-spanning 
institutional intermediaries” are “embedded and independent,” and their systemic 
perspective allows them to link issues, data, and people.  Their position “affords 
access and knowledge concerning the range of problems that arise within that 
overall system,” and puts the intermediary “in a position to generate norms, pro-
cesses, and remedies that have an impact beyond a particular case.”372   
For this reason, to capitalize on the systemic role that these “institutional in-
termediaries” could play, state and national committees of conflict assessors with-
in each nation could be created.  The conflict assessors from individual Casas de 
Justicia would form the state committee, and representatives from each state 
committee would constitute the national committee.373 In this way, the conflict 
 ___________________________  
 372. Sturm & Gadlin, Systemic, supra note 368, at 39-40. An institutional intermediary is  
 
located at the intersection of multiple, interrelated systems.”  They have the capacity to “address 
problems arising within defined systems that involve repeat players whose conduct affects those 
within the system, even if they do not regularly and directly interact.  Their boundary-spanning 
position affords access and knowledge concerning the range of problems that arise within that 
overall system.  Because they operate within defined practice domains, over time they confront 
problems that recur within that domain.  Institutional intermediaries also interact with and have 
an opportunity to observe repeat players over time.  They operate at the intersection of multiple 
governance systems, seeing the relationships among those systems.  By working with these 
‘communities of practice,’ they are in a position to generate norms, processes, and remedies that 
have an impact beyond a particular case.  They also cultivate communities of practice as learning 
systems.  
 
Id.  These “boundary-spanning institutional intermediaries” are “embedded and independent” and their 
strategic location allows them to link issues, data, and people.  It enables them to have a systemic 
perspective, which can be beneficial in the solution of individual conflicts by transcending the particu-
larities of the conflict.  Id. 
 373. See Hernández Crespo, Making Rights Reality, supra note 35 (arguing that regional and national 
committees need to be comprised of representatives from lower committees, rather than appointed 
individuals with no connection to those committees, in order to enhance horizontal and vertical com-
munication and participation). Colombia, for example, has already taken steps in this direction. Cur-
rently, various Casas de Justicia in Colombia already have some form of a intermunicipal structure, 
based on small towns sharing limited resources. Interview with Pearson de Gonzalez, supra note 191.  
Those structures could share their experiences so other Casas de Justicia can benefit from their 
knowledge when forming regional committees that, while not sharing resources, could share infor-
mation and policies. It is also important to note that Colombia has formed a national committee, and 
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assessors’ systemic perspective that link issues, data, and people could be expand-
ed throughout local regions and the entire nation.  Moreover, these committees 
would act as a peer community for the exchange of experience, ideas, and best 
practices for a group of individuals that, at present, work without formal forums 
for synergy.  In addition, these committees could aggregate data gathered from the 
state and national levels for the identification of root causes of recurring systemic 
conflict that could have a national impact. A national committee would also be a 
good avenue for providing capacity building and ongoing evaluation of the role of 
the conflict assessors.   
4. Addressing the Identified Systemic Issues                                      
through Collaborative Governance 
While Casas de Justicia and both regional and national committees could 
provide the necessary structure for the assessment and resolution of individual 
disputes, as well as the identification of the root causes of conflict in its broader 
context, they are currently limited in their capacity to address systemic conflict.  
Based on their objectives, Casas de Justicia are expected to assume a public role. 
Some already have a form of public dispute resolution, which is still in its early 
stages, but lack the development of necessary capacities to maximize their poten-
tial.374  Furthermore, they are usually unaware of the broad variety of other op-
tions encompassed by collaborative governance.375 Nonetheless, Partners for 
Democratic Change have made significant efforts to advance capacity building 
and participatory experiences in the region, gradually increasing awareness about 
these options. 376 
Casas de Justicia are strategically located to go beyond their current down-
stream functions by including some forms of upstream and midstream collabora-
tive governance. As previously discussed, there are a number of processes that 
could be used to promote citizen participation in the different stages of design and 
implementation in the policy continuum. Some important considerations in the 
 ___________________________  
made some efforts to connect Casas de Justicia. Interview with Muñoz, supra note 364. However, the 
Colombian model could be more effective if it were to include conflict assessors and the representative 
structure suggested. 
 374. The Colombian model, for example, has dealt with several experiences of public dispute resolu-
tion. Interview with Muñoz, supra note 364; Interview with Pearson de Gonzalez, supra note 191.  
 375. For a brief overview of collaborative governance, see COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE: A GUIDE 
FOR GRANTMAKERS (2005), available at http://www.hewlett.org/uploads/files/HewlettCollaborative 
Governance.pdf. 
 376. Partners for Democratic Change (hereafter PDC) promotes conflict management and resolution, 
participation and consensus building, and leadership and change management techniques across the 
globe.  For more information, see PARTNERS FOR DEMOCRATIC CHANGE, 
http://www.partnersglobal.org/ (last visited Aug. 6, 2011). In Argentina, PDC has been involved with 
local casas de justica through training in techniques to resolve disputes for the underprivileged in areas 
of domestic violence, property disputes, etc. See PARTNERS ARGENTINA, 
http://www.partnersglobal.org/network/argentina (last visited Aug. 7, 2011).  In Peru, PDC seeks to 
help build consensus around contentious development issues, PDC facilitators seek to move conten-
tious “economic and social issues beyond dialogue into long-term sustainable agreements for change.” 
See PARTNERS PERU, http://www.partnersglobal.org/network/peru (last visited Aug. 7, 2011).  In 
Brazil, PDC is focused on corporate conflict resolution involving “business mediation, work-place 
mediation, governance and muti-stakeholder process.” See PARTNERS BRAZIL, 
http://www.partnersglobal.org/network/brazil (last visited August 7, 2011). 
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Latin American context include the need to ensure transparency, accountability, 
and inclusiveness in order to effectively address the systemic conflict identified.  
The consensus-building method developed by Lawrence Susskind, for example, 
meets these criteria as an inclusionary process aimed at unity through steps of 
integration, which include the interests of all participants.377  As a method for 
managing public decision-making and public disputes, consensus building is high-
ly participatory, guaranteeing full and accurate representation of the interests of all 
stakeholders.378  It is important to note that this method, despite its name, marks a 
radical departure from the traditional understanding of consensus, which aims for 
the adoption of a single, uniform view brought about through a process of assimi-
lation, eschewing alternative views and thus preventing inclusion.   
When using forms of collaborative governance, such as consensus building, 
the issues identified at the state and national levels by the committees of conflict 
assessors can become the starting point for deliberation by the representatives of 
all stakeholders.379 In addition to the processes explained by Bingham, it is also 
important to take into account the structures pertaining to collaborative govern-
ance, as highlighted by Matt Leighninger, who classifies these structures in terms 
of permanency; thus, Leighninger distinguishes between two types of democratic 
governance:380 “temporary organizing efforts” and “permanent neighborhood 
structures.”  Both of these forms utilize the same “four successful principles”: 
recruiting from previously existing groups and organizations with the goal of 
bringing together a broad range of citizens from various sectors of society; engag-
ing these citizens in small, facilitated dialogues and large groups with the goal of 
information sharing and action planning; comparing points of view and alternative 
policies; and implementing change through incorporating public opinion into poli-
cy decision-making, advocating institutional change, promoting action through 
teams, and developing volunteer networks.  The “organizing efforts,” which have 
been referred to as “democratic organizing” since the 1990s, have engaged hun-
dreds, indeed thousands, of people in a variety of issues, including, but not limited 
to race, immigration, youth development, community-police relations, and public 
finance. “Permanent neighborhood structures,” such as “neighborhood councils,” 
“priority boards,” or “neighbor action committees,” have provided an official 
 ___________________________  
 377. See generally LAWRENCE SUSSKIND & JEFFREY CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING ROBERT’S RULES: 
THE NEW WAY TO RUN YOUR MEETING, BUILD CONSENSUS, AND GET RESULTS (2006) [hereinafter 
SUSSKIND, BREAKING ROBERT’S RULES]. See also, LAWRENCE SUSSKIND ET AL., THE CONSENSUS 
BUILDING HANDBOOK (1999) [hereinafter SUSSKIND, HANDBOOK].  
 378. Consensus building is not just about reaching agreement; it is necessary for all parties to walk 
away “not just clear about what’s been promised to them but also clear about what they’ve promised to 
others.”  The goal is “informed consensus.” SUSSKIND, BREAKING ROBERT’S RULES, supra note 377, 
at 19. “Nearly self-enforcing agreement[s]” are the ultimate goal of consensus building. Id. at 29-30.  
In consensus building, stakeholders should be better off with the final consensus than with no agree-
ment at all. Id. at 21. 
 379. For a complete description of the identification of stakeholders and legitimate representatives 
and “getting the right people to the table,” see id. at 41-60; see also SUSSKIND, HANDBOOK, supra note 
377; see also Bingham, Collaborative Governance: Emerging Practices, supra note 14, at 273-77; 
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Getting to “Let’s Talk”: Comments on Collaborative Environmental Dispute 
Resolution Processes, 8 NEV. L.J. 835, 842 (2008) [hereinafter Menkel-Meadow, Let’s Talk] (identify-
ing evidence that suggests the success of “bottom up” collaborative processes in varying issues and 
levels of government). 
 380. LEIGHNINGER, supra note 226, at 3 (defining democratic governance: “the art of governing 
communities in participatory, deliberative and collaborative ways”). 
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forum for neighborhood decision-making.381 Despite the weaknesses of this mod-
el, which include poor attendance and overworked representatives, it has great 
capacity to facilitate change.382 
In addition to being catalysts for temporary organizing efforts, Casas de Jus-
ticia, when dealing with the identified issue, could also provide permanent neigh-
borhood structures that go beyond private and public conflict resolution. They 
could engage local stakeholders beyond downstream enforcement, to also include 
design and implementation, by advising state legislative bodies and/or govern-
mental agencies.383  Representatives could be selected from the state forums to 
participate in national forums that would similarly advise national legislative bod-
ies and/or governmental agencies about policies addressing the identified is-
sues.384  In this way, both forums could use the data aggregated by the state and 
national conflict assessors’ committees as a starting point for deliberation, and to 
the development of alternatives to address the root causes of systemic conflict, 
and to suggest policies at their respective levels. While it could be argued most 
countries in Latin America lack the infrastructure and resources necessary for 
such committees to operate effectively, new technology that makes virtual com-
munication possible has proven to be accessible and within reach of most stake-
holders. Even remote and poverty stricken areas can obtain access to these virtual 
platforms, with a moderate level of investment.385 This only paints what could be 
done in broad strokes so as to raise awareness about the potential collaborative 
governance has for the region. There are many options and directions in which 
each country could proceed concerning the numerous decisions that would have to 
be made, depending on local circumstances and the needs and interests of the 
particular stakeholders.  This is a broad area that deserves further exploration to 
further promote a more sustainable rule of law.  
IV. CRITICAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION IN THE 
LATIN AMERICAN CONTEXT 
To advance systemic inclusion through participatory conflict resolution, it 
would be advisable to engage local stakeholders in a national Dispute System 
Design effort to evaluate the current system and explore ideas such as the proposal 
made in this Article.  It would also be essential to provide the necessary capacity 
building for those who take part in the implementation process, including the par-
 ___________________________  
 381. Id. at 3.  
 382. Id. 
 383. LAWRENCE SUSSKIND, BREAKING THE IMPASSE 130 (1987) (arguing for the need to link infor-
mal decision making processes to the formal system of government).  
 384. See SUSSKIND, BREAKING ROBERT’S RULES, supra note 377, at 186-87; see also SUSSKIND, 
HANDBOOK, supra note 377. 
 385. Internet access is relatively widespread in Latin America, and free online voice, video and screen 
sharing software, such as Skype, can be used to facilitate regular communication among committee 
members. The University of St. Thomas International ADR Research Network, for example, has uti-
lized similar technology to develop and maintain lines of communication among citizens who, even if 
from the same country, lack the resources to convene in person. The consensus building process car-
ried out in Brazil illustrates how this can be carried out. Hernández Crespo, Building, supra note 19, at 
438. 
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ties, lawyers, mediators, and conflict assessors.  Finally, attention should be paid 
to possible obstacles in the implementation process.   
A. National Dispute System Design: Engaging Local Stakeholders in the 
Decision-Making Process 
As mentioned earlier, Dispute System Design (DSD) is an inclusive386 pro-
cess that gathers stakeholder representatives from particular organizations, com-
munities, or political entities to create a goal-oriented system for managing their 
conflicts and resolving their disputes.387  In this case, the aim is to engage local 
stakeholders in each Latin American country to initiate in a process of national 
DSD.  Throughout the process, local stakeholders would participate fully in what 
Janet Martinez and Stephanie Smith identify as the three main phases: analyzing 
the system’s development, performance, and effectiveness; proposing revisions or 
an entirely new design for the system; and creating the system itself.388 
Some may argue ADR reform in the region should follow traditional rule-
making and that there is no need for DSD.  Traditional rule-making typically func-
tions top-down, with experts designing a plan and enforcing its implementation. 
This gives stakeholders little say in the process, which may or may not represent 
their interests to their satisfaction.  The problem with this approach is that some 
parties may not feel their interests were adequately represented.  As a result, they 
may not comply with the ensuing decisions, and in some cases may even sabotage 
them.389  Research shows that people are more likely to abide by rules when they 
have had a hand in creating them.390  In this regard, as John Lande has pointed out, 
a highly participatory DSD process can give stronger results than traditional rule-
making because it involves gaining a detailed understanding of the stakeholders’ 
problems and interests, engaging all stakeholders in the decision-making process 
via facilitation techniques, and creating and evaluating new policies according to 
systematic procedures.391  
DSD has been criticized for being expensive, time-consuming, and compli-
cated to implement.  Yet, as theorists such as Susan Franck have pointed out, DSD 
 ___________________________  
 386. The DSD process fosters stronger relationships, problem-solving skills, and dispute resolution 
skills among all stakeholders. The more participatory the process, the more people will follow through 
on its resolutions. See also Peter Robinson, Arthur Pearlstein & Bernard Mayer, DyADS: Encouraging 
“Dynamic Adaptive Dispute Systems” in the Organized Workplace, 10 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 339, 
353 (2005) [hereinafter Robinson et al., DyADS].  Although the authors are writing in the context of 
organized workplaces, the principles of DSD can also be applied in the Latin American context. 
 387. See generally, as two foundational pieces in the Dispute System Design field, URY, GETTING 
DISPUTES, supra note 210; COSTANTINO & SICKLES MERCHANT, supra note 210. 
 388. Stephanie Smith & Janet Martinez, An Analytic Framework for Dispute System Design, 14 
HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 123, 124 (2009). Every Dispute System Design has three constitutive elements: 
interests, rights, and power. Disputes resolved by mediation on the basis of interests (the parties’ val-
ues and concerns) tend to give the best results, although they can take longer. Rights-based dispute 
resolution score high on procedural justice but may not satisfy all stakeholder interests. Finally, power-
based dispute resolution works for the party with the most money and means, but can be unjust and 
even destructive to the losing side. All three elements are necessary, with emphasis placed on interest-
based negotiation. Id. at 126-27 (citing URY, GETTING DISPUTES, supra note 210, at 3-9). 
 389. Lande, Good-Faith, supra note 360, at 113. 
 390. Id. at 114 (citing Jody Freeman & Laura I. Langbein, Regulatory Negotiation and the Legitimacy 
Benefit, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 60, 69, 124-27, 130-32 (2000)). 
 391. Id. at 112-17. 
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can save time and money by foreseeing possible conflicts and setting up channels 
to manage them before they escalate into expensive, time-consuming disputes.392  
In addition, the method’s emphasis on stakeholder involvement has been shown to 
result in increased public trust,393 higher levels of self-determination,394 and a 
greater sense of procedural justice.395  In this regard, Lisa Bingham has pointed 
out the need to distinguish between self-determination at the design level and self-
determination in the actual use of the system during the specific case. She explains 
DSD, at the design level, refers to control over the structure and process; at the 
case level, it refers to process and outcome.396  Among these positive outcomes, 
the sense of procedural justice is particularly important.  When a dispute resolu-
tion process respectfully and thoroughly addresses stakeholders’ true interests and 
is perceived as fair, impartial, and truly participatory,397 it tends to bring manifold 
benefits, such as greater perception of institutional legitimacy and heightened 
compliance with decisions and the law.398 However, Amy Cohen has pointed out 
DSD also faces challenges posed by issues of scale, which need to be taken into 
consideration.399 Nevertheless, scholars such as David Kahane and Bettina von 
Lieres have worked to protect the interests of the disenfranchised, suggesting 
structural measures be considered in the design and implementation process.400 
Even though DSD may not be preferable in all cases, its preliminary organi-
zational assessment can still be useful, since it allows us to gain a large scale per-
spective on issues such as power and culture from the viewpoint of the diverse 
 ___________________________  
 392. Susan Franck, Integrating Investment Treaty Conflict and Dispute System Design, 92 MINN. L. 
REV. 161, 208-12 (2007).  Although Franck is writing in the context of disputes arising out of bilateral 
investment treaties, the principles of DSD used can also be applied in the Latin American context. 
 393. Id. at 217 (arguing that the “systemic analysis” of DSD that leads to a recommendation can 
result in enhanced trust); id. at 216 (saying that the DSD process involves input from involved parties). 
 394. Bingham, Self-Determination, supra note 361, at 882-83 (citing Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Ethics 
in Environmental ADR: An Overview of Issues and Some Overarching Questions, 34 VAL. U. L. REV. 
403 (2000); Robert A. Baruch Bush, “What Do We Need a Mediator for?”: Mediation’s “Value-
Added” for Negotiators, 12 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 34 (1996); Nancy A. Welsh, The Thinning 
Veil of Self-Determination in Court-Connected Mediation: The Inevitable Price of Institutionaliza-
tion?, 6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 93 (2001)). 
 395. Donna Shestowsky, Disputants’ Preferences for Court-Connected Dispute Resolution Proce-
dures: Why We Should Care and Why We Know So Little, 23 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 549, 555 
(2008). 
 396. Bingham, Self-Determination, supra note 359, at 882-83. 
 397. See Lande, Good-Faith, supra note 360, at 119. 
 398. Franck, supra note 392, at 214-15.  
 399. See Amy J. Cohen, Dispute System Design, Neoliberalism, and the Problem of Scale, 14 HARV. 
NEGOT. L. REV. 51, 69 (2009) (citing DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM 166-67 
(2005)).  
 
The dangers I am envisioning arise simply when we forget that the idea of equivalence across 
scale is fictitious. Dispute system designers may reasonably find this fiction convenient, even 
necessary: configuring the organization, the city, the NGO, and the business as each like an indi-
vidual greatly facilitates our ability to design horizontal dispute processing systems that can en-
compass a multitude of public and private entities in parsimonious, representative and cohering 
fashion. But it is a fiction nonetheless, and one that can cause human suffering when it masks the 
‘complex realities behind [it]. 
 
Id. 
 400. See generally von Lieres & David Kahane, supra note 240.  
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range of stakeholders.401  In the Latin American context, given the fact that partic-
ipation is the goal, DSD seems to be an ideal framework for assessing, redesign-
ing, and implementing procedures for conflict management and dispute resolution, 
especially since the process is tailored to address the needs and goals of the stake-
holders in each particular country.  
In the first stage of implementing DSD, the facilitator402 pinpoints which 
stakeholders403 should be represented and selects the members of a design team to 
supervise the process.404  Since the results of the system depend greatly on the 
design team, it is important to evaluate who they are, what they want to achieve, 
and how they have used their power and influence in the past.405  
Next, the facilitator and the design team assess406 the interests and goals of 
the main stakeholders, the strengths and weaknesses of the current system, and 
factors that can be catalysts for change.407  The facilitator and design team then 
use this information to make a plan to meet the stakeholders’ interests.408  When 
crafting the plan,409 the design team should consider what values the DSD will 
foster and what kinds of remedies it will give.410  It should also reflect on which 
 ___________________________  
 401. See Cohen, supra note 399, at 53-54. Cohen suggests:  
 
that when viewed through an analytic of scale, both neoliberal ideologies and the methods of 
DSD can appear insensitive to distinctions in social organization in analogous ways. I suggest 
further that to the extent projects of DSD are unfolding against a backdrop of neoliberal ideas and 
practices, this structural similarity stands to strengthen some of these ideas and practices, and 
with them attendant forms of social inequality. 
 
Id. COSTANTINO & SICKLES MERCHANT, supra note 210, at 96-116 (arguing that the organizational 
assessment allows for a comprehensive outlook of the system). 
 402. Smith & Martinez, supra note 388, at 167. 
 403. Id. at 131. 
 404. Lande, Good-Faith, supra note 360, at 115. 
 405. Lisa Blomgren Bingham et al., Dispute System Design and Justice in Employment Dispute 
Resolution: Mediation at the Workplace, 14 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 5 (2009).  Although Bingham is 
writing in the context of employment disputes, the principles of DSD can also be applied in the Latin 
American context. 
 406. See COSTANTINO & SICKLES MERCHANT, supra note 210, at 96-116. 
 407. Robinson et al., DyADS, supra note 386, at 356-57. 
 408. COSTANTINO & SICKLES MERCHANT, supra note 210, at 117-33; Lande, Good-Faith, supra note 
360, at 115-16.  
 409. Robinson et al., DyADS, supra note 386.  Robinson lists seven key factors to consider when 
designing a system: 
 
(a) an understanding of how an existing system works, its strengths and weaknesses, and the 
forces that promote and hinder change in the system; (b) clarity about the goals of change and 
rationale for expending resources on a change effort; (c) focus placed on one or two key changes 
that can be catalysts or focal points around which the overall system can reorganize; (d) a built-in 
process for ongoing reflection, adaptation, revision, and evaluation; (e) continual involvement of 
key players and groups in this reflection process; (f) modesty about the ability to control how a 
new system will adapt to new inputs and willingness to learn from what is happening in a non-
defensive and open-minded way; (g) attention to how parts of a system interact as much as to 
what occurs within any given process. 
 
Id. 
 410. Andrea Schneider, The Intersection of Dispute System Design and Transitional Justice, 14 
HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 289, 290-91 (2009) [hereinafter Schneider, Transitional].  Although Schneider 
is writing in the context of transitional justice, the principles of DSD can also be applied in the Latin 
American context. 
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methods would be most effective in light of past best practices, such as making 
the entry points accessible and giving stakeholders clear options to choose from. 
411  
Another essential component in DSD is capacity building.  Since the imple-
mentation of the process will require specific skills, it is necessary to invest in 
training for all participants.412  Recommendations for capacity building measures 
are discussed further in the next section of this Article. 
Once a design is drawn up and the training is in place, it is highly recom-
mended to launch a pilot program to test and evaluate the system before applying 
it on a more widespread basis.413  Since the transformation of a dispute culture is 
necessarily gradual and takes place from within, the DSD pilot, and later the full 
system, must be implemented in a gradual, incremental way to ensure it takes 
lasting root.414   
After the actual system is implemented, there must be ongoing observation, 
evaluation, and attention to the way it works as a whole.415  In this regard, evalua-
tion is particularly important in three respects: it allows implementers to know 
whether the system is working; it allows for constant improvements; and it makes 
the system more credible, thus inviting greater participation and feedback.416  
 ___________________________  
 411. Robinson et al., DyADS, supra note 386, at 364. 
 412. It is important to note the distinction between training and education. While they seem to be 
synonymous, training is more skill-based, while education is more knowledge-based. In this regard, it 
is important to have both. See COSTANTINO & SICKLES MERCHANT, supra note 210, at 134-50; Lande, 
Good-Faith, supra note 360, at 115.  
 413. COSTANTINO & SICKLES MERCHANT, supra note 210, at 150-65; Lande, Good-Faith, supra note 
360, at 115-16.  
 414. Robinson et al., DyADS, supra note 386, at 356-57. Robinson explains: 
 
[I]t is almost always wiser to begin with an incremental approach to DSD and to focus on a few 
key areas that will lead to change in the overall system. As new procedures or approaches take 
root within an existing system, other modifications and initiatives may need to be considered.  
Therefore, an incremental approach to design is more likely to be effective than an attempt to im-
pose entirely new systems and procedures all at once. 
 
Id.  However, Robinson notes that, as an exception, major overhaul may be appropriate when a whole 
new system is required, when disruptions have made the existing system unworkable, or when major 
stakeholders have indicated a desire and commitment to go through a large-scale change.  Id. at n.39.  
Ideally, however, what is being proposed by this Article will build on already existing systems (e.g. 
oficinas multi-puertas, and Casas de Justicia), so incremental change will usually be preferable.  This 
may not be the case in countries lacking a proper foundation. 
 415. COSTANTINO & SICKLES MERCHANT, supra note 210, at 168-86 (discussing the evaluation cycle, 
the criteria for measurement of ADR’s effectiveness and impact, and measurement of ADR administra-
tion and operation). 
 416. Smith & Martinez, supra note 388, at 132-33; see also Bingham, Self-Determination, supra note 
359, at 908 (“Transparency and accountability are powerful tools through which to shed light on our 
evolving private justice systems.”). Evaluation will, therefore, not only enhance the effectiveness of 
the Casas de Justicia, but also, in itself, increase the trust that is necessary for the rule of law; the 
evaluative system must assure that the values inherent to ADR are being pursued.  See Robert Acker-
man & Nancy Welsh, Interdisciplinary Collaboration and the Beauty of Surprise: A Symposium Intro-
duction, 108 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (2003) (observing that, over time, mediators have become rou-
tinized and more concerned with “marketing to attorneys and getting agreements than [with] fostering 
self-determination”).  Over time, an accessible system may become un-accessible through over-
complication and over-professionalization; ongoing evaluation can hedge against this risk.  See Carrie 
Menkel-Meadow, Practicing “In the Interests of Justice” in the Twenty-First Century: Pursuing Peace 
as Justice, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1761, 1766 (2002) [hereinafter Menkel-Meadow, Peace as Justice] 
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Initial levels of evaluation should include internal supervision, using surveys, 
data, and focus groups, to find out what stakeholders think.  External review is an 
even more effective means of evaluation, but can also be more costly.417  These 
measures both require and foster greater accountability and transparency.418  On-
going evaluation and adaptation does not necessarily mean there will be constant, 
major overhauls; rather, a dynamic and adaptive approach to system design focus-
es on making small changes that could have a significant impact.419  
Regarding DSD efforts in specific countries and regions, it seems important 
to consider how to strike the right balance between standardization and customiza-
tion. Some theorists, such as Nancy Welsh and Bobbi McAdoo, have noted that 
developing a statewide ADR program is “very difficult and time-consuming 
work.”  Moreover, planning the design is only half the battle; implementation 
requires significant attention to a host of details, especially given the complexities 
of the system, coupled with “competing demands on time and resources.”420  Giv-
en this reality, it could be tempting to opt for standardized methods, which are 
faster, cheaper, and easier to implement. However, as Andrea Schneider has ar-
gued, there are many cases when “one size fits all” justice does not suit the situa-
tion at hand.  Customized systems tend to be more effective, although slower and 
more costly.  They may even be the only valid option when there are significant 
cultural differences that make it impossible to copy-and-paste the same methods 
from one country to another.421 Therefore, even though the implementation pro-
cess using DSD methodology could be lengthy and expensive, if the goal is to 
encourage citizen engagement as a necessary component of efforts to foster sus-
tainable rule of law, the participatory nature of DSD could play an essential role in 
incorporating citizen involvement from the design stage forward.   
 ___________________________  
(discussing how the pursuit of justice can become “over-professionalized” and inaccessible “arcane 
principles” or “processes”). 
 417. Smith & Martinez, supra note 388, at 132-33. 
 418. See id.  
 419. Robinson et al., DyADS, supra note 386, at 349 (citing Nonlinear Dynamics, in THE COLUMBIA 
ENCYCLOPEDIA 2029 (6th ed. 2000) (referencing the theory of nonlinear dynamics, Robinson notes 
that “small variations [in a dispute system] can lead to vastly different results”). 
 420. Barbara McAdoo & Nancy A. Welsh, System Implementation Means Difficult Choices, 14 
ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITG. 135, 135 (1996). 
 421. The East Timorese people are a case in point:  
 
A revealing story told by Professor Jane Stromseth from the establishment of the East Timorese 
tribunal reflects this concern. When setting up the tribunal for East Timor, UN experts found 
themselves in a quandary. In Timorese culture, defendants were expected to confess to the crimes 
truthfully with the expectation that sentences would be determined with compassion. In order to 
train the Timorese in the adversarial, Western model that is typical for criminal law, ‘the UN ex-
perts had to train the Timorese to lie.’ In setting up the Khmer Rouge tribunal, commentators 
have worried that the tribunal does not match the values of the Buddhist Cambodian population.  
 
Schneider, Transitional, supra note 410, at 305-06 (citing Kingsley Chiedo Moghalu, GLOBAL 
JUSTICE: THE POLITICS OF WAR CRIMES TRIALS 152-53 ( 2006); Panel: The Impending Extraordinary 
Chambers of Cambodia to Prosecute the Khmer Rogue, 5 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 326, 332 (2007)). 
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B. Essential Capacity Building for Stakeholders 
While developing expert capacities in conflict assessors is indispensable to 
achieve the full potential of Casas de Justicia, it is also important for other actors 
in the system to develop some capacities for effective participation.  First, parties 
should be equipped with basic information about the different forums for dispute 
resolution and should have knowledge about problem-solving prior to beginning 
the process.  Second, lawyers should understand and appreciate the different roles 
they play in the selection of the forum for the resolution of the dispute, including 
the facilitative process when it is chosen, to ensure they do not impinge upon their 
clients’ self-determination.  Third, mediators should be experts in the value-
creation process in order to lead in citizens’ capacity building for participatory 
problem solving.  Finally, conflict assessors must develop the necessary capacities 
to guide the parties in the selection of the forum as well as the identification of the 
underlying root causes of the conflict.  
1. Parties: Capacity Building for Decision Making and                         
Participation in Problem Solving 
It seems of critical importance to develop materials explaining the various 
available alternatives for conflict management and dispute resolution to the gen-
eral public.  To this end, simple pamphlets and videos articulating the essential 
characteristics and fundamental differences between these methods could be pro-
duced.  The goal is not only to assist the parties in the selection of the forum for 
the specific dispute, but also to build decision-making capacity more broadly.   
In addition, to build problem-solving capacity, parties in the Latin American 
context can benefit from understanding the difference between position-based and 
interest-based problem solving.  Even though these notions are to some degree 
widespread, the disenfranchised majorities in the region have had little access to 
this knowledge.  If parties were exposed to the basic notions of interest-based 
problem solving, they would have the ability to better create a wider variety of 
options that could satisfy the interests of both parties in the dispute, resulting in a 
more durable resolution and possibly influencing the way they address future 
disputes.422  Concepts such as value creation (the integrative stage) and value 
claiming (the distributive stage)423 could ensure the process is not reduced to an 
exercise in compromise, in which the final agreement simply reflects the power 
(im)balance at the table or the differences in the parties’ best alternatives to a ne-
gotiated agreement—known as a BATNAs.424  To this end, simple materials could 
also be developed. 
 ___________________________  
 422. Training parties need not be costly or time-consuming, and can be done through the implementa-
tion of a variety of visual and printed media. 
 423. FISHER & URY, supra note 362, at 56-80. 
 424. Id. at 97-128. 
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2. Lawyers: Greater Appreciation for Parties’ Self-Determination and the 
Knowledge of the Spectrum of ADR Options 
Most lawyers in Latin America have not been significantly involved in the 
promotion of facilitative ADR methods as a means to promote access to justice.  
This may be due, in part, to the fact that most of the efforts have been directed 
towards low-income communities, which usually cannot afford legal representa-
tion.  In addition, ADR courses are not yet broadly taught in Latin American law 
schools.  As a result, the majority of those working in the legal profession are still 
unfamiliar with the spectrum of dispute resolution options existing beyond litiga-
tion.  They are even less familiar with the notion that their clients could play a 
more active role in choosing the appropriate method for the resolution of their 
own disputes.  
Similarly, most lawyers in the region are not aware of how prominent the cli-
ent’s role becomes in facilitative ADR processes, in which disputes are not cir-
cumscribed solely by the legal issue or by precedent.425   Yet, as Carrie Menkel-
Meadow has pointed out, lawyers can be “ideal process leaders” in the promotion 
of ADR, given their “process consciousness.”426   She has argued lawyers have 
awareness of procedural rules and have concern for “voice” and procedural fair-
ness, but advocates for additional training in a broader set of collaborative skills 
that is quite different than argumentation. 427  Thus, in order to promote ADR as a 
means for participation and inclusion in Latin America, it is essential to develop 
lawyers’ ADR capacities.   
In this regard, Latin American ADR capacity building for lawyers needs to 
include not only an understanding of the different types of dispute resolution pro-
cesses available, but also an awareness that the role of the lawyer in facilitative 
processes varies significantly from the one played in the conventional adjudicative 
court-based process.  While in the court system, lawyers are experts in the sub-
stantive matter and procedural aspects; in facilitative ADR methods, such as me-
diation, the lawyer’s role shifts to that of an advisor, who can provide clients with 
the legal implications of their decisions and the alternatives available.428  Given 
 ___________________________  
 425. Clients are in a strategic position to frame the issue, and generate and select the best possible 
options to satisfy their interest.  Lawyers should advise parties on the legal implications of the various 
options, but should allow the parties to decide their level of involvement in the process.  See Marshall 
J. Breger, Should an Attorney be Required to Advise a Client of ADR Options?, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 458 (2000); Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Lawyers, Non-Lawyers and Mediation: Rethinking 
the Professional Monopoly from a Problem-Solving Perspective, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 235, 299 
(2002).  The American Bar Association has developed a competition on representation in mediation to 
train future lawyers on the different roles a lawyer plays in a mediation process.  See ABA Mediation 
Competition, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, http://www.abanet.org/dispute/mediationcomp.html (last 
visited June 18, 2011). 
 426. Menkel-Meadow, Peace as Justice, supra note 416, at 1765, 1773. 
 427. Menkel-Meadow suggests that there is a need for an expanded vision of justice in pursuit of 
peace that utilizes a variety of “appropriate” dispute resolution processes and methods.  Lawyers “may 
be particularly well suited” for these new processes because they have “process consciousness.”  
Lawyers are “[a]ware of procedural rules and concerned about ‘voice’ and procedural fairness, with 
proper training (facilitation is quite different from argumentation), lawyers may make ideal process 
leaders of these new processes and institutions.” Id. at 1773. 
 428. See Ackerman, Disputing Together, supra note 217, at 60–61; see also Schneider, Pedagogy, 
supra note 362, at 117 (observing that lawyers often have a hierarchical relationship with their clients 
that can harm the flow of information). 
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the centrality of the self-determinative aspect of facilitative ADR as opposed to 
litigation, lawyers need to acquire a different set of skills to effectively interact 
with their clients in these processes.429  The issue of self-determination is of par-
ticular importance, since it has a direct effect on the level of the parties’ satisfac-
tion; addressing parties’ interests ensures the sustainability of the agreement.430   
3. Mediators: Enabling Citizens to Develop Problem Solving Capacity 
It is critical to ensure the competency of the mediators currently working in 
Casas de Justicia and the oficinas multi-puertas in order to maximize citizens’ 
capacity for participatory problem solving.  To this end, mediators need to devel-
op skills enabling them to shape the parties’ expectations about what could be 
achieved in the process by helping the parties gain a clear understanding of the 
goals and of the process itself.431  A skillful mediator can also model collaborative 
behaviors and attitudes, which could potentially lead to either the maximization of 
 ___________________________  
 429. Carrie Menkel-Meadow argues that lawyers need more training in question asking to identify 
values and interests.  This will help lawyers solve problems and promote the self-determination of their 
clients.  Menkel-Meadow observes that, “[l]egal analysis is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition of 
good problem solving.” Carrie Menkel-Meadow, When Winning Isn’t Everything: The Lawyer as 
Problem Solver, 28 HOFSTRA L.REV. 905, 912 (2000) [hereinafter Menkel-Meadow, Winning]. 
 430. See generally, SUSSKIND, BREAKING ROBERT’S RULES, supra note 377.  
 431. Training and regulation of mediators is uneven in the region, and there are no uniform guidelines 
for mediator education and evaluation.  Basic education and regulations govern the number of hours, 
rules of confidentiality, and processes of collaboration.  Value creation, however, is not a prominent 
feature in most regulations regarding training and evaluation.  Incorporating value creation language 
into legislation governing mediation could send a strong message to educational institutions and practi-
tioners.  Mediators can have tremendous influence over the process, so there should be adequate train-
ing and standards for mediators. See James Coben, Gollum, Meet Sméagol: A Schizophrenic Rumina-
tion on Mediator Values Beyond Self-Determination and Neutrality, 11 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 
65, 74-75 (2004) (mediators have control over aspects of the process such as the agenda, location, 
information exchange, etc.); see also John Lande, Doing the Best Mediation You Can, 14 DISP. RESOL. 
MAG. 43, 46 (2008) [hereinafter Lande, Doing the Best]. Lande explains: 
 
Mediation is a difficult craft, and virtually all mediators would benefit from continuing to learn 
about it.  Many mediators attend continuing education programs to learn about mediation theory 
and practice skills, legal issues, and new developments in the field. Mediators may benefit from 
additional ways to develop their professional skills, such as routinely debriefing mediations by 
writing what went well, where the mediation seemed at a halt, and how they might handle similar 
situations differently in future mediations. Mediators can also routinely ask lawyers and parties to 
complete confidential feedback forms after mediation. 
 
Id.  Sharon Press identifies several requirements that should be discussed when setting mediator quali-
fication standards. Sharon Press, Building and Maintaining a Statewide Mediation Program: A View 
from the Field, 81 KY. L.J. 1029, 1036-37 (1993) (arguing that mediators should typically “meet some 
combination of the following requirements to be qualified: attend mediation training, take part in 
apprenticeships or mentorships, meet a specified educational background, and have previous experi-
ence in related fields.”).  Professionalization may also improve the quality of mediation by giving 
legitimacy to the field, attracting qualified individuals and promoting self-regulation.  See Kimberlee 
K. Kovach, Musings on Idea(l)s in the Ethical Regulation of Mediators: Honesty, Enforcement, and 
Education, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 123, 142-43 (2005) (observing that mediators are con-
cerned with professionalism to obtain recognition for their work through adequate compensation, 
public recognition, and respect as members of a profession); see also Nancy Welsh & Bobbi McAdoo, 
Eyes on the Prize, 11 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 13, 13 (2005) (arguing that professionalization must mean 
something more than recognition and compensation in themselves; it must be directed toward improv-
ing the standards, methods, and qualifications of mediators). 
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joint gains432 in facilitative mediation or to better achieve the parties’ goals in 
transformative mediation.433  Either way, the experience of a successful and highly 
satisfactory problem-solving process could influence the way parties approach 
disputes and their resolution in the future.434 
Furthermore, if the ultimate goal is to develop citizens’ capacity to manage 
their own conflicts and resolve their own disputes, skillful mediators in both fa-
cilitative and transformative mediation have to be able to not just model, but also 
explain, each stage of the process and the rationale behind the process.  In sum, 
skillful mediators need to go beyond satisfactory experience of dispute resolution 
to enable citizens to develop problem-solving capacity. 
4. Conflict Assessors:  Capacity Building for Root Cause Analysis and 
Selection of Appropriate Forums 
It is imperative for conflict assessors to develop the necessary capacities in 
conflict resolution in order to identify the underlying root causes of the issue and 
to guide the parties in selecting the forum that best suits their specific dispute. To 
develop capacity in these two areas, organizational ombudsmen could be called 
upon to assist the conflict assessors.  Organizational ombudsmen are conflict 
management experts who handle a broad range of intra-organizational conflicts in 
 ___________________________  
 432. See Robert Bordone, Taming Hard Bargainers, NEGOT. NEWSLETTER HARV. PROGRAM ON 
NEGOT., Sept. 2008, at 8 (collaborative approach is a bargaining stance in which issues are jointly 
identified and parties work together to address them; it is not a personal style or necessarily equivalent 
to “being nice”). 
 433. Harold Abramson describes a transformative mediator:  
 
A transformative mediator engages in a mediation practice based on communication and rela-
tional theory. Instead of promoting the goal of settlement for the parties, the transformative me-
diator allows the parties to determine their own direction and supports the parties' own opportuni-
ties for perspective-taking, de-liberation, and decision-making. The mediator focuses on the par-
ties' interactions and supports their shifts from destructive and alienating interactions to more 
constructive and open interactions (referred to as empowerment and recognition shifts). In this 
model, parties are likely to be able to make positive changes in their interactions with each other 
and, consequently, find acceptable resolution for themselves, where such terms genuinely exist. 
 
Harold Abramson, Selecting Mediators and Representing Clients in Cross-Cultural Disputes, 7 
CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL 253, 263 (2006). Menkel-Meadow, Winning, supra note 429, at 919 
(stating that mediators can also benefit from training in questioning and active listening); see also 
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, W.M. Keck Foundation Forum on the Teaching of Legal Ethics: The Trouble 
with the Adversary System in a Postmodern, Multicultural World, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 5, 37 
(1996) (stating that mediators need training to prevent adversarial values from corrupting collaborative 
dispute resolution processes); see also Harold Abramson, Problem-Solving Advocacy in Mediations: A 
Model of Client Representation, 10 HARV. NEGOT. L.REV. 103, 113 (2005) [hereinafter Abramson, 
Problem-Solving] (writing that effective problem solving requires a collaborative relationship and is 
likely to produce endearing, nuanced and inventive solutions that are agreeable to all sides). Mediators 
need training in more than process and structure.  See also Ackerman, Disputing Together, supra note 
217, at 27, 89-90 (arguing that implementing a process alone is not sufficient to create community; 
participants need to find a common bond that transcends the process). 
 434. Mediators should also be cognizant of party self-determination in the process. See Lande, Doing 
the Best, supra note 431, at 45 (suggesting that mediators should elicit procedural preferences from the 
parties and follow them if appropriate; imposing a process without considering the parties’ preferences 
may damage rapport and participant confidence). 
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the private sector.435  They are not to be confused with the well-established institu-
tion of the traditional public ombudsmen, who are public advocates and defen-
sores del pueblo in most countries in Latin America.  Since organizational om-
budsmen are still a relatively new development in the region, foreign ombuds 
organizations436 could establish an ongoing partnership with local groups, sharing 
resources and tailoring them for the specific needs and context. The main skills to 
be developed would be root cause analysis and an understanding of how to select 
the most appropriate forums for resolution. Although launching training programs 
would require an initial investment, the benefits could be significant and lasting.  
An initial group of local ADR professionals, preferably mediators, could be se-
lected to gain the necessary capacities and then train the local conflict assessors. 
Even though current conflict assessors in rural areas usually lack a formal ed-
ucation, such a plan would be feasible.  Their deep understanding of their com-
munities and their practical knowledge of how to handle real-life cases could 
serve as a suitable foundation for further capacity building.  
Within the capacity-building program, written and audio-visual materials 
could be developed as part of a collaborative enterprise between locals and foreign 
experts.  The purpose of these materials would be to give the conflict assessors a 
sense of how to conduct root cause analysis as well as how to discern which pro-
cess, whether facilitative, adjudicative, or hybrid, fits each case.  These materials 
could also serve as educational resources for the public in Casas de Justicia. 
C. Foreseeing Possible Obstacles 
In the area of Dispute System Design (DSD), the question is not if obstacles 
will arise, but when.437  In Designing Conflict Management Systems, Cathy Cos-
tantino and Christina Sickles Merchant address implementation issues in the or-
ganizational context, grouping them into two main categories: resistance and con-
straints.438 This section will adopt their framework in order to examine some 
forms of resistance and constraint that may arise when implementing Dispute 
System Design in Latin America.  
1. Overcoming Resistance 
In this framework, resistance is defined as a “mostly unconscious, social, cul-
tural, and personality-driven phenomenon”439 which may arise from fear, culture, 
power, personality preferences, and corporate symbols and images.440 One of the 
most challenging hurdles in Latin America comes from the current structures of 
power, which will be explored below. 
 ___________________________  
 435. For a more complete overview of the evolution of the term, see CHARLES L. HOWARD, THE 
ORGANIZATIONAL OMBUDSMAN: ORIGINS, ROLES, AND OPERATIONS—A LEGAL GUIDE 1-78 (2010). 
 436. For the development of organizational ombudsmen in Argentina, see Guillermo Ceballos Serra, 
¿Ombudsman Corporativo?, BLOG DE GUILLERMO CEBALLOS SERRA Y SUS INVITADOS (Oct. 19, 
2008), http://ceballosserra.blogspot.com/2008/10/ombudsman-corporativo.html.  
 437. See generally COSTANTINO & SICKLES MERCHANT, supra note 210, at 199-217. 
 438. See id. at 199. 
 439. Id.  
 440. Id. at 201-09. 
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a. Reactions to Change: Fear, Culture, Personality Preferences,         
Symbols and Images 
No matter what kind of change happens, there is nearly always resistance to 
it.  When organizations or individuals face change, the lack of predictability pro-
duces fear of the unknown and fear of losing control.441 Even for those who have a 
higher tolerance for risk, there is still the challenge of adjusting to new circum-
stances, which requires greater effort and engagement.  What helps the most in 
these circumstances is to set up processes enabling individuals to state their fear in 
a safe environment, since identifying it is half the battle.442  In the Latin American 
context, however, change often results from crisis443—a very different set of cir-
cumstances that occur in the midst of relative stability.  Therefore, change is often 
sought and welcomed rather than avoided, as it represents the hope for an alterna-
tive better than the status quo.444 
Deeply rooted attitudes, practices, and beliefs can be hard to change.  When 
facing this resistance factor, Costantino and Sickles recommend customizing the 
system for the local culture, so it is not rejected on the basis of a clashing of val-
ues.445  In Latin America, each country and region can have a value system that 
reflects different priorities.  It will take time for widespread implementation of the 
innovation to take root and lead to more participatory problem-solving practic-
es.446 The last resistance factors are personality preferences and their reactions to 
ADR447 and symbols and images, which have to do with the outward expressions 
of the system’s culture.448 Even though they are more specific to the context, these 
last two factors, if overlooked, could pose significant challenges. 
 ___________________________  
 441. Id. at 201-02. 
 442. Id. 
 443. See e.g., Fred Rosen & Jo-Marie Burt, Hugo Chávez Venezuela’s Redeemer?, 33 NACLA 
REPORT ON THE AMERICAS 15, 16 (2000) (observing that at the time of the Chávez election, 80% of 
Venezuelans were living below poverty; and that Chávez promised “revolution” and instituted many 
popularly supported reforms to consolidate power). 
 444. Id.  
 445. COSTANTINO & SICKLES MERCHANT, supra note 210, at 203. 
 446. See generally DPK Consulting, Use of Pilot Programs, supra note 168. 
 447. Rational, left-brain people may respond differently to ADR than the more intuitive right-brain 
types. These differences can be incorporated into the system.  Engaging in team building activities and 
teaching participants about the main personality types in advance may encourage greater mutual un-
derstanding and acceptance. When utilizing this framework in an international context, it would be of 
critical importance to raise awareness among cultures, taking into consideration, for example, the 
distinction between direct and indirect communication, and its effects on conflict resolution. See Har-
old Abramson, Outward Bound to Other Cultures: Seven Guidelines for U.S. Dispute Resolution 
Trainers, 9 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 437, 444 (2009). Cultures that tend more toward direct communica-
tion could be perceived as more confrontational, while those tending toward indirect communication 
could be misinterpreted as conflict avoiders, when in fact they simply handle it differently. A deeper 
understanding of the cultural dimension could go a long way to avoid misunderstandings. See, e.g., id. 
at 454-55 (observing that U.S. parties who communicate directly might not perceive a “no” conveyed 
by Chinese parties, who are likely to convey a “no” without actually saying “no”). 
 448. Symbols and images have to do with the outward expressions of the system’s culture.  In some 
cases, these symbols may become a restraint, if ADR fails to harmonize with the imagery different 
players within the system use to describe its mission and identity.  In cases where a strong metaphor 
sets the tone for a group, it is essential to try to adapt ADR to the existing imagery beforehand. 
COSTANTINO & SICKLES MERCHANT, supra note 210, at 207-08. Assessing the identities of the stake-
holders and the history of their relationship becomes of critical importance before starting the imple-
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b. The Intricacies of Power 
In some cases, power is the resistance factor: people who have power are re-
luctant to lose it and may feel the Dispute System Design would make them too 
vulnerable.449  Costantino and Sickles Merchant recommend addressing these 
concerns head on, educating participants about the disadvantages of not changing 
the current system, and pulling together a “visible and committed critical mass of 
leadership” to support the new system so others will follow.450 
In Latin America, the prevailing structure of power has been what theorists 
describe as a “power-over” paradigm, an adversarial binary paradigm of con-
flict451 based on a zero-sum mindset that encourages domination.452  The region’s 
history shows that Latin Americans tend to resolve disputes either by passively 
resigning themselves to the will of others or by using violence and coercive force 
to impose their own will on others.453  Similar to Nieztsche’s articulation of pow-
er, this mindset views power as necessarily oppressive; the power of one must 
come at the expense of the power of another.454  This suggests a predominant di-
 ___________________________  
mentation process.  After years of civil war, various groups in some Latin American countries have 
defined their identity in terms of conflict. In El Salvador, for example, the popularly elected president, 
Mauricio Funes, belongs to the left wing Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN), which 
still strongly identifies with Marxist and revolutionary imagery and its historical involvement with the 
bloody 12-year Salvadoran Civil War. See e.g., Banderas De Las Fuerzas Populares De Liberacion 
Farabundo Marti (FPL-FM), GUERILLA LATINOAMERICA ARMADOS, 
http://perso.wanadoo.es/guerrillas/simboloselsalvador.htm. (last visited June 16, 2011). This could 
pose difficulties for an ADR system built on negotiation and mutual understanding.  In El Salvador, for 
example, where labor unions and management groups have a longstanding adversarial relationship, 
ADR cannot adopt the image of clasped hands because it would be jarring for the stakeholders.  In-
stead, it would have to opt for an image that represents the two sides working together for a shared 
goal, such as building up the country together. 
 449. COSTANTINO & SICKLES MERCHANT, supra note 210, at 204. 
 450. Id. at 205. 
 451. See Corinne Davis Rodrigues & Enrique Desmond Arias, The Myth of Personal Security: Crimi-
nal Gangs Dispute Resolution, Security and Identity in Rio de Janeiro's Favelas, 48 LAT. AM. POL. & 
SOC'Y 53 (2006); see also Corinne Davis Rodrigues, Property Rights, Urban Policy and the Law: 
Negotiating Neighbor Disputes in a Brazilian Shantytown, in 5 LAW AND GEOGRAPHY 259 (Jane 
Holder & Carolyn Harrison eds., 2003).  The dichotomy between the powerful and unpowerful creates 
an environment for “spoilers” to disrupt the process. See Abramson, Problem-Solving, supra note 433 
at 121 (observing that participants who are deeply upset with each other and harboring misperceptions 
and stereotypes may become more concerned with hurling threats, rather than seeking solutions); see 
generally Robert C. Bordone, Dealing with a Spoiler? Negotiate Around the Problem, NEGOT. 
NEWSLETTER HARV. PROGRAM ON NEGOT., Jan. 2010, at 4. 
 452. See BOULDING, supra note 48, at 55–58 (1990) (refers to power-over as destructive power); see 
also Jean Baker Miller, Women and Power, in WOMEN’S GROWTH IN CONNECTION: WRITINGS FROM 
THE STONE CENTER 197, 199–203 (1991); Robert S. Adler & Elliot M. Silverstein, When David Meets 
Goliath: Dealing with Power Differentials in Negotiations, 5 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 8 (2000) 
(“Most observers agree that the critical element of power is the ability to have one’s way, either by 
influencing others to do one’s bidding or by gaining their acquiescence to one’s action.”). 
 453. Hernández Crespo, Building, supra note 19, at 431. 
 454. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL 203 (Walter Kaufmann trans., Random House 
1989) (1886) (“‘Exploitation’ does not belong to a corrupt or imperfect and primitive society: it be-
longs to the essence of what lives, as a basic organic function; it is a consequence of the will to power, 
which is after all the will of life.”); see also ANDREW C. BACEVICH, THE LIMITS OF POWER: THE END 
OF AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM (2008); NICCOLÒ MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE (George Bull trans., 
Penguin Books, 1999) (1532) (“it is far better to be feared than loved if you cannot be both.”). One 
party dominates and the other must be the dominated, which creates a zero-sum game where only one 
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chotomy of winners and losers, of “I” versus “you,” in which there is little room 
for the development of the unity of “us.”455  In this scenario, the interaction be-
tween parties runs the risk of slipping into a series of power games,456 which at 
worst could lead to complete domination.  At best, both can arrive at a partially 
satisfying compromise, but without the possibility of an optimal agreement in 
which the interests of both parties are fully satisfied.457  An outstanding manifesta-
tion of the “power-over” mindset in the Latin American context is the powerful 
caudillo, who unilaterally decides the collective goals of society and the means by 
which to achieve those goals.  Since the current paradigm favors the caudillos in 
power, they are more likely to see any proposed change to the status quo as a 
threat to be resisted at all costs.458   
In contrast, a “power-with” paradigm requires participation of both parties in-
volved and an understanding of the underlying reasons behind each party’s posi-
tion.459  Only then can options be generated with a goal of fulfilling each party’s 
interests, thus maximizing joint gains.460  To do so, it is critical to have the support 
of the marginalized majority for the participatory efforts.  If power is going to be 
distributed more equally, those who are going to exercise their decision-making 
abilities should be aware of the reactions of the power holders.  In addition, rather 
than excluding the stakeholders resistant to changes, it would be necessary to look 
for ways to include them.461  It will not do to talk about participation and then shut 
out certain groups in order to impose a participatory system.462  Authentic dia-
logue must involve representatives of all stakeholders with the goal of understand-
ing the concerns, interests, needs, and values of each, and how the proposed sys-
tem can address them.463  Nonetheless, even if a participatory system is designed 
to include all stakeholders in the decision making and implementation of the pro-
posed change, some may choose to opt out.  It is still important, however, to save 
them a seat at the table to send a strong message that the option to participate re-
mains open.   
 ___________________________  
party is able to hold the power. See MORTON D. DAVIS, GAME THEORY: A NONTECHNICAL 
INTRODUCTION 14 (1997) (“The term ‘zero-sum’ . . . means the players have diametrically opposed 
interests. The term comes from parlor games like poker where there is a fixed amount of money around 
the table. If you want to win some money, others have to lose an equivalent amount.”). 
 455. Adler & Silverstein, supra note 452, at 17-19. 
 456. DAVID LAX & JAMES SEBENIUS, MANAGER AS NEGOTIATOR 30-33 (1986) (contrasting value 
creators to value claimers: value creators focus on cooperation in an effort to better both parties, 
whereas value claimers emphasize competition). 
 457. FISHER & URY, supra note 362, at 56-57; DAVIS, supra note 454 at 14. 
 458. Not only can a single powerful “hold-out” disrupt collaboration, but a coalition can also “gang 
up” or “exclude others” and have a similarly disruptive effect.  See Menkel-Meadow, Let’s Talk, supra 
note 379, at 847.  
 459. LAX & SEBENIUS, supra note 456, at 143 (describing power tactics in negotiation); FISHER & 
URY, supra note 362, at 56-80. 
 460. LAX & SEBENIUS, supra note 456, at 88-117; FISHER & URY, supra, note 362, at 56-80.  
 461. Carrie Menkel-Meadow suggests finding “linkages in issues that might bring parties to a table” 
that will give parties of unequal power “an interest in looking for solutions and trading and bargain-
ing.” Menkel-Meadow, Let’s Talk, supra note 379, at 848. 
 462. “If the goal of the oppressed is to become fully human, they will not achieve their goal by mere-
ly reversing the terms of contradiction, but by changing poles.” PAOLO FREIRE, PEDAGOGY OF THE 
OPPRESSED 56 (2000). 
 463. I suggest an implementation process similar to one carried out by the UST International ADR 
Research Network in Brazil in 2007.  For a description of the system design, goals, and process, see 
Hernández Crespo, Building, supra note 19. 
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Participatory processes also pose some risks of possible retaliation from reac-
tionary movements that pose a significant challenge in some areas of Latin Amer-
ica, where the history of disenfranchisement has produced groups such as the 
FARC in Colombia.  These groups have not only refused to participate, but have 
taken strong actions against those who have invited them to the table.464  In this 
regard, perhaps the best strategy would be to start with places less polarized by 
violent conflict, building up a strong base of support and successful implementa-
tion that can serve as a reference point for further expansion throughout the rest of 
the region, including the more volatile areas. 
In the final analysis, despite the high risks involved, the alternative to keeping 
the status quo unchallenged may be too costly since political and social instability 
drive away investors, hindering advancement toward greater social cohesion and 
economic development.  Therefore, the challenge ahead lies in how to promote 
participatory systems while minimizing the risks for citizens.  An organized civic 
society would also contribute to minimizing the risk that comes with a participa-
tory system in a region currently dominated by caudillos and insurgency.    
2. Dealing with Constraints 
Along with the aforementioned resistance factors, Costantino and Sickles 
Merchant identify a second category of obstacles: constraints, which they define 
as the “instrumental aspects of architecture, resource and systemic impedi-
ments.”465 These constraints include the challenge posed by possible lack of lead-
ership support for the new system,466 systemic complexities, corruption, and fi-
nancial considerations.    
Regarding lack of leadership, when top or middle leadership does not support 
a new system, Costantino and Sickles Merchant recommend starting with particu-
lar leaders who need it and expanding from there.467 Leadership support in Latin 
America could be found in collaboration with promoters of ADR, such as USAID 
and the World Bank, which have launched their efforts primarily in low-income 
communities, and with the Chambers of Commerce.468 Support could also be 
found through the legal community by encouraging law professors to teach ADR 
as a complement to litigation, so that the next generation of lawyers can develop 
the capacities to support upcoming ADR efforts in the region. In cases when ADR 
may be perceived as too complicated due to the high degree of coordination re-
quired,469 one solution would be to stack the design teams with representative 
stakeholders from across the organization who can provide accurate feedback and 
 ___________________________  
 464. For example, Ingrid Betancourt, was kidnapped by the FARC while attempting to bring them to 
the negotiating table.  Colombia Hostage Betancort Freed, BBC NEWS (July 3, 2008), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/americas/7486552.stm. 
 465. COSTANTINO & SICKLES MERCHANT, supra note 210, at 199. 
 466. Id. at 212. 
 467. Id. at 212-13. 
 468. See Jose Alberto Ramirez Leon, Why Further Development of ADR in Latin America Makes 
Sense: The Venezuelan Model, WORLD SERVICES GROUP, 
http://www.worldservicesgroup.com/publications.asp?action=article&artid=1294 (last visited Aug. 21, 
2011); see also USAID Supports ADR, supra note 165 (summarizing USAID efforts to promote ADR 
in Latin America, many of which involve local Chambers of Commerce). 
 469. COSTANTINO & SICKLES MERCHANT, supra note 210, at 213-14. 
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keep track of logistics and dynamics.470  While international bodies do not neces-
sarily have experience engaging a wide swath of stakeholders, a two-year national 
consensus building effort ending in 2008—comprised of Brazilian mediators and 
representatives from various sectors of society and led by the University of St. 
Thomas International ADR Research Network—showed it is possible to bring 
diverse people together for a shared goal, to reflect together and draft a realistic 
plan for the implementation of ADR in their country.471 
Systemic complexities, in some cases, present certain constraints if the sys-
tems design is not well tailored to the disputes.  For example, perhaps the entry 
points to the system are not easy to access, or some systems may speed up or in-
tensify disputes.472  In these cases, Costantino and Sickles Merchant suggest the 
best response is to carefully assess the right methods for the each case before de-
signing the system.473  As mentioned earlier, pilot projects are extremely useful in 
this regard.474 
Aside from the constraints mentioned in the framework of Costantino and 
Sickles Merchant, the additional constraints of corruption and the lack of credibil-
ity of the court system in Latin America could affect the implementation process.  
There is a long history of inefficiency, bureaucratic obstacles, and corruption in 
the court system in the region.  In fact, a 2008 Gallup Poll found only 37% of 
Latin Americans had confidence in the court system.475  In order to address this 
issue, corruption expert Luis Moreno-Ocampo has argued issues of corruption go 
beyond corrupt individuals and further argued emphasis should be placed on cre-
ating a system of controls476 that would lend greater transparency.477  In this re-
gard, engaging stakeholders in Dispute System Design could promote greater 
ownership and accountability, since performance, outcomes, and citizen satisfac-
tion can be measured through ongoing evaluation.  In this way, lower citizen satis-
faction levels and poorer outcomes can indicate aspects of the system needing 
further assistance.478  Likewise, such levels can indicate where the system is work-
ing well and can provide opportunities for rewards and developing best practices. 
 ___________________________  
 470. Id. at 214. 
 471. See Hernández Crespo, Building, supra note 19. 
 472. COSTANTINO & SICKLES MERCHANT, supra note 210, at 209. 
 473. Id. at 210. 
 474. Id. 
 475. Julie Ray, Mexico’s Citizens Ready for Improved Justice System, GALLUP, 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/104455/Mexicos-Citizens-Ready-Improved-Justice-System.aspx (last 
visited Aug. 26, 2011). 
 476. LUIS MORENO OCAMPO, EN DEFENSA PROPIA: CÓMO SALIR DE LA CORRUPCIÓN 300-314 (3d 
ed. 1993).  
 477. Id. at 315-333.  
 478. Corruption can take a variety of forms in the judicial system, from forces outside the court influ-
encing outcomes to bribery of judges and court clerks.  In the late 1980s and early 1990s in Venezuela, 
chronic backlog and a lack of control over cases left some defendants in prison for decades as they 
awaited judgment of their case.   Some government officials led an effort to introduce greater account-
ability for judges regarding the backlog and control of criminal cases in their courts.  Through periodic 
measurements, officials were able to see which local courts were struggling with chronic backlog.  
Rather than punishing these courts, they were given more resources to address the issue.  Furthermore, 
the measurements provided an incentive for courts to eliminate backlog in order to achieve judicial 
recognition among their peers.  These efforts resulted in a substantial decrease in backlog and in-
creased control over caseloads.  VENEZUELAN JUDICIAL COUNCIL REPORTS (on file with the author).  
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Finally, pertaining to financial considerations, the framework of Costantino 
and Sickles Merchant suggests that one obstacle is a real or perceived lack of the 
resources—such as personnel, time, money or material goods—needed to launch a 
system of dispute resolution.479  One recommendation they offer to address this 
obstacle is to use marketing strategies to highlight the benefits of using ADR and 
to conduct a worst-case analysis to explore the disadvantages of leaving it aside.480 
Broadening the role of existing structures like the Casas de Justicia and oficinas 
multi-puertas and enhancing the capacities of everyone involved, from conflict 
assessors to mediators, lawyers and parties, would require less investment than 
building an entirely new model. While the judiciary would need to allocate funds 
to coordinate committees of conflict assessors as well as forms of collaborative 
governance, the IFIs and foreign aid organizations have allocated significant funds 
for reforms in the region over the last decades;481  thus, if inclusion were advanced 
through a participatory model, some of the available funding could be directed to 
that end.  
V. CONCLUSION  
Historically, Latin America has fluctuated from caudillo rule, which is like 
the sound of a single dominant instrument, to riots and revolution, which would be 
like the noise produced when all the instruments are playing at the same time in 
discord.  If we are to see Latin America fulfill its potential, inclusion and partici-
pation are essential.  Maximizing the potential of the Casas de Justicia is one 
possible way in which citizens could begin unlocking their capacity for decision-
making and collaborative problem solving, moving from merely producing noise 
in the public square to participating in collectively created music through public 
dispute resolution and other forms of collaborative governance in the stages of the 
policy continuum—deliberative democracy and collaborative public management.  
We have not yet seen what Latin America can accomplish when the invisible ma-
jority of its citizens act as protagonists in crafting a new future for their countries, 
nor do we know the affect this can have in laying a foundation for a more sustain-
able rule of law.  
To establish this foundation, it is not sufficient to utilize ADR mainly as a 
means of providing access to justice for the poor. The implementation of ADR 
would have to be broadened to foster conflict resolution capacities for all citizens 
and to promote systemic inclusion and participation. If citizens have access to 
participatory experiences in private conflict resolution, as well as collaborative 
governance, they can contribute to dismantling the caudillo mentality by making 
choices that affect their lives. If private conflict resolution were consistent with 
procedural justice values, it could create the social capital necessary for rule of 
law.482 If public conflict resolution and other experiences collaborative govern-
ance were to empower, engage, and ultimately include the traditionally marginal-
 ___________________________  
 479. COSTANTINO & SICKLES MERCHANT, supra note 210, at 210. 
 480. Id. at 211-12. 
 481. See Sternlight, ADR Consistent, supra note 10, at 572-74. 
 482. Reuben, ADR and the Rule of Law, supra note 8. 
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ized, this majority would have a greater stake in the system and would therefore 
be more likely to uphold it.483  
Tapping into the potential of the multi-door courthouse model, in the form of 
Casas de Justicia, could be one of the necessary steps to unleash the potential of 
citizens, promoting systemic inclusion and participation in several ways. First, the 
expanded Casas de Justicia could offer a framework that would encompass all 
citizens, making the invisible marginalized communities and practices visible; 
integrating them into best mainstream practices.  Also, by extending the reach of 
the judicial system, the enforcement of rights could be strengthened.  Second, 
while the adapted model would remain a vehicle for delivery of integrated dispute 
resolution services, it would transform the role of multi-door screeners in the 
Casas de Justicia into conflict assessors, enabling them to identify the root causes 
of systemic issues and empowering citizens to select the most appropriate forum 
for the resolution of their disputes. This would foster self-determination, enhanced 
decision-making capacity, and, when facilitative processes are chosen, enhanced 
problem solving capacity as well.  The root cause identification, through the inclu-
sion of an organizational ombuds function, could provide the starting point for 
setting up agendas of collaborative governance efforts to address systemic issues. 
Third, Casas de Justicia are strategically located to bring members of the commu-
nity together and to address the public issues that affect them as well as to partici-
pate in the development of public policy that impacts the community. In this re-
gard, the capacities citizens develop in the context of private conflict resolution 
could eventually be applied to interactions in the public realm, making their par-
ticipation in collaborative governance more effective.  
The proposal presented above explores ideas that aim to spark dialogue about 
tapping the potential of ADR to expand it beyond access to justice, in order to 
promote inclusion and participation in the Latin American context.  To this end, I 
have proposed that local stakeholders should engage in national Dispute System 
Design efforts to channel and facilitate citizen participation in private conflict 
management and dispute resolution as well as collaborative governance in each 
particular country. A system aimed at promoting citizen participation must be 
developed and owned by the stakeholders.  This proposal is offered as material for 
the stakeholders, IFIs, and foreign aid organizations to reflect upon and to expand 
the range of possibilities at their disposal.  It is only one piece, among others, of a 
whole civic participatory framework that should include the educational system 
and international mechanisms for conflict management and dispute resolution.  
Rather than being a strictly academic proposal, the goal of this work is to open up 
the realm of possible options to address the systemic plight brought on by the 
exclusion of the disenfranchised majorities.   
When I first met Juan, he was seven years old; today, Juan may be in his thir-
ties. Yet, as an adult, his options most likely remain the same as they were back 
then, providing little opportunity for his development.  Martin Luther King once 
said, “Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere.”484  The high levels of 
exclusion and instability in Latin America pose a challenge not just to the region, 
 ___________________________  
 483. See generally Blumoff & Tyler, Procedural Justice and the Rule of Law, supra note 21. 
 484. Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from Birmingham City Jail (April 16, 1963), in A TESTAMENT OF 
HOPE: THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 289 (James M. Wash-
ington ed., HarperOne 1986). 
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but to the world.  If rule of law efforts aim to be effective and sustainable, they 
need to broaden their scope to address the prevailing caudillo mentality that pro-
duces exclusion and instability.  Unless the focus shifts to creating room for Juan 
and those like him to develop and participate, the invisible majorities of which he 
is a part will continue to resort to the familiar options of the caudillos and revolu-
tion.  The ADR field can be used to develop citizens’ capacities and to provide the 
framework that promotes inclusion and participation.  Understanding the systemic 
dimensions of the challenge is only the first step; translating it into targeted action 
comes next. It is ultimately up to the IFIs, foreign aid organizations, and local 
stakeholders to achieve the potential Latin America could have if everyone were 
allowed to participate.  
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